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ABSTRACT 
Judges as well as members of plaintiffs’ and defense bars agree: a 
class action is a superior, efficient, and inexpensive procedural tool to 
litigate disputes that present similar questions of fact and law. To be sure, 
corporations and insurers have a long history of filing successful class 
actions against each other in state courts. Yet those corporate entities 
convinced Congress to embrace an uncommon view: continuing to allow 
allegedly “hostile” and “biased” state judges and juries to hear and de-
cide everyday consumers’ “purely substantive state law class actions” is 
unfair and inefficient. Responding to the plea, Congress enacted the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). 
Reading CAFA’s purpose and findings, one discovers several ques-
tionable assumptions: (1) Out-of-state corporate defendants are more 
likely to lose consumer-initiated class actions in state courts, (2) allowing 
multinational insurers and corporations to remove consumers’ “purely 
state law class actions” to federal courts will increase efficiency between 
states’ and the federal judiciaries, and (3) federal judges are more “im-
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partial” and significantly less likely to allow extralegal factors to influ-
ence the dispositions of class actions. 
To determine whether reformers’ assumptions were sound, the author 
sampled, read, and coded 2,657 federal and state court class actions and 
ordinary decisions. This Article discusses the historical and empirical 
findings and provides evidence that refutes reformers’ assumptions about 
class action litigation in state and federal courts. Also, this Article ques-
tions the rationality of Congress’s sweeping removal reforms, which find 
no sound support in law or in fact. Moreover, this Article highlights sev-
eral unintended consequences of class action reforms, which insurers and 
corporations are likely to regret. Finally, given that CAFA’s removal 
provisions are likely to undermine traditional principles of judicial feder-
alism, this Article encourages the Supreme Court or, preferably, a more 
enlightened Congress, to address the concerns raised here as soon as the 
opportunity arises. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Opinion research consistently reveals that a wide spectrum of Ameri-
cans fervently embrace the concept of federalism—the allocation and 
separation of powers between states and the federal government.1 To be 
sure, federalism appears in a variety of flavors—constitutional,2 political,3 
economic or regulatory,4 fiscal,5 and judicial.6 Most often, numerous 
                                                 
1 Cf. Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten 
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 352 (2003) (“History clearly suggests ... [that] state 
and federal governments continue to compete for supremacy in the public’s eyes and that 
citizens have favored changes in the distribution of regulatory power when they have 
judged it to be in their best interest.”). There is more. In fact, in recent years, broad bipar-
tisan coalitions of elected officials have fashioned legislation that would make it difficult 
for Congress to enact laws and for the executive branch to issue orders that would 
preempt states’ ability to regulate a broad range of activities, including the sale and 
distribution of drugs, the environment, health-related issues, and workers’ safety. See 
Stephen Labaton, Anti-Federalism Measures Have Bipartisan Support, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
6, 1999, at A12; see also Federalism Accountability Act of 1999, S. 1214, 106th Cong.; 
Federalism Preservation Act of 1999, H.R. 2960, 106th Cong. 
2 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 439–40 (2002) (observing that “[t]here is 
no agreed-upon definition of constitutional federalism. As a structural principle, federal-
ism requires that power should be divided among layers of government. As the Constitu-
tion makes plain, the national government was designed to be one of limited powers, with 
central responsibilities retained for the states. Beyond these generalities lie deep disa-
greements about how precisely the federalism principle should be specified and imple-
mented.”); Vince Lee Farhat, Term Limits and the Tenth Amendment: The Popular Sov-
ereignty Model of Reserved Powers, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1163, 1164 n. 14 (1996) 
(defining “constitutional federalism” as “the political agenda of states’ rights, justified 
from the Tenth Amendment perspective.”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of 
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 633 (1993) (observing that in “the United States 
of America, one might assume [that] there could be no question about the legal character 
of federalism. The very name suggests the federal character of what many Americans still 
refer to as ‘the Union.’ ... It is, therefore, notable that for most of the last half-century, the 
United States has had no constitutional law of federalism.”). 
3 See Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federal-
ism,” 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 710 n.78 (1993) (defining “political federalism” as “the bal-
ance of power between the political branches of the Federal Government and the States”). 
4 See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust 
State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in 
Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1232 (1997) (“The task of a well-
articulated theory of regulatory federalism ... is to define the separate domains for federal 
antitrust rules on the one hand and state business regulations on the other.”); Thomas M. 
Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic 
Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227, 236–37, 241 (1987) (discussing how the roots of the 
state action doctrine are found in the values of economic federalism). 
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commentators and jurists devote a substantial amount of time and resources 
to discussing and questioning the Supreme Court’s decisions surrounding 
regulatory, economic, and fiscal federalism.7 But judicial federalism also 
generates a significant amount of controversy, analysis, and commentary. 
As an example, numerous legal scholars8 have criticized federal judges for 
allegedly violating the Erie doctrine.9 Still, other commentators have at-
tacked federal courts of appeals and their panels for purportedly making 
too many Erie guesses when deciding diversity-of-jurisdiction disputes.10 
                                                                                                                         
5 See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2551 
(2005) (“Fiscal relationships between federal and state governments ... operate in very 
different ways than do regulatory relationships. Most obviously, though regulatory feder-
alism primarily seeks to define and protect separate zones of authority for the two levels 
of government, much of fiscal federalism addresses more subtle problems resulting when 
both levels are involved concurrently.”). See generally WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL 
FEDERALISM 19 (1972) (defining fiscal federalism and providing a thorough analysis of 
economic federalism). 
6 See infra notes 39–47, 49–59 and accompanying text. 
7 See Super, supra note 5, at 2551–62 and accompanying notes (presenting a thorough 
outline and discussion of the ongoing debate among various constitutional scholars and 
theorists about fiscal, regulatory and economic federalism). In addition, so-called “pure 
federalists” devote a lot of time questioning whether the federal government may regulate 
all commerce or whether the Commerce Clause gives the federal government superior 
power to regulate commerce even within the various states. See Matthew Søberg Shugart, 
Constitution Day and Federalism, FRUITS & VOTES (Sept. 16, 2005), http://fruitsandvotes 
.com/?p=103 (defining “pure federalism” as “the existence of separate sovereign levels of 
authority ... that the founding fathers committed to parchment ... 218 years ago. But 
nowhere does this federal constitution require that Congress give money to the states 
without strings, or that it give money to the states at all.”). See generally Mark Tushnet, 
Federalism’s Future—Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1634–50 (1994) (providing a general discussion of pure federalism 
and its limitations). 
8 See, e.g., Laurel E. Miller, Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of Foreign 
Plaintiff Access to U.S. Courts in International Tort Actions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 
1390 (1991) (arguing that allowing a federal diversity court to dismiss a lawsuit—in 
which a state court applies its forum non conveniens law—would violate the Erie doc-
trine, “[b]ecause a forum non conveniens dismissal affects the suit’s substantive out-
come”); Carole A. Quinn and R. Scott Weide, Violation of the Erie Doctrine: Application 
of a Rule of Federal Common Law to Issues of Patent License Transferability, 32 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1121, 1141 (1999) (asserting that “those federal courts which have 
created and/or applied a ‘federal rule’ to resolve issues of patent license transferability 
have violated the Erie doctrine”). 
9 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938) (requiring federal courts 
to apply state supreme courts’ decisions when determining questions of state law). 
10 See id. at 78 (requiring federal courts to make reasonable guesses about how states’ 
supreme courts would decide certain questions of law if the latter courts have not consid-
ered or decided those questions); see also Wentwood Woodside I, LP v. GMAC Com-
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According to critics, federal appellate courts should certify11 arguably 
state law questions to state supreme courts rather than guess how state 
courts would interpret and/or apply state laws.12 
On the other hand, the allegedly “biased,” “hostile,” “discriminatory,” 
“incompetent,” “unprincipled,” and “out-of-control” state court judges 
also received a sizeable amount of criticism.13 In particular, both jurists 
and commentators have asserted that outrageous and unprincipled state 
court judges as well as plaintiffs’ lawyers are destroying the “fundamental 
principles” of judicial federalism.14 To be sure, one can readily find these 
                                                                                                                         
mercial Mortg. Corp., 419 F.3d 310, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Neither the Texas Supreme 
Court, nor indeed any of the courts of Texas, has ever considered whether a plaintiff like 
Wentwood belongs to the class that section 4012a protects. We must, therefore, make an 
Erie ‘guess’ about how the Texas Supreme Court would answer this question.”); Howe v. 
Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2000) (“To determine Louisiana law ... 
this [c]ourt should first look to final decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. If the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, then this [c]ourt must make an ‘Erie 
guess’ and ‘determine as best it can’ what the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide.”). 
11 See, e.g., Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 473 F.3d 1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 2006) (stressing 
that a federal court should certify a question to the state supreme court—to avoid engag-
ing in unnecessary speculation—when significant doubt exists about the answer to a 
material state law question). But see Anderson v. Siemens Corp., 335 F.3d 466, 470 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (citing Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) and quoting TEX R. 
APP. P. 58.1) (“It is within our discretion to certify a state law question to the relevant 
state supreme court. The Supreme Court of Texas may answer questions of law certified 
to it by a federal appellate court only if ‘the certifying court is presented with determina-
tive questions of Texas law having no controlling Supreme Court precedent.’”). 
12 See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and 
Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 220 (2003) (“[S]ince the fraudu-
lent transfer remedy is a routine feature of state law, equitable subordination might like-
wise be invoked as a matter of state law. Cases ... to the contrary should therefore be 
viewed as bad ‘Erie guesses’ as to the content of state law.” (footnotes omitted)); Dolores 
K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federal-
ism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1679–80 (1992) (admitting that “state courts have found fault 
with a [significant] number of [the Third Circuit’s and district courts’] ‘Erie Guesses.’ 
Despite our best efforts to predict the future thinking of the state supreme courts within 
our jurisdiction on the basis of all of the available data, we have guessed wrong on ques-
tions of the breadth of arbitration clauses in automobile insurance policies, ... the availa-
bility of loss of consortium damages for unmarried cohabitants, ... the ‘unreasonably 
dangerous’ standard in products liability cases ... and the applicability of the ‘discovery 
rule’ to wrongful death and survival actions .... And this list is by no means exhaustive.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
13 See infra notes 14, 21, 95, 348 and 617 and accompanying text. 
14 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1626, 1651 (2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) 
(“[T]he minute the lawyers start talking about a class action and they send a demand 
letter, the companies know they are dead if the case is brought in Madison County, IL. 
No matter how right they may be, they are dead because the judges in that particular 
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latter sentiments if one reviews the ongoing, heated debates about the 
proper venues for various class actions.15 More specifically, in recent 
years, class action reformers—primarily national and multinational corpo-
rations and insurance companies—have lobbied Congress intensely, en-
couraging that legislative body to move alleged “class actions of national 
importance” from state to federal courts.16 According to reformers, class 
actions often involve complex legal and national-interest issues.17 Thus, 
federal courts should have sole jurisdiction to hear “national class ac-
tions,” because (1) state court judges are allegedly prejudiced against out-
of-state corporate defendants, and (2) only federal courts are sufficiently 
competent to adjudicate complex class action controversies.18 
Fairly recently, embracing class action reformers’ arguments,19 Con-
gress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).20 Simply 
put, CAFA “federalizes” very large swaths of purely substantive state law 
class actions, and it allows corporate defendants to remove those so-called 
“class actions of national importance” to federal courts.21 To repeat, in 
                                                                                                                         
jurisdiction are in the pockets of the local lawyers with whom the out-of-State lawyers 
who have these class actions align themselves in order to go in there and get these outra-
geous verdicts that would not be obtained in any fair court of law.”). 
15 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, THE ROGUE COURTS OF MADISON COUNTY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF EGREGIOUS 
CASES IN THE COURTS OF MADISON COUNTY, ILL., 13–14 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM]. 
16 See NAMIC Supports President’s Commitment to Tort Reform, INS. J. (Jan. 7, 
2005), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2005/01/07/49419.htm (“‘We are 
extremely pleased to see the high priority President Bush is giving to the issue of legal 
reform,’ said National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) Federal 
Affairs Senior Vice President, David A. Winston .... On class action reform Winston 
stated, ‘This is one of our top priorities .... Due to the dramatic increase in the filing of 
class action lawsuits in the U.S. in the last decade—many of which are frivolous—our 
member companies, as well as other businesses in other industries, have been forced to 
divert their valuable resources from their businesses.’”). 
17 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, supra note 15, at 13. 
18 Cf. infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 384–97 and accompanying text. 
20 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. 
21 See Industry Basks in Class-Action Victory, NAT’L UNDERWRITER P&C (Dec. 3, 
2005), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2005/12/19/7-industry-basks-in-classaction-victory 
(“For eight long years, the insurance industry battled on Capitol Hill to put a lid on what 
they considered to be an out-of-control tort system. With Republicans firmly in control of 
both houses of Congress and the White House, they finally were able to see at least one 
of their dream bills passed. Insurers were positively giddy when President George W. 
Bush signed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 into law. After all, the law moves a 
lot more cases into the more predictable federal courts, limits ‘venue shopping’ by trial 
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some quarters, a prevailing view exists: state court judges and juries are 
hostile to out-of-state corporate and non-corporate defendants.22 Certainly, 
from the reformers’ perspective, the latter conditions are actual rather than 
imaginary perils of litigating class actions in state courts. Thus, according 
to corporate defendants and the defense bar, “national” class actions must 
be litigated in federal courts, where the litigation field is arguably more 
leveled for both out-of-state corporate defendants and in-state consumers-
plaintiffs.23 
In contrast, states’ righters acknowledge that both plaintiffs and de-
fendants will confront various risks when litigating class actions in state 
courts; however, states’ righters insist: intentionally biased and hostile 
state court judges and juries are simply imaginary rather than actual risks 
of litigating class actions in state courts.24 Furthermore, proponents of 
states’ rights argue that allowing out-of-state corporate defendants to re-
move truly substantive state law class actions to federal courts is a radical 
departure from commonly accepted notions of judicial federalism.25 And 
opponents of class action reforms insist that removing the majority of 
class actions from allegedly hostile and discriminatory state courts to fed-
eral courts severely undermines the separation of powers between federal 
and state courts.26 
Positively, class action reforms in general and the long terms effects of 
CAFA in particular are important topics. Thus, CAFA will be discussed 
necessarily and briefly at relevant points throughout this Article. But it is 
important to emphasize that CAFA is not the central focus of this Article. 
Quite simply, the literature is replete with CAFA-related articles.27 In-
                                                                                                                         
lawyers seeking friendly jurisdictions (called ‘judicial hellholes’ by the industry), and 
places limits on state class actions.”). 
22 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, supra note 15, at 11. 
23 See, e.g., id. at 10. 
24 See discussion infra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
25 See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text. 
27 A search on May 4, 2011 generated nearly two hundred CAFA-related articles. See, 
e.g., Diane B. Bratvold & Daniel J. Supalla, Standard of Proof to Establish Amount in 
Controversy when Defending Removal Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 36 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1397, 1401 (2010) (discussing a circuit split over the standard of proof 
for determining the amount in controversy in CAFA removal cases); Stephen B. Burbank, 
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1439, 1445 (2008) (presenting a pre- and post-CAFA description of the 
jurisdictional rules governing federal diversity class action litigation); Alexander 
Lemann, Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: Removing Parens Patriae Suits Under the Class 
Action Fairness Act, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 123 (2011) (examining the applicability of 
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stead, this Article presents a fairly comprehensive discussion as well as an 
empirical analysis of a persistent, poorly studied, and divisive question: 
whether allegedly biased state court judges and juries have a greater pro-
pensity to decide against out-of-state corporations and insurers who are 
defendants in state law class actions. 
Stated more succinctly, this Article addresses two major questions: (1) 
whether in-state and out-of-state litigants are significantly more or less 
likely to “win” state law class actions in state courts or in federal courts, 
and (2) whether state court judges or federal judges are significantly more 
or less likely to allow impermissible, discriminatory or extralegal factors 
influence the disposition of class actions in state and federal courts, re-
spectively. Perhaps answers to these questions will shed some light on the 
more general question: whether purportedly “incompetent and biased” 
state judges and juries are significantly more likely to resolve class actions 
differently than allegedly “more competent, unbiased, and less hostile” 
federal judges and juries. 
Thus, Part I discusses, extremely briefly, judicial federalism. Neces-
sarily, this succinct discussion will focus on the Framers of the Constitu-
tion’s intent when they adopted a federalist system that allocates power, 
establishes a division of labor, and creates checks and balances between 
state and federal judiciaries. But even more importantly, Part II highlights 
and discusses the proven risks and the imaginary perils of litigating ac-
tions generally and class actions particularly in purportedly “impartial” 
federal courts and allegedly “hostile and biased” state courts. Finally and 
inescapably, the closing discussions in Part II focus, briefly, on the follow-
ing procedural issues: (1) the scope of federal courts’ jurisdictional powers 
to hear diversity actions between parties from different states, (2) the 
scope of allegedly “unprincipled” and “prejudiced” state court judges’ 
power and expertise to hear disputes between citizens and noncitizens who 
reside within the borders of a state, and (3) the extent of both federal and 
state court judges’ legal competence to certify and adjudicate various class 
actions judiciously and efficiently. 
When Congress was debating whether class action reforms were nec-
essary, a significant split emerged among legislators. Some asserted that 
enacting CAFA would severely undermine the Framers’ intent regarding 
                                                                                                                         
the Class Action Fairness Act’s removal provisions to parens patriae suits); Adam N. 
Steinman, “Less” Is “More”? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the 
Class Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1189 
(2007) (summarizing CAFA’s jurisdictional and appellate provisions). 
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judicial federalism.28 Others maintained that class action reforms would 
restore the “proper” allocation of powers between state and federal 
courts.29 Therefore, Part III presents a short overview of CAFA’s stated 
purposes and a discussion of that act’s controversial provisions regarding 
the proper venue for litigating supposedly “class actions of national im-
portance.” 
In addition, using CAFA as a point of reference, Part III outlines the 
insurance industry and insured corporate entities’ ostensible reasons for 
using their substantial political clout and financial resources to help enact 
CAFA. As mentioned earlier, class action litigation is plagued with sub-
stantial perils, regardless of whether the actions commence in supposedly 
“unfriendly” and “prejudicial” state courts, or in professedly “impartial” 
and “highly proficient” federal courts.30 Yet, during the 2005 congression-
al debates over whether to enact class action reforms, the powerful insur-
ance industry and other class action reformers also cited many arguably 
fictitious perils, pitching them to justify allowing out-of-state, corporate 
defendants to remove purported “national class actions” from allegedly 
“biased” state courts to federal courts.31 
Why would national insurers and their insured corporate clients intro-
duce lists of arguably fictitious perils into the class action debate? Were 
the insurers truly interested in eradicating allegedly “biased” and “hostile” 
state court proceedings, or were the insurers and insured corporations 
determined to “turn 200 years of judicial federalism on its head”? Since 
the latter has been suggested, Part III also focuses more closely on insur-
ers’ critical role in helping to remove purely substantive state law class 
actions from state to federal courts. 
As discussed more fully in Part IV, corporations as well as insurance 
companies have a long history of filing class action lawsuits among them-
selves.32 Thus, even a cursory examination of case law and the legal litera-
ture demonstrates that whether a class comprises similarly situated con-
sumers, corporations, or insurance companies, class representatives and 
                                                 
28 Michael D. Y. Sukenik & Adam J. Levitt, CAFA and Federalized Ambiguity: The 
Case for Discretion in the Unpredictable Class Action, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 233, 235–
36 (2011). 
29 John Stevens, Securing “Steady, Upright and Impartial Administration of the 
Laws”—The Federalist-Based Imperative for Class Action Reform, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 361, 377 (2005). 
30 See, e.g., id. at 372. 
31 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, supra note 15, at 2, 4. 
32 See Ross E. Cheit & Jacob E. Gersen, When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empir-
ical Study of State Court Litigation, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 789, 790 (2000). 
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counsels must prepare for and confront numerous serious perils in federal 
courts.33 Also, as discussed in Part IV, some of the procedural hurdles 
include inter-circuit conflicts over the criteria for determining jurisdiction, 
conflicting interpretations of class certification rules, inter- and intra-
circuit conflicts over the proper choice of law rules under the Erie doc-
trine, Erie-guessing problems, and conflicts over whether federal district 
courts must apply state laws, the laws of a specific federal circuit, or the 
laws of a specific panel within a federal circuit.34 
Arguably, CAFA’s fairly new jurisdictional and removal rules will in-
crease rather than reduce the numbers of known procedural and substan-
tive hurdles that class action litigants presently face in federal courts. 
Therefore, Part IV presents a fairly brief discussion of some possibly unin-
tended, post-CAFA consequences that corporate plaintiffs are likely to 
encounter when they commence class actions in federal courts. Part IV 
also discusses some unexpected perils that insurance companies are likely 
to come across in a post-CAFA era as class action plaintiffs and defend-
ants in federal courts. 
Part V is the final section in this Article. It presents the results of an 
empirical study of class action cases litigated in federal and state courts 
between 1925 and 2011. These results were compiled in a database. As 
reported in Part V, the database reveals that disgruntled consumers and 
third-party victims filed class actions in both state and federal courts 
against a large assortment of national and multinational insurance compa-
nies, insured corporations, businesses, and public and private institu-
tions.35 Thus, in Part V, several important statistical findings are reported. 
For example, when comparing class action defendants and plaintiffs’ like-
lihoods of success, the results are clear: multinational insurance companies 
and other corporate defendants have a greater likelihood of “winning” 
class actions in allegedly “hostile,” “biased,” and “incompetent” state 
courts.36 But even more relevant, the study reveals: either consciously or 
unconsciously, allegedly “impartial” federal judges as well as purportedly 
“biased” state court judges permit extra-legal or irrelevant factors—like 
                                                 
33 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (citing Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) (“[F]ederal standing requires an allegation of a present or 
immediate injury in fact, where the party requesting standing has ‘alleged such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues.’”). 
34 See infra notes 459–83 and accompanying text; see also Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat 4, 5. 
35 See infra Part V. 
36 See infra Part V.C. 
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the geographic location of the deciding court and the legal statuses of class 
action complainants—to influence class action outcomes.37 
Finally, as of this writing, CAFA’s removal and jurisdictional rules 
have begun to generate serious intra-circuit and inter-circuit conflicts 
among federal courts.38 Therefore, this Article concludes by inviting the 
Supreme Court to seize the opportunity to review one or several of those 
procedural conflicts. And, in light of the empirical findings and historical 
analysis reported in this Article, the author encourages the Court to declare 
that CAFA’s removal rule is constitutionally overboard, because (1) the 
jurisdictional procedural rule evolved in whole part from a set of beliefs 
and conclusions which have no firm foundation in fact or in law; and (2) 
the “case of national importance” procedural rule interferes excessively 
and unreasonably with state court judges’ long recognized authority, com-
petence, judiciousness, and efficiency to hear and decide class actions 
involving purely substantive state law disputes. 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW: THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
“Fundamental principles of federalism” is a phrase that appears fre-
quently in reported cases,39 the Congressional Record,40 and legal litera-
                                                 
37 See infra Part V.D. 
38 See infra Part V.E. 
39 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he Qualifications Clauses are exclusive.... [I]t is well settled that the 
whole people of the United States asserted their political identity and unity of purpose 
when they created the federal system. The dissent’s course of reasoning suggesting oth-
erwise might be construed to disparage the republican character of the National Govern-
ment, and ... that course of argumentation runs counter to fundamental principles of 
federalism.”); United States v. Martinez-Cortez, 354 F.3d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 2004) (Lay, 
J., dissenting) (“The majority opinion fails to address the fundamental principles of 
federalism and deference owed by federal courts to state courts in processing their own 
criminal cases.”); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 184 (2nd Cir. 1999) (concluding 
that a lower federal court offends the most fundamental principles of federalism when 
that tribunal attempts improperly to decide a purely a question of state law); Bell v. Hill, 
190 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999) (Rymer, J., dissenting) (arguing that issuing a feder-
al writ of habeas corpus to a state court—merely on the basis of the Ninth Circuit’s case 
law—violates fundamental principles of federalism); People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 
1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975) (“[T]he California Constitution is, and always has been, a docu-
ment of independent force. Any other result would contradict not only the most funda-
mental principles of federalism but also the historic bases of state charters.”). 
40 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1796, 1821 (2005) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley) 
(“The amendment, in short, is a radical attempt to avoid the fact that in some areas Con-
gress has chosen to leave the decision of what substantive law should govern conduct to 
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ture.41 Some commentators argue that the Framers developed and inserted 
fundamental principles of federalism conspicuously in the Constitution.42 
                                                                                                                         
the legislative process of each state. By having judges dismiss the laws of all states but 
one, the Public Citizen amendment violates fundamental principles of federalism.”); 150 
CONG. REC. S8055, 8071 (daily ed. July 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Wayne Allard) 
(citing JOSHUA K. BAKER, IS DOMA ENOUGH? AN ANALYSIS, INST. FOR MARRIAGE & 
PUB. POLICY (2004) (“Many legal analysts argue that a constitutional amendment that 
creates a national definition of marriage violates fundamental principles of federalism.”)); 
146 CONG. REC. 2899, 2912 (2000) (statement of Rep. Sherwood Boehlert) (“Mr. Chair-
man, I rise in strong opposition to this bill. The detrimental effects of [the Private Proper-
ty Rights Implementation Act of 2000] are likely to be felt by virtually every citizen in 
virtually every community in this country.... [T]his bill disempowers citizens and their 
towns and cities and counties, and skews local zoning rules to give developers the upper 
hand. It removes the incentive to negotiate zoning disputes, replacing that incentive with 
the threat of federal court review.... Let us not take power away from citizens and locali-
ties. Let us not overturn the fundamental principles of federalism.”). 
41 See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Con-
straints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1361 (2006) (reporting that the 
United States ratified the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime but 
attached a reservation that preserved the nation’s “fundamental principles of federal-
ism”); Michelle Lawner, Why Federal Courts Should Be Required to Consider State 
Sovereign Immunity Sua Sponte, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1270 (1999) (asserting that 
“fundamental principles of federalism ... compel the Court to protect state sovereignty”); 
Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General 
in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2032 (2001) (rejecting the notion that 
state attorneys general violate fundamental principles of federalism and separation of 
powers when they prosecute multistate cases); Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage 
Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2688 
(2004) (arguing that the Defense of Marriage Act “abuses the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause and contravenes fundamental principles of Federalism”). 
42 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838–39 (1995) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t seems appropriate to add these few remarks to explain why 
[the dissenter’s] course of argumentation runs counter to fundamental principles of feder-
alism. Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sover-
eignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capaci-
ties, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting 
Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two 
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of 
mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. It is 
appropriate to recall these origins, which instruct us as to the nature of the two different 
governments created and confirmed by the Constitution.”); Adam Nagourney, G.O.P. 
Right Is Splintered on Schiavo Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A14 (“[Con-
gress’s vote to allow] ... federal courts to take over the Terri Schiavo case has created 
distress among some conservatives who say that lawmakers violated a cornerstone of 
conservative philosophy by intervening in the ruling of a state court.... David Davenport 
of the [conservative] Hoover Institute [stated] ...‘[Congress’s intervention] really is a 
violation of federalism.’ ... Some more moderate Republicans are also uneasy. Senator 
John W. Warner of Virginia, the sole Republican to oppose the Schiavo bill ... said: ‘This 
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Other constitutional scholars, however, disagree.43 While acknowledging 
that a core set of principles generally allocate jurisdictional powers be-
tween the states and branches of the federal government, many jurists 
stress that judicial interpretations of the Constitution,44 congressional 
statutes45 and the executive branch’s policies46 have created and shaped 
our ever evolving principles of federalism. Once more, there are several 
types and theories of federalism, and imaginative commentators are forev-
                                                                                                                         
senator has learned from many years you’ve got to separate your own emotions from the 
duty to support the Constitution of this country. These are fundamental principles of 
federalism.’”). 
43 See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
9–10 (2004) (“Both the text and historical understandings of the Constitution plainly 
contemplate balance between national and state power .... [But while the] text and history 
of the Constitution are important starting points ... they are necessarily incomplete 
guides; after all, that incompleteness is the major reason we turn to doctrinal develop-
ment.”). 
44 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Foreword: The Doc-
ument and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 26–27 (2000) (“[T]he Constitution has 
often proved more enlightened and enlightening than the case law glossing it.... The 
document, of course, must be interpreted ... [The documentarians] seek inspiration and 
discipline in the amended Constitution’s specific words and word patterns, the historical 
experiences that birthed and rebirthed the text, and the conceptual schemas and structures 
organizing the document.... [The doctrinalists do not attempt to comb] meaning from 
constitutional text, history, and structure. Instead, they typically strive to synthesize what 
the Supreme Court has said and done ... in the name of the Constitution.... Judges have 
often transformed sound and widely accepted constitutional principles into normatively 
insensitive or outlandish lines of case law.”); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 905 (1997) (concluding that a federal statute—which compelled state officers to 
execute federal laws—was unconstitutional and observing that although “no constitution-
al text [covered or addressed the] precise question, the answer ... must be sought in his-
torical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the juris-
prudence of this Court”). 
45 See Young, supra note 43, at 9 (“Congress stakes its claim to regulate certain as-
pects of life while eschewing others and ... creates mechanisms of shared state and feder-
al responsibility.”). 
46 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Associa-
tion v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 825, 827–29 (2004) (“In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the U.S. 
Supreme Court invalidated California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA), 
which required insurance companies doing business in California to disclose all policies 
they or their affiliates sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945. According to the Court, the 
state’s law unconstitutionally interfered with the foreign affairs power of the national 
government.... The Court’s conclusions in Garamendi ... come as something of a surprise, 
for ... the essence of the decision is that the President, at least in some circumstances, 
does have this preemptive power in foreign affairs.... The final outcome ... was that a 
state law fell, not because the law was in itself unconstitutional, but because the executive 
branch disagreed with it as a policy matter.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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er creating novel theories about federalism and the Framers’ intent.47 But 
those numerous theories will not be discussed here. Instead, this Part pre-
sents a very brief and necessary discussion about judicial federalism, an-
other branch of the separation of powers doctrine.48 
Briefly put, Article III of the Constitution49 created a federal judiciary, 
and it gives the Supreme Court and lower federal courts powers to resolve 
constitutional as well as federal statutory and regulatory disputes.50 In 
addition, depending on the status of the parties in a legal action, the Judi-
ciary Act of 178951 gives the federal judiciary additional powers and juris-
diction over states and their citizens.52 But state courts also have power to 
hear and resolve controversies. Therefore, one might ask: what are the 
unique parameters of judicial federalism? At the outset, it is worth men-
                                                 
47 See Adam M. Giuliano, Emergency Federalism: Calling on the States in Perilous 
Times, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 345 (2007) (discussing the Framers’ intent and 
assessing “what the Constitution says [about how] emergency federalism might apply to 
the War on Terror and homeland security”); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism 
in the Administrative State: The SEC’s Discretion to Move the Line Between the State 
and Federal Realms of Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1144 
(2007) (discussing how state regulators abrogated their duties and allowed federal regula-
tors to expand corporate governance rules and the obligations of officers and directors). 
48 See Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogue of Judicial Federalism in the United States, 46 
S.C. L. REV. 835, 842–44 (1995) (“From the earliest days of the Republic, the judicial 
inquiry has always been two-dimensional. The scope of the federal judicial power always 
is determined, first, by examining Article III of the Constitution and, second, by interpret-
ing the particular enabling act of Congress.... The constitutional principle of separation of 
powers is evident in the resolution of issues of federal court jurisdiction.... Like separa-
tion of powers, the principle of federalism is not found in so many words in the text but 
nonetheless is an essential part of the Constitution’s structure.” (footnotes omitted)). 
49 U.S. CONST. art. III. 
50 Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides for original jurisdiction in the Su-
preme Court. It reads in pertinent part: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall ... re-
ceive ... a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office. 
Id. § 1. 
51 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 § 12. 
52 The Judiciary Act of 1789 confirms the Supreme Court’s powers and states: 
[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controver-
sies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state 
and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other 
states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclu-
sive jurisdiction. 
Id. § 13. 
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tioning that judicial federalism in America is multifaceted. First, it is a 
two-pronged system that comprises federal and state judiciaries,53 and, 
within each judiciary, one finds a hierarchy of courts that have specific 
and limited jurisdictional powers.54 
Second, even though it is a dual system, judicial federalism “means 
different things in different contexts.”55 The Supreme Court’s policing the 
“boundaries of power between federal and state [courts],” limiting and 
interpreting congressional powers under various federal statutes or pre-
venting Congress from violating the constitution and its amendments all 
comprise one meaning of judicial federalism.56 Judicial federalism, how-
ever, also means ensuring the existence of a stable and “fully developed 
dual court system” that is efficient and impartial,57 instituting democratic 
procedures to select, elect, and retain judges in both judiciaries, accepting 
the principle that the Supreme Court may police state courts’ federal-law 
rulings, and, even more importantly, acknowledging that state courts are 
indeed competent to adjudicate federal questions of law.58 
To reiterate, judicial federalism includes state and federal courts’ re-
specting each other’s powers and competencies to try and award remedies 
in cases that involve both federal and state questions of law.59 But note: as 
plaintiffs or as defendants, many national insurers and their insured—
national and multinational corporations, partnerships and other medium-
to-large conglomerates—have embraced or fashioned arguably a difficult 
conundrum regarding whether state courts or federal courts are the proper 
forums to litigate state law disputes.60 On some occasions, large out-of-
                                                 
53 See William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise in 
Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?, 48 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1139, 1176 (1996) (“American federalism also finds expression in our legal 
system, with its dual set of federal and state courts.... But just as there is no fundamental 
norm to [help us to understand] federalism in general, no overarching neutral principle 
defines the contours of judicial federalism .... since.”). 
54 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13. 
55 See Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Federalism After Bush v. Gore: Some Observa-
tions, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 45, 47 (2002). 
56 Id. at 47. 
57 Robert A. Schapiro, Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norm Interjurisdictional En-
forcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2005). 
58 Solimine, supra note 55, at 47. 
59 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1141, 1142 n.1 (1988). 
60 Compare Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption 
for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 590 (1978), with U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 
15, at 13–14. 
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state and in-state insurance companies champion state courts’ right and 
power to decide controversies in which insurers and/or their corporate 
clients are defendants.61 During those moments, national and multinational 
insurers routinely cite states’ jurisdictional powers under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,62 and fight fiercely to litigate mixed-claims, state substan-
tive law and/or federal substantive law controversies in state courts.63 
On other occasions, when those same insurers and their insured corpo-
rate clients “think” or “believe” that they are victims of state courts’ alleg-
edly biased proceedings or discriminatory rulings, those corporate defend-
ants frequently fight to remove general actions and class actions from state 
to federal courts.64 Furthermore, during those episodes, corporate defend-
ants often accuse state courts of being incompetent to decide mixed feder-
al and state controversies.65 And those national and multinational insurers 
and corporations also insist that state courts are “hostile” forums because 
state court judges allegedly redefine, undermine or destroy settled princi-
ples of judicial federalism.66 Without a doubt, these and similar arguments 
were presented extremely effectively before Congress during its debate 
over CAFA, an act that allows corporate defendants to remove large per-
centages of state substantive law class actions from various state courts to 
federal courts.67 
II. ALLEGEDLY “BIASED” STATE COURT JUDGES AND “CORRUPT STATE 
COURT PROCEEDINGS” VERSUS THE REAL PERILS OF LITIGATING IN STATE 
AND FEDERAL COURTS 
Long before the Constitutional Convention adopted the United States 
Constitution in 1787 and the original states’ ratification,68 there were state 
                                                 
61 See Weller, supra note 60, at 590. 
62 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1945); see also infra notes 279–347 and accompanying 
text. 
63 See infra notes 279–347 and accompanying text. 
64 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, supra note 15, at 9. 
65 See, e.g., id. at 3. 
66 See, e.g., id. at 13–14. 
67 See generally id. (offering many, if not all, of these arguments two years prior to 
the passage of CAFA). 
68 See State v. Neufeld, 926 P.2d 1325, 1345 (Kan. 1996) (reporting that a Constitu-
tional Convention framed the United States Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787, all 
representatives of the original states except Rhode Island adopted and signed the Consti-
tution on September 17, 1787 and eleven states ratified the Constitution by August 1788). 
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courts.69 Those courts tried cases and issued an assortment of rulings un-
der state constitutions and statutes as well as under English and American 
common law.70 But even more relevant, nearly ninety years after the orig-
inal states ratified the Constitution, diverse parties litigated federal claims 
and causes of action primarily in state courts, because inferior federal 
courts did not have general jurisdiction to try such cases.71 
Under the Constitution, the judicial power of the federal government 
extends “to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under ... the Laws of the 
United States” and “to Controversies...between a State and Citizens of 
another State.”72 And, under the Judiciary Act of 1789,73 federal courts 
have jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states or 
between a citizen of a state and an alien.74 As some constitutional scholars 
have reported, neither the Constitutional Convention’s debates nor the 
                                                 
69 See Luke Bierman, From the Benches and Trenches—Three Views of State Appel-
late Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 91, 91 (2005) (noting that some state courts have a very long 
history that predates the federal judiciary); Ellen A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A 
Perspective on the Historic Role of the State Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1065, 1073 (1998) (“[Although] detailed information about the agenda of early state 
courts [is absent for various reasons] .... the early courts rendered far reaching decisions, 
especially on matters that would now be characterized as raising constitutional ques-
tions.”). 
70 See PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW 
YORK 1 (1996) (reporting that some original states adopted state constitutions between 
1776 and 1787 that later became models for the United States Constitution). 
71 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 320 (5th ed. 2003). 
72
 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
73 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 § 11 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)). 
74 Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 states: 
[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the 
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law 
or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the 
sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plain-
tiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen 
of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State. 
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11. The Judiciary Act of 1875 removed the requirement 
that one of the parties be a citizen of the forum state, and gave jurisdiction of all 
suits in which the jurisdictional amount was met and “in which there shall be a 
controversy between citizens of different States, or ... a controversy between 
citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects ....” Judiciary Act of 
1875, 18 Stat. 470 § 2. 
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First Congress’s records explain why the Constitution and the Judiciary 
Act award “diversity jurisdiction”75 to federal courts.76 
One fact, however, is unquestionable: since the nation ratified the 
Constitution and embraced federalism in its various forms, tensions be-
tween federal and state judiciaries have been very real and pronounced.77 
And, even though state courts have been highly competent to hear and 
decide federal-law causes of action for centuries,78 debates persist in the 
literature and, more recently, in Congress, over whether state courts are 
competent, dispassionate, and reliable enough to decide federal claims or 
causes.79 
Certainly litigants must confront and prepare for known procedural 
and substantive legal barriers if they expect to prevail in either state or 
                                                 
75 Although 28 U.S.C.§ 1332(a) extends federal courts’ jurisdiction to suits between 
“citizens of different states,” “diversity jurisdiction” embraces both diversity actions and 
alienage cases. 
76 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (3d ed. 2011). 
77 Cf. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662–63 (1978) (recognizing that 
duplicative litigation in as well as concomitant tension between state and federal courts 
are major concerns and “as the overlap between state claims and federal claims increased, 
this Court soon recognized that situations would often arise when it would be appropriate 
to defer to the state courts”); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that “uncertainty of the standards creates a continu-
ing source of tension between state and federal courts” and suggesting “[t]he problem is 
... that one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members 
of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so.”). 
78See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“We begin with the axiom that, un-
der our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal 
Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Under this 
system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent 
authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the 
laws of the United States.”). But see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (reaffirming 
the principle that a state court cannot “refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of 
the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of 
Congress in having called into play its lawful powers”) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
79 Compare 151 CONG. REC. 2631, 2652 (2005) (statement of Rep. William Delahunt) 
(“[W]e have before us [the Class Action Fairness] bill that would sweep aside genera-
tions of State laws that protect consumers. Citizens will be denied their basic right to use 
their own State courts to file class action lawsuits against companies.”), with id. at 2092 
(statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“Article III of [the Constitution] extends Federal 
jurisdiction to suits between ‘citizens of different States.’ The purpose of extending this 
‘diversity jurisdiction’ to citizens is to prevent the citizens of one State from being dis-
criminated against by the courts of another State. However, over the years, this purpose 
has been increasingly thwarted by clever pleading practices of enterprising class action 
attorneys.”). 
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federal courts. Thus, this realization generates no serious debate because 
predictable legal hurdles affect both in-state and out-of-state litigants.80 
There is, however, a broader concern: whether state and federal courts are 
equally competent, dispassionate, and reliable in preventing extra-legal 
“perils” from determining or influencing in-state and out-of-state litigants’ 
likelihood of prevailing or “winning” in those respective tribunals. 
Some jurists, corporate officials, and liability insurers insist that extra-
legal perils are rampant in state courts.81 Consequently, defendants in 
those cases assert that state court judges are significantly more likely to 
allow non-legal factors to adversely affect out-of-state litigants’ chances 
of winning.82 There is, of course, the counter argument: extra-legal perils 
are found in both federal and state courts, and neither state nor federal 
judges are more or less likely to allow unwarranted perils to determine in-
state and out-of-state litigants’ chances of winning. In addition, controver-
sy also surrounds another issue: whether state and federal courts are more 
or less likely to permit real and arguably imaginary perils or factors to 
determine the disposition of class actions in state and federal courts. 
Therefore, the following sections review and discuss both real and imagi-
nary perils of litigating civil actions generally and class actions particular-
ly. 
A. In-State and Out-of-State Litigants’ Actual and Imaginary Risks of 
Litigating Civil Actions in State and Federal Courts 
1. Proven and Perceived Perils in State Court Proceedings 
Early on, jurists, legislators and commentators voiced legitimate con-
cerns about the proven risks of litigating civil actions in state courts and 
about reducing state court judges’ alleged propensity to allow extralegal 
variables to influence the disposition of disputes.83 For example, during 
                                                 
80 It is fairly easy to identify an “in-state” litigant when: (1) that person resides in or is 
incorporated with a certain state, and (2) that person is either the plaintiff or defendant in 
the state court proceeding. On the other hand, when a diversity action commences in a 
federal district court, distinguishing “in-state” from “out-of-state” litigants becomes a bit 
more difficult. In this Article, a person is an “in-state” litigant if: (1) that person either 
resides or has a principle place of business in the state, and (2) that person invokes feder-
al jurisdiction in a federal district court within his state, or (3) that person is named as 
defendant in a diversity action in the federal district court. 
81 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, supra note 15, at 3. 
82 See, e.g., id. at 6. 
83 3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836). 
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debates in the First Congress, James Madison—a strong proponent of 
federal diversity jurisdiction—encouraged legislators to remember what 
was common knowledge at the time: the administration of justice in some 
state courts was unquestionably “tardy and even defective.”84 Moreover, 
state court judges were often unqualified85 and they served short terms.86 
As a consequence, the quality of justice in state courts was less than ide-
al.87 
Also, early on, state legislatures often dominated state courts.88 There-
fore, some state legislatures’ intentional interference undermined the ad-
ministration of justice in those tribunals.89 For instance, after state courts’ 
findings, rulings or judgments, state legislatures often intervened and 
“fines [were] remitted, judicially established claims disallowed, verdicts of 
juries set aside, the property of one given to another, defective titles se-
cured, marriages dissolved, [and] particular persons held in execution of 
debt released ....”90 
                                                 
84 See id. 
85 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Sligh, 1 H. & McH. 434, 437 (1772) (“It appears, from the 
notes of T. Jenings, Esq. who was counsel in this cause, and of W. Cooke, Esq. that the 
Justices [who were present could not] determine the points [of laws, and secured] ... the 
opinions of some of the gentlemen of the bar, [who were] not engaged in the cause ....”). 
86 See, e.g., PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN COLONIES 27–28 (1899) (reporting that “judges had a term of one year only.... 
Under this regime, the administration of the rules of the common law would of course be 
impossible.... [I]t was only in 1754 that a lawyer ... became chief justice. Samuel Liver-
more, chief justice in 1782, though trained in the law, refused to be bound by precedents, 
holding ‘that every tub should stand on its own bottom;’ and looking upon the adjudica-
tions of English tribunals only as illustrations.” (citation omitted)). 
87 Cf. Hinchman v. Clark, 1 N.J.L. 340 (1795) (“Where the law is in any degree am-
biguous, and will admit of two constructions, one consonant to justice and humanity, the 
other contrary to these principles, it never should be done. Judges in the worst of times 
have been ashamed to do what we are called upon to do, unless where the construction 
was forced upon them, and was unavoidable. Let us not, in this government professedly 
founded upon the rights of human nature, begin our administration of justice with the 
doctrines and maxims which sometimes dishonored the character of the nation from 
which we and our institutions have alike sprung.”). 
88 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query 13, 120–21 
(1784), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 319–20 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (documenting Jefferson’s harsh criticism of the post-revolution-
ary Virginia courts for their lack of independence and for allowing the Virginia Legisla-
ture to dominate and influence judicial proceedings and rulings.). 
89 See id. at 320. 
90 See Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. 
REV. 511, 519–20 (1925). 
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On the other hand, fear of imaginary perils in state courts generates the 
most debate and unfounded concerns about the plight of out-of-state liti-
gants in those courts.91 What are the imaginary risks of litigation in state 
courts? Historically, the belief that state courts are prejudiced, hostile, or 
biased against out-of-state citizens has been a prominent fear.92 Of course, 
the precise origin of this particular imaginary or supposed risk is un-
known.93 However, during debates in the First Congress, James Madison 
stated: 
[Regarding] disputes between citizens of different states ... it is [not] a 
matter of much importance. Perhaps [those disputes] might be left to 
the state courts.... [A] strong prejudice may arise, in some states, 
against the citizens of others, who may have claims against them.... A 
citizen of another state might not ... get justice in a state court, and ... he 
might think [he is] injured.94 
Very likely, Madison’s comments started and continue to fuel the fear 
about state courts’ imaginary prejudices against out-of-state litigants.95 
Also, to justify the removal of diversity cases to federal courts, advocates 
who championed the rights of “foreign” litigants highlighted some sup-
posed “inadequacies” that infected state court proceedings and cited non-
citizens’ allegedly increased “possibility” of facing “difficult” proceedings 
in state court. 96 
                                                 
91 See Justin D. Forlenza, CAFA and Erie: Unconstitutional Consequences?, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1065, 1070–71 (2006). 
92 See id. at 1071. 
93 See 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (3d ed. 2009) (“It is unclear what prompted 
the concern about the inadequacy of or bias in the state courts and whether it was justi-
fied.”). 
94 See 3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836). 
95 See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898) (“The object of the 
provisions [giving jurisdiction to] circuit courts ... of controversies between citizens of 
different States ... was to secure a tribunal presumed to be more impartial than a court of 
the state in which one of the litigants resides.”); Kopff v. World Research Grp., LLC, 298 
F. Supp. 2d 50, 55 (D.D.C. 2003) (embracing the belief that the Constitution and federal 
law created federal diversity jurisdiction to prevent state courts from actually discriminat-
ing against nonresident defendants); Donald R. Songer, Martha Humphries Ginn & 
Tammy A. Sarver, Do Judges Follow the Law When There Is No Fear of Reversal?, 24 
JUST. SYS. J. 137, 139 (2003) (“The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 created diversity 
jurisdiction to protect out-of-state citizens from the biases inherent in the various state 
courts.” (citing EDWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1989))). 
96 See WRIGHT, supra note 93; see also Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 
(1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[Accepting as true] that the tribunals of the states will adminis-
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But, it should be stressed that citing out-of-state litigants’ fear of “po-
tential local bias”97 in state courts as the primary justification for removing 
state substantive law disputes to federal courts has been challenged.98 For 
example, one commentator has suggested that, historically and presently, 
state courts’ alleged bias or propensity to discriminate is not necessarily 
the cause of non-citizens’ unfounded fears litigating in state courts.99 In-
stead, out-of-state litigants want to evade local substantive laws and state 
courts’ evenhanded application of those laws to citizens and non-
citizens.100 Arguably, this latter explanation has some appeal, even though 
one cannot pinpoint the exact origin of out-of-state corporations’ and citi-
zens’ unproven fears or imaginations about state courts judges’ purported 
inability to be impartial and judicious. 
2. Proven and Imaginary Perils in Federal Diversity Proceedings 
Again, the Constitution and an act of Congress created federal diversi-
ty jurisdiction ostensibly to increase the likelihood of in-state and out-of-
state litigants’ receiving equal treatment in federal courts.101 But jurists 
have questioned and even criticized that justification, asserting that diver-
sity jurisdiction only enhances the disorderly administration of justice in 
the United States.102 Do plaintiffs have unfounded concerns about the risk 
of litigating state law claims in federal courts? A reasonable review of the 
literature reveals that neither in-state nor out-of-state litigants should have 
                                                                                                                         
ter justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not 
less true that the constitution ... either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views 
with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has estab-
lished national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or 
between citizens of different states.”). 
97 See Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
98 See John Burritt McArthur, Good Intentions Gone Bad: The Special No-Deference 
Erie Rule for Louisiana State Court Decisions, 66 LA. L. REV. 313, 317–18 (2006). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Forlenza, supra note 91, at 1070–71. 
102 See, e.g., Elbert, 348 U.S. at 53–54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[O]ur holding 
[is] such a glaring perversion of the [original] purpose [for granting] diversity jurisdiction 
... that it ought not to go without comment, as further proof of the mounting mischief 
inflicted on the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance of diversity 
jurisdiction.”); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT 37 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1955) (Justice Jackson wrote: “[I]n my judgment 
the greatest contribution that Congress could make to the orderly administration of justice 
... would be to abolish the jurisdiction of the federal courts which is based solely on the 
ground that the litigants are citizens of different states.”). 
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such unfounded fears.103 On the other hand, for those who commence 
diversity actions in federal courts, the actual risks are substantial and most 
litigants are cognizant of the perils.104 For example, both in-state and out-
of-state litigants understand and appreciate that legal expenses and other 
unexpected costs can be burdensome and even staggering if litigants want 
to enter and remain in federal court until finality.105 In addition, the federal 
docket is overburdened with diversity cases, and those controversies pre-
sent numerous questions of law, which many federal judges are precluded 
from addressing intelligibly and in a timely manner because financial 
resources are inadequate.106 
But even more significantly, proven judicial bias is an outstanding and 
unwarranted peril that in-state plaintiffs and defendants must confront in 
federal courts.107 First, unlike the imaginary biases and hostilities that 
allegedly exist in state courts,108 empirical research shows consistently that 
federal judges often permit their preferences and attitudes about laws and 
procedures to influence the disposition of cases.109 More telling, federal 
                                                 
103 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 288 (3d ed. 1999). 
104 See id. (explaining cost); E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing 
Civil Cases to Federal Court Based on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 202 
(2005) (claiming federal courts can misinterpret state law). 
105 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 103, at 288–89 (asserting that the initial justi-
fication for federal diversity jurisdiction has vanished and that diversity actions are too 
costly); Percy, supra note 104, at 201 (“Given the lack of firm evidence that local preju-
dice actually exists in state courts ... and in light of the serious cost of diversity jurisdic-
tion .... diversity jurisdiction raises serious federalism concerns.”). 
106 See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Pro-
posal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 322–24 (1977) (reporting and reviewing statistics which 
confirmed that diversity actions and questions are overburdening federal courts and 
undermining the quality of justice because financial resources are expensive and limited). 
107 See generally Songer, supra note 95 at 138. 
108 See, e.g., Stone Grissom, Diversity Jurisdiction: An Open Dialogue in Dual Sover-
eignty, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 372, 385 (2001) (“Opponents of diversity jurisdiction argue 
that there no longer exists enough bias against out of state residents to justify ... [the] 
costly and burdensome doctrine.... [S]ince the decision in Erie, the federal courts have 
applied state laws consistently in diversity cases. Thus, commercial interests may no 
longer use the federal forum to find protection against biased state legislatures.”); James 
E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1925, 1942 (2004) (questioning whether state judges are biased in favor of 
citizens and noting that state court bias could become a problem that might affect the 
adjudication of disputes between in-state and out-of-state litigants). 
109 See Songer, supra note 95 at 138 (listing numerous studies of judicial bias in fed-
eral courts and reporting the empirical findings). 
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judges have admitted that their prejudices and attitudes affect the outcome 
of diversity jurisdiction cases more wittingly than unwittingly.110 
Thus, it is warranted to ask: who is more likely to benefit from federal 
judges’ bias in diversity jurisdiction cases, in which the disputes involve 
state law claims? The answer is not too complicated: out-of-state liti-
gants—national corporations and their insurers—have a higher probability 
of receiving favorable procedural and substantive outcomes in federal 
courts than in-state litigants.111 More specifically, one reputable study 
revealed that out-of-state corporations have a greater likelihood of prevail-
ing in those tribunals than in-state corporations.112 Similarly, nonlocal 
individuals’ probability of prevailing in diversity actions is statistically 
and significantly greater than in-state individuals.113 Therefore, in light of 
documented judicial bias in federal courts, another question is warranted: 
why move the bulk of states’ substantive law class action from state to 
federal courts when the risk of judicial bias is significantly more prevalent 
in the latter courts? Consider the discussion in the next section. 
B. Proven and Unproven Risks of Litigating Class Actions in Federal and 
State Courts 
1. A Brief History of Class Action 
For centuries, English law has been very clear: if a plaintiff or a de-
fendant has a material interest in a legal controversy, a complaint must list 
or identify that person as a “named party.”114 The rule was fashioned to 
ensure that a court’s judgment would bind all interested parties and was 
called a “joinder,” since all interested parties had to be joined in the 
case.115 
                                                 
110 Id. (reporting that the “admissions of a number of sitting federal judges” reinforce 
the findings of judicial bias in federal courts). 
111 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in Amer-
ican Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1142 (1996) (“Instead of faring poorly, nonlocals 
... enjoy an elevated win rate.”). 
112 Id. (“An out-of-state corporation suing a corporation either incorporated or having 
its principal place of business in the forum state has a win rate of 84.47%, whereas an in-
state corporation suing an out-of-state corporation has only a 66.66% win rate.”). 
113 Id. (“[O]ut-of-state individual plaintiffs suing in-state individual defendants have a 
win rate of 67.78%, whereas in-state individuals suing out-of-state individuals have a win 
rate of only 57.06%.”). 
114 See 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 1.09, 1–22 (3d ed. 1992). 
115 See id. (“[English] equity courts imposed a compulsory joinder rule that all parties 
materially interested—either legally or beneficially—in the subject of the suit had to be 
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But frequently, a joinder was extremely impractical and onerous for 
several reasons. Litigants often did not file meritorious cases because the 
pool of interested parties was too large; consequently, the representative 
had difficulty identifying and locating all parties.116 In addition, assuming 
all interested persons were located, they were difficult to manage because 
the class comprised such large numbers.117 Furthermore, misjoinder, or the 
practice of including persons who should have been excluded from the 
pool of interested parties, often occurred.118 Without a doubt, both indi-
vidually and collectively, mandatory joinder and misjoinder were real 
risks for litigants in England and as a consequence, they were major pro-
cedural headaches, forcing litigants to invest excessive time and generat-
ing unexpected financial costs.119 
While English courts of law and equity courts embraced the compulso-
ry joinder rule, England’s Court of Chancery decided to adopt a less bur-
densome and a more liberal method to join interested parties.120 Chancery 
                                                                                                                         
made parties so there might be a complete decree to bind all.” (citing 1 REPORT ON CLASS 
ACTIONS, ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION 5 (1982))). 
116 Cf. Joll v. Curzon, (1847) 136 Eng. Rep. 501, 503 (stressing that under the rules of 
joinder, “[t]he defendant is bound to state the names of all ... persons with whom the 
contract was made.... [T]he affidavit must give the names and residences of the several 
parties with convenient certainty ....” The court then concluded that defendant’s plea 
revealed “that some of the parties [could not] be brought into court at all” because of 
inconvenience). 
117 See Thimblethorp v. Hardesty, (1702) 87 Eng. Rep. 1133 (K.B.) 1133 (finding that 
there were too many parties, but concluding that the action should had commenced “in 
the joint names of the principal and the ancients.... [T]he debt upon the account stated 
[involves] ... many particular persons, and they all ought to join in the action ....”). 
118 See Pearce v. Watkins, (1852) 64 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch.) 1133–34 (“[I]t is a rule of 
this [c]ourt that a [p]laintiff cannot join himself with another person who has no interest. 
The rule of this [c]ourt as to misjoinder, that is to say, the joinder of parties who have 
conflicting interests, is a very strict rule.”). 
119 Cf. M’Intyre v. Miller, (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. 304, 308 n. (a) (“Pearson obtained a 
rule to [explain] why the peremptory undertaking should not be enlarged and why the 
defendant should not join in demurrer, ... [why] the plaintiff [should not have] liberty to 
sign [a] judgment for want of such joinder, and why the defendant should not pay the 
costs of the application. Bovill [explained] ... that there was no power to compel a party 
to join in demurrer, and no power in the [c]ourt to award costs, which could only be 
given when the parties put themselves upon the judgment of the Court, and judgment was 
actually given; ... [but in this case, there was] no judgment ... and no costs [were] award-
ed.” (citing Cooper v. Painter, 153 Eng. Rep. 308, 308)). 
120 William Weiner & Delphine Szyndrowski, The Class Action, from the English Bill 
of Peace to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: Is There a Common Thread?, 8 
WHITTIER L. REV. 935, 936–38 (1987). 
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allowed litigants to file a bill of peace.121 Designed “to prevent a multi-
plicity of suits,” the bill of peace covered all interested parties and sub-
jected every litigant to the same rulings, outcomes, judgments, or damag-
es.122 
There were two types of bills—pre- and post-trial bills of peace.123 Be-
fore commencing a lawsuit, a representative of a group could file a pre-
trial bill of peace and ask the court to join all interested persons if there 
were simply too many persons to locate in a timely manner or to identify 
precisely.124 However, once one’s cause of action had been tried in a court 
of law and the court had entered its judgment, the successful party could 
file a post-trial bill of peace.125 A court would grant the latter “to prevent 
further and useless litigation.”126 
Of course, a representative could commence or defend against an ac-
tion on behalf of other interested persons and himself.127 But the bill of 
peace petitioner had to prove three elements.128 He had to establish that: 
(1) multiple lawsuits had been filed repeatedly against the representative, 
(2) several persons had threatened to bring separate suits against the indi-
vidual, and (3) multiple lawsuits had been filed in the same court.129 In 
addition, the representative had to establish that all group members had a 
material interest in the issues and the lawsuits.130 If the petitioner satisfied 
                                                 
121 See How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, (1681) 23 Eng. Rep. 277, 277 (Two substan-
tive questions appear in this case: (1) whether the Lord of Bromsgrove Manor “had a 
grant of free warren”; and if so, (2) “whether there were sufficient common left for the 
tenants.” The Lord Chancellor declared that, “these matters were properly triable at 
common law; and he did not see, what jurisdiction the chancery had of this cause.” But 
plaintiffs argued: “[T]he bill was ... a bill of peace.” The court declared that bills of peace 
are proper in equity.). 
122 Disney v. Robertson, (1719) 145 Eng. Rep. 588, 588 (“[A] bill of peace ... binds 
all parties ... [and is] retained to prevent a multiplicity of suits.”). 
123 See Corp. of London v. Attorney-Gen., (1848) 9 Eng. Rep. 829, 838. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See generally Lord Stawell v. Atkins, (1795) 145 Eng. Rep. 967. 
128 Id. at 968. 
129 See id. (“[A] suit is in the nature of a bill of peace, which can be brought only [un-
der three conditions]: 1st, Where [a] party is harassed by repeated suits. 2dly, Where 
several persons claiming under a general right threaten to bring separate suits, as in 
parochial or manerial rights dispute(s). 3dly, Where a bill for tithes has been instituted in 
the same court.”). 
130 See Gage v. Lister, (1705) 22 Eng. Rep. 147, 147 (“[Where several persons have 
one and the same rights and each person wants to secure remedies for their disturbed 
several rights, the persons may apply for a bill of peace]...to prevent [e]xpence, and [a] 
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those elements, the court granted a bill of peace.131 Again, that judgment 
applied to all interested members in the group.132 
In the United States, the class action evolved out of England’s bill of 
peace. In the mid-1800s several states adopted the practice of allowing a 
representative to file a lawsuit on behalf of numerous interested per-
sons,133 and the states codified that principle in their respective Field 
Codes.134 The first class action rule per se was Rule 38 of the Federal 
Equity Rules.135 It was adopted in 1913 and was the predecessor to the 
current Federal Rule 23(a), which states: 
                                                                                                                         
[m]ultiplicity of [s]uits [the court] ... will establish the [r]ight of all [p]arties concerned 
....”) (emphasis omitted). 
131 See Atkins, 145 Eng. Rep. at 968. 
132 See Gage, 22 Eng. Rep. at 147. 
133 See 3 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, 
§ 13.04, 13–14 n.24 (3d ed. 1992) (The Field Code of 1849 states in part: “[When a 
question concerns] a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are 
very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or 
more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.”). 
134 See Haxton v. Haxton, 705 P.2d 721, 726 (Or. 1985) (“[Field Codes were simply] 
a comprehensive codification of [states’] laws .... [The] codes were the product of a 
commission directed by David Dudley Field between ... 1846 and 1865 .... [The commis-
sion was] formed to codify the law of New York. The codes are a restatement and refor-
mation of then existing statutory and common law.... [The Field Codes were successful 
and] they served as a model for many codification attempts elsewhere in the country, 
including one of the first Oregon codes in 1853. The Field Codes were organized into 
five separate codes: Code of Civil Procedure, Code of Criminal Procedure, Political 
Code, Penal Code and Civil Code.”). 
135 Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912) provided: “When the question is one of common or 
general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracti-
cable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.” 
JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES (8th ed. 1933); see also Shaw v. Toshiba 
Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 950 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (“The English equity rule 
permitting exceptions to compulsory joinder was adopted in United States jurisprudence 
and was codified in the Federal Equity Rule 48 (1842), the New York Field Code of 
1848, as amended in 1849, and Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912, the successor to earlier 
Equity Rule 48 (1842)). The United States Supreme Court officially abandoned old 
Equity Rule 48 in 1912 and adopted Equity Rule 38. Federal Equity Rule 38 ‘allowed 
representative suits where the parties were too numerous for joinder. In contrast with the 
prior rule [Federal Equity Rule 48], absent parties could be bound by subsequent judg-
ments pursuant to this provision.’” (citations omitted)). 
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One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of 
law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the repre-
sentative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class.136 
Originally, Rule 23 prohibited any class action decisions or judgments 
from binding absent class members, if a representative had not secured 
those persons’ express consent and the class action sought various damag-
es.137 Of course, the reason for securing members’ consent is not difficult 
to comprehend, as it evolved from a fundamental legal principle: an in 
personam138 judgment does not bind a person, if that person has not re-
ceived service of process and is not party in a legal action.139 However, in 
1966, an amendment expanded the reach of class actions under Federal 
Rule 23.140 
Most remarkably, under a new Rule 23(b)(3),141 a “common-question 
damages” judgment in a class action could bind absent class members 
                                                 
136 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
137 See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.03 (3d ed. 
1997) (reporting that original rule limited the binding effect of a damages ruling to class 
members who affirmatively embraced an “opt-in” requirement or who directly participat-
ed in the class action). 
138 See Brooks v. United States, 833 F.2d 1136, 1143 (4th Cir. 1987) (“A proceeding 
in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the 
person and based on jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the 
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose 
of it in accordance with the mandate of the court.” (citing 1 AM. JUR. 2D, ACTIONS, § 39, 
at 573 (1962))). 
139 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general applica-
tion in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam 
in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a 
party by service of process.” (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877))). 
140 See Notes of Rules Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 
F.R.D. 69, 104–05 (1966). 
141 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) states, in relevant part: 
 
2012] ALLEGEDLY “BIASED,” “INTIMIDATING” 449 
 
even without those persons’ affirmative consent.142 To ensure that Rule 
23(b)(3) did not violate absent members’ due-process rights, the Rules 
Advisory Committee added some procedural safeguards.143 Under a newly 
fashioned Rule 23(c)(2)(B),144 the committee inserted two important 
clauses: (1) a mandatory notice clause that requires class action repre-
sentatives to give sufficient and timely notices to absent members, and (2) 
an opt-out provision that gives absent class members an opportunity to 
exclude themselves from classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3).145 
                                                                                                                         
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23 (a) is satisfied and if: ... 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods 
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters per-
tinent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interests in in-
dividually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy 
already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or un-
desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 
forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
142 See Notes of Rules Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 
F.R.D. at 105; see also Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41 (1940) (The court recognized and 
embraced the exception to the general rule, “that, to an extent not precisely defined by 
judicial opinion, the judgment in a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ suit, to which some mem-
bers of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those represented who 
were not made parties to it.”). 
143 Lawrence J. Restieri, Jr., The Class Action Dilemma: The Certification of Classes 
Seeking Equitable Relief and Monetary Damages After Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. 
Brown, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1760 (1995). 
144 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) states, in relevant part: 
For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to 
class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstanc-
es, including individual notice to all members who can be identified 
through reasonable effort. The notice must clearly and concisely state 
in plain, easily understood language: ... (v) that the court will exclude 
from the class any member who requests exclusion;(vi) the time and 
manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class 
judgment on [class] members under Rule 23(c)(3). 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
145 See Notes of Rules Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 
F.R.D. at 107 (1966) (A review of the Committee’s Notes reveals that the mandatory 
notice and opt-out provisions were necessary “to fulfill requirements of due process to 
which the class action procedure is of course subject.” (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315–17 (1950); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 
(1940))). 
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Although constitutional scholars raised their misgivings about the le-
gality of those two controversial provisions,146 the Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes.147 As of this writ-
ing, the Field Codes and the original and amended Federal Rule 23 com-
prise the summation of present-day class action rules.148 Also, barring 
Mississippi, every state has embraced some class action procedure.149 Like 
England’s bill of peace, federal and state class action rules and procedures 
are designed to reduce multiple lawsuits, spread litigation costs, enhance 
judicial efficiency, ensure that similarly situated persons secure access to 
courts, ensure that all class members receive damages, and reduce the 
costs of litigation.150 
                                                 
146 See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil 
Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 44 (1967) (concluding that the sweep of Rule 23(b)(3) is “among 
the more debatable of the innovations in the amended Rule,” and comparing the opt-out 
procedure to the Book-of-the-Month Club); Marvin E. Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a 
Judge’s Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 300 (1966) (indicating his preference for 
an affirmative opt-in procedure, so that silence would not constitute consent to inclusion); 
Charles A. Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal and Appellate Proce-
dure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 338 (1964) (“In the situation which [Rule 23](b)(3) covers, there is 
a strong feeling that the person who wants to go it alone, and to bring his individual 
action with his own lawyer, should be permitted to do so.... Even with this protection [of 
the right to opt-out], [Rule 23](b)(3) is a novel and controversial proposal ....”). 
147 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810–12 & n.3 (1985) (conclud-
ing that Rule 23(b)(3)’s notice and opt-out requirements are indispensable requirements 
of due process rather than merely procedural niceties). 
148 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-44, at 9 (2003). 
149 See USF&G Ins. Co. of Miss. v. Walls, 911 So. 2d 463, 468 (Miss. 2005) (stress-
ing that the Mississippi Supreme Court “has the exclusive power to make rules of prac-
tice, procedure, and .... [that] class actions[ rules] are not a part of Mississippi practice—
chancery, circuit, or otherwise.”); LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTIONS: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Matthew G. Ball & Todd L. Nunn eds., CCH 2000 with 
annual updates); Richard T. Phillips, Class Actions & Joinder in Mississippi, 71 MISS. 
L.J. 447, 453 n.14 (2001) (suggesting that New Hampshire and Virginia do not have class 
action rules, but recognize “‘equitable class actions’ ... in consumer litigation”). But see 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-A (2011) (covering “class actions”); Prive v. N. H.-Vt. 
Health Servs. No. 98-E-20, 1998 WL 375294, at *1 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 1, 1998) (ob-
serving that Rule 27-A, and FED. R. CIV. P. 23’s provisions are comparable); Kuznicki v. 
Mason, 639 S.E.2d 308, 311 (Va. 2007) (reaffirming that Virginia’s Code § 55-79.53 
allows a class action and relief if condominiums, time-sharing units, or property-
association matters produce the legal disputes); King v. Va. Birth-Related Neurological 
Injury Comp. Program, No. HA-726-4, 1990 WL 751353, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 9, 
1990) (reaffirming that class actions are not generally allowed in Virginia and allowing 
the twenty-nine individual physicians to sue defendant only on behalf of themselves 
individually). 
150 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not 
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of 
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There is one final observation. Federal and state court class action 
practices, procedures, and resolutions are not remarkably different.151 But 
a variety of persons—insurers, insured corporate officers and directors, 
laypersons, and even commentators who are not practitioners—have pre-
sented several arguably outlandish misconceptions about the risks that 
class action litigants confront or are likely to confront in state and federal 
courts.152 Consequently, in light of those misconceptions, gross imagina-
tions have evolved. In fact, an extremely wide gulf has evolved between 
what corporate defendants believe and the actual risks of litigating class 
actions in state and federal courts. 
2. Proven Class Action Perils in Federal Courts 
All federal lawsuits have unavoidably inherent risks, which can de-
crease plaintiffs or defendants’ likelihoods of winning procedurally or on 
the merits. And whether plaintiffs and defendants are in-state or out-of-
state litigants, their respective legal counsels should understand, appreci-
ate, and prepare for those known risks. Similarly, defense counsels as well 
as the counsels for the class understand that the class representative must 
overcome several known procedural obstacles. 
For example, under federal law, a class representative must prove that 
she has standing to commence a class action.153 This means that the “liti-
gant must normally assert [and prove] his own legal interests rather than 
those of third parties.”154 Furthermore, the class representative must estab-
lish that a causal connection exists between her alleged injury and the 
                                                                                                                         
small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective 
redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”); In re American Reserve, 840 
F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing that a class action is a method to enforce rights 
or deter the abridgment of rights which might not otherwise exist for individuals with 
small claims). 
151 See THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, AN EMPIRICAL 
EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS’ CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 54 
(Federal Judicial Center, 2005) (After examining state and federal courts’ class certifica-
tion rulings, motions, and other issues, the authors discovered that class action rulings 
and the disposition of cases did not differ greatly between state and federal courts.). 
152 See infra notes 244, 249–54, 386–90 and accompanying text. 
153 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (“[F]ederal stand-
ing requires an allegation of a present or immediate injury in fact, where the party re-
questing standing has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as 
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues.’” (citing 
Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 
(1962))). 
154 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 804. 
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defendant’s conduct, and that a favorable court ruling will undo or correct 
the harm.155 Without doubt, whether a class representative can overcome 
those barriers or perils is far from certain. 
Second, a class representative must secure a class certification before 
proceeding to a trial on the merits.156 And, as stated earlier, Rule 23(a) 
outlines multiple elements that a class representative must satisfy before a 
court will grant a motion for class certification.157 Again, the class repre-
sentative must prove that: (1) joining all similarly situated parties is im-
practicable because the number is extremely large—numerosity, (2) class 
members present common questions of law or fact—commonality, (3) 
class members present similar claims or causes—typicality, and (4) the 
representative “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class”—adequate representation.158 
In addition, a class representative must overcome another barrier. She 
must persuade the court that a class action will not present manageability 
problems.159 Stated another way, the representative must establish that 
choice of law problems,160 the likelihood of timely and costly Erie guess-
es,161 and insufficient means to notify numerous class members162 will not 
                                                 
155 Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church 
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)); see also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 67 F.Supp.2d 
1140, 1141, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (denying a putative class of Burmese citizens’ motion 
for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) in an ATS case. The court concluded that the 
plaintiffs—who alleged that Unocal had subjected them to forced labor, forced reloca-
tion, and various forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in connection with the 
pipeline construction project—did not have standing to seek injunctive relief. The court 
declared that an injunction against the corporation probably would not redress their 
alleged injuries since “the cessation of [the] alleged illegal acts would depend on the 
independent actions of companies and governmental entities who [were] not parties to 
[the] lawsuit.”). 
156 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). 
157 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
158 See Windsor, 521 U.S. at 613. 
159 Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 183 F.R.D. 627, 679 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
160 See In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D. 539, 551 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (refusing to certify a 
class because the risk of confusing the jury—“when taken together with the risk of im-
properly grouping different states’ laws”—would outweigh “any possible advantages to 
be gained from certification.”). 
161 See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 
1992) (“[I]t is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can, what the highest 
court of the state would decide.” (citing Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch, 
387 U.S. 456 (1967); West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Commonwealth 
Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 521 F. Supp. 812 (M.D. La.), aff’d, 669 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1981))); 
see also New Orleans Assets, LLC v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 372, 376, 377 n.10 (5th Cir. 
2004) (acknowledging that the Louisiana Supreme Court had not addressed the disputed 
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undermine the representative’s ability to manage the class action compe-
tently.163 Essentially, the class representative must convince the federal 
district court that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudica-
tion.164 
Without doubt, a federal district judge’s requiring a representative to 
meet these minimum requirements before certifying a class presents 
daunting and very real challenges. However, for emphasis, the obvious 
must be stated: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate repre-
sentations are perils that complaining parties must overcome.165 And more 
often than not, class action complainants are not medium-to-large corpora-
tions, employers, insurers, or national and international corporate officials. 
Instead, consumers of various products and services are significantly more 
likely to be complainants in class actions.166 But even more importantly, 
federal courts are appreciably more likely to deny than grant those con-
sumers’ motions for class certification.167 
Of course, class members also face other established as well as unex-
pected risks, which can reduce complainants’ likelihood of prevailing in 
federal court. Consider, for example, the plight of the class representative 
                                                                                                                         
question in this case, the Fifth Circuit refused to certify the case to the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana, preferring instead “[to] make an Erie guess.”). 
162 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We first ad-
dress the district court’s superiority analysis. The court acknowledged the extensive 
manageability problems with this class. Such problems include [the difficulty of giving] 
... notice to millions of class members ....”). 
163 See In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 209–10 (concluding that, in light of 
various theories or recovery under various state laws, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 
that a class action would be manageable. “Where plaintiffs ... failed to [present] clearly 
defined classes [to the court given] on the variations in state law, the superiority require-
ment has not been met.” (citing In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 203, 
219 (S.D. Ohio 1996))). 
164 See id. at 204. 
165 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
166 See generally infra Table 3 and accompanying discussion in Part VI. 
167 See, e.g., Nicholas M. Pace, Stephen J. Carroll, Ingo Vogelsang & Laura Zakaras, 
Insurance Class Actions in the United States, 2007 INST. FOR CIV. JUST. 21–22, available 
at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG587-1.sum.pdf (reporting the 
results of 564 “attempted class actions” against insurers and finding that “[o]nly 14 
percent of the cases in [the] data set [became] certified classes. The judges denied certifi-
cation in 11 percent of the cases, and the remainder—about 75 percent of the total—
never had a decision either way.... For all attempted class actions .... [t]he judge ruled in 
favor of the defendant on some sort of dispositive pretrial motion in 37 percent of the 
cases.”). 
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in Latona v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co.168 Pietra Latona commenced a class 
action against Carson Pirie Scott & Company, citing numerous violations 
under various federal and state truth-in-lending and consumers’ protection 
statutes.169 After identifying herself and another disgruntled consumer—
Priscilla Staniec—as the class representatives, Latona filed a motion for 
class certification.170 
The federal district court denied the class certification motion, citing 
three unexpected risks that would have prevented the class from receiving 
fair and adequate representation.171 First, the court found that the proposed 
class’s attorney was married to Latona’s niece.172 Therefore, in light of the 
alleged nepotism and related concerns that the Seventh Circuit has high-
lighted,173 the federal district judge concluded that Latona could not repre-
sent the class’s interests competently and fairly.174 Additionally, the court 
noted that the second class representative—Staniec—was both psycholog-
ically and physically impaired.175 More specifically, during a two-year 
period, “she was nonfunctional and confined to bed rest.”176 Therefore, 
citing those personal problems and embracing the Sixth Circuit’s concerns 
about class representatives’ unsuitability generally and their medical prob-
lems in particular,177 the Latona federal district court concluded that 
Staniec could not adequately represent the class members’ interests.178 
Certainly, one’s attempt to certify a class action for trial presents mul-
tiple difficulties for named plaintiffs or class representatives. But there is 
                                                 
168 Latona v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., No. 96 C 2119, 1997 WL 109979, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 7, 1997). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at *2. 
172 Id. at *1. 
173 See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 91 (7th Cir. 1977) (“Since possi-
ble recovery of the class representative is far exceeded by potential attorneys’ fees, courts 
fear that a class representative who is closely associated with the class attorney would 
allow settlement on terms less favorable to the interests of the absent class members.”). 
174 Latona, 1997 WL 109979, at *2. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. (“Ms. Staniec has a benign brain tumor and a spinal condition, but she also be-
lieved that some of her periods of incapacitation could have resulted from just emotional 
distress.”). 
177 See In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1083 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that 
plaintiff’s suitability as a class representative was very questionable because of plaintiff’s 
psychological problems); see also In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 
203 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (finding that plaintiff’s health problems prevented plaintiff from 
representing the class). 
178 Latona, 1997 WL 109979, at *2. 
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more: a motion to certify a settlement-only class action presents unique 
impediments179 for class members who question the merits of a proposed 
settlement.180 To illustrate, consider the plight of the disgruntled class 
members who challenged the class action settlements in Mars Steel v. 
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust.181 
The class representative—William J. Tunney—retained the law firm 
of Joyce and Kubasiak to file a class action against Continental Illinois 
National Bank and Trust Company (Continental).182 The action proceeded 
on behalf of persons who had borrowed money from Continental using an 
interest rate that was congruent with the bank’s prime rate (Tunney ac-
tion).183 The complaint alleged that Continental committed fraud and 
breached various contracts over a ten-year period by failing to charge an 
interest rate that was pegged to the “prime rate.”184 A state court judge 
certified the Tunney action as a nationwide class action.185 Three years 
after filing the Tunney action, the class representative—along with the 
class’s legal counsels—offered to settle the action. Continental rejected 
the offer.186 
However, two years after the state court certified the Tunney action, 
Mars Steel Corporation filed a class action against Continental in a federal 
court (Mars action).187 Jerome Torshen—the class representative—filed 
the lawsuit on behalf of aggrieved consumers like those in the Tunney 
suit.188 But unlike the multiple allegations in the earlier suit, the Mars 
complaint only alleged that Continental violated the federal Civil Racket-
                                                 
179 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–20 (1997) (declaring that 
a class representative must also satisfy Federal Rule 23(a) and (b) after petitioning a 
district to certify a class action for settlement, but stressing that the court “need not in-
quire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems.”) (cita-
tion omitted). 
180 Id. at 619. 
181 Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 834 F.2d 677 (7th 
Cir. 1987). 
182 Id. at 678. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 678–79. 
185 Id. at 679 (appointing “Joyce and Kubasiak to represent the class.”). 
186 Id. (Under Joyce and Kubasiak’s settlement offer, “Continental would ... not ... op-
pose a request for an attorney’s fee of ... $1.25 million ... and the class members would 
[have] an opportunity to [secure] new loans from Continental at below-market rates. 
Continental refused the offer ....”). 
187 Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 679. 
188 Id. 
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eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act189 during a ten-year inter-
val.190 
Although Rule 23 does not have a “tentative certification” provi-
sion,191 the federal district judge preliminarily approved the Mars settle-
ment—without holding an evidentiary hearing—and simultaneously “[cer-
tified] the suit as a class action for settlement purposes only.”192 Shortly 
thereafter, Continental accepted Torshen’s offer and settled the Mars class 
action.193 Two class members, however, criticized and refused to embrace 
the settlement.194 They were William Tunney and another class member 
who decided to opt out of the Mars settlement in order to preserve the 
state court class action.195 
Ultimately, the district court conducted a “fairness” hearing and ap-
proved the settlement after concluding that the agreement was fair.196 Of 
course, under the doctrine of res judicata, the court’s conclusion effective-
ly extinguished the claims of all class members who did not opt out of the 
settlement class action.197 In his appeal before the Seventh Circuit, Tunney 
asserted that: (1) the judge erroneously certified a preliminary class action 
for settlement purposes before certifying a class action for trial in the Mars 
suit, (2) the settlement class action was fundamentally unfair because the 
class notice was inaccurate and misleading, and (3) class members who 
opposed the settlement did not have an opportunity to prove—either be-
fore or during the fairness hearing—that the class action settlement was 
unfair.198 
                                                 
189 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006). 
190 Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 679. 
191 See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 177 (5th Cir. 1979) (con-
cluding that “Rule 23 does not deal specifically with a tentative settlement class”). But 
see Comment, Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1557 
n.111 (1976) (suggesting that Rule 23(c)(1) sanctions allow a tentative class action—“a 
form of conditional certification”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) and note to 
Subdivision (c)(1) suggests that some forms of conditional certification may be appropri-
ate. It reads in relevant part: “An order embodying a [class action] determination can be 
conditional ... [and] can be altered or amended before the decision on the merits if, upon 
fuller development of the facts, the original determination appears unsound.” FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(c)(1). 
192 Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680. 
193 Id. at 679. 
194 Id. at 680. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680. 
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First, the Seventh Circuit readily acknowledged that it is common for a 
district court to defer a class certification for trial while there are ongoing 
settlement negotiations.199 Second, the court of appeals conceded that a 
district judge’s deferring a class certification during ongoing settlement 
negotiations clashes with pertinent language in Rule 23(c)(1).200 But even 
more importantly, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a court’s defer-
ring a class certification—because of contemporaneous settlement nego-
tiations—creates numerous practical problems for class members.201 
What are those additional judge-made perils that class members must 
anticipate and confront? Settlement negotiations become significantly 
more complicated (1) when litigants do not know whether they are at-
tempting to settle a class action or just an action that only addresses the 
named plaintiffs’ interests, (2) when class members do not trust the named 
plaintiffs—fearing that the latter will not adequately represent all mem-
bers’ interests if a trial on the merits occurs,202 and (3) when the class 
members are ignorant about the composition and size of the class.203 
Moreover, a federal district judge’s waiting until a few interested par-
ties certify and negotiate a class action settlement produces several other 
adverse consequences and risks for class members. Some noted problems 
are (1) premature and even collusive settlements, (2) an extremely low 
probability of a district court certifying a class action for trial, and (3) 
class members’ greater inability to opt out of a class action settlement 
when they do not receive a prompt notice.204 
                                                 
199 Id. 
200 Id. The named plaintiffs in the Mars suit filed their complaint in 1985, but the dis-
trict judge did not certify it as a class action until 1986. Moreover the judge certified the 
suit only for purposes of settlement. And to repeat an earlier observation, the district 
judge approved the Mars settlement preliminarily before notifying the members of the 
class. Id. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) states: “At an early practi-
cable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must deter-
mine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
201 Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680. 
202 See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 532–33 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(recognizing that class members must anticipate and confront the risks of interclass 
conflicts and dueling class action before commencing a lawsuit and noting that “some 
courts have created subclasses of class action plaintiffs where there are conflicts of inter-
est among class members” (citing Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir. 1974)) 
(noting that subclasses are generally utilized to eliminate antagonistic interests within a 
class)); Am. Fin. Sys. Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94, 109 (D. Md. 1974) (encouraging 
combination of subclasses into one class where interests of class are not antagonistic). 
203 Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680. 
204 See id. at 680–81. 
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Certainly, class action members and their representatives must conquer 
certification hurdles and overcome many additional procedural and sub-
stantive barriers if they expect to prevail. But in truth, class action defense 
lawyers are the ones who generate those perils by raising and crafting a 
variety of general or affirmative defenses.205 For example, in a class ac-
tion, defense counsels must prepare for and overcome known risks. Two 
of the most obvious risks are: (1) federal district courts prevent class ac-
tion defendants from raising an assortment of procedural and substantive 
defenses, thereby forcing defendants to settle a class action prematurely or 
begrudgingly; or (2) district courts allow defendants to advance certain 
defenses in a trial where a jury rejects them, thereby still causing a prema-
ture or a more expensive class action settlement.206 
Finally, abuse of judicial discretion is arguably the most egregious risk 
that defendants will face when defending against class actions. For exam-
ple, abuse of discretion can occur when a federal district court rests its 
decision “upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of 
law or an improper application of law to fact.”207 To prove that federal 
district judges abuse their authority, class action defendants often cite 
“questionable” or “unwarranted” class certifications.208 In fact, some de-
fendants have charged and appellate courts have found that: (1) district 
courts embraced class action plaintiffs’ flimsy evidence and used that 
questionable evidence to certify a class,209 (2) district judges certified class 
actions even when plaintiffs’ claims were too individualized to satisfy 
Rule 23(a)’s commonality and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance require-
ments,210 and (3) district courts certified class actions without making 
proper findings of fact and without applying controlling legal principles.211 
                                                 
205 See infra note 206. 
206 See generally THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, ATTORNEY 
REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE 
FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RULES REGARDING A CASE-BASED SURVEY OF ATTORNEYS 30–43 (Washington, 
DC: Federal Judicial Center, 2004) (reporting class action defense attorneys’ perceptions 
about state and federal courts’ procedural and substantive rulings and the relationships 
between those rulings and attorneys’ various choices—whether to settle, remove, or 
litigate the class actions). 
207 In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (quoting Int’l Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 
1987)). 
208 See infra note 209–11. 
209 See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 
263–63 (5th Cir. 2007). 
210 See In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136,145–48 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 
Cole v. General Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 730 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiffs have failed 
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3. Proven Perils of Litigating Class Actions in State Courts 
Persons who litigate class actions in state courts often must contend 
with established risks, like those that class action litigants face in federal 
courts.212 The reason is found in an earlier observation: federal and state 
courts’ class action practices and procedural rules are very similar.213 In 
fact, many states have completely adopted the federal class certification 
requirements and procedures.214 Therefore, like their counterparts in fed-
eral courts, class representatives frequently have difficulty securing class 
certification in state courts.215 
Among other explanations, state courts are less likely to certify classes 
because class representatives do not establish that: (1) the class representa-
tives and attorneys are competent to represent all class members’ inter-
                                                                                                                         
to adequately address, much less ‘extensively analyze,’ the variations in state law ... and 
the obstacles they present to predominance. The district court was not in a position to 
determine that ‘questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predomi-
nate’ in the vacuum created by plaintiffs’ omission. Given these significant variations in 
state law and the multiple individualized legal and factual questions they present, we 
conclude that plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden in establishing predominance and 
that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class action.” (citing Spence v. 
Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2000); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 
742–43 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1996))). 
211 See, e.g., Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs. Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“The district court conditionally granted class certification against the plan’s claims 
administrator, Healthplan Services Inc., as successor in interest to Third Party Claims 
Management, Inc. (collectively, “TPCM”) and against individual and corporate insurance 
agents who marketed and sold the plan. The court properly applied controlling legal 
principles and made well-supported factual findings supporting its decision to certify a 
class action against TPCM; thus, we see no abuse of discretion in that decision. However, 
because the court rested its class certification against the individual agents on findings 
grounded in a misapprehension of governing law, we must conclude that the court did 
abuse its discretion in certifying those separate class actions.”). 
212 See cases cited infra note 214. 
213 Id. 
214 See, e.g., Campbell v. New Milford Bd. of Ed., 423 A.2d 900, 903 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1980) (“Since the requirements for certification of class actions in federal court under 
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially similar to the Practice 
Book requirements, federal case law may be used to aid our construction of these re-
quirements.” (footnote omitted)); Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So.2d 1090, 1092 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reporting that Rule 1.220(a) of Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure requires a party to establish numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of 
representation, and, that Rule 1.220(b)(3) requires plaintiffs to prove predominance, 
superiority, and manageability). 
215 See cases cited supra note 214. 
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ests,216 (2) the proposed class presents predominant, common questions of 
law and fact,217 (3) the representatives can manage a nationwide class 
action in a state court,218 (4) subclasses can protect the various legal rights 
of numerous class members,219 and (5) the representative can manage 
fairly and efficiently competing state laws in a state court trial.220 Fur-
thermore, even after a state court certifies a class for trial, representatives 
still must confront some burdensome challenges—preventing a “claim-
jumping” assault,221 overcoming “causation barriers,”222 and proving “in-
dividual damages.”223 
                                                 
216 See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct., 15 P.3d 1071, 1082 (Cal. 2001) (reiterat-
ing that “the class action proponent bears the burden of establishing the propriety of class 
certification”); Smith v. Nat’l Sec. Corp., No. D043779, 2005 WL 1060249, at *5 (Cal. 
Ct. App. May 6, 2005) (identifying several problems with the class action lawsuits: 
counsel’s inadequacy to represent the class and the lack of a predominance of common 
issues among class members); Bolt v. City of Lansing, 604 N.W.2d 745, 755 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999) (emphasizing that class certification, notice and fair representation are noto-
rious “class-action problems” (citing Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605 
F.2d 1348, 1357 (5th Cir. 1979))). 
217 See Hannan v. Weichert South Jersey, Inc., 2007 WL 1468643, at *10 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. May 22, 2007) (embracing the view that “special problems” prevent a party 
from proving deception—based on oral and written misrepresentations and omissions of 
material fact—in a class action because “there is a significant risk that individual issues 
will overwhelm those common to the class” (citing Stephenson v. Bell Atl. Corp., 177 
F.R.D. 279, 290 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Davis v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. 158 F.R.D. 173, 
175 (S.D. Fla. 1994)))); see also Brooks v. Norwest Corp., 103 P.3d 39, 49–50 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2004) (confirming that “a whole range of practical problems ... may render the class 
action inappropriate in any given case.... [including] class size, whether notice can rea-
sonably be effected, and the overwhelming presence of individual issues” (citing Eisen v. 
Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 (1974))). 
218 See Doyle v. Fluor Corp., 199 S.W.3d 784, 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (embracing 
the view that “[m]anageability encompasses the gamut of practical problems that could 
render the class action format inappropriate for a particular matter”) (citation omitted). 
219 Aljabi v. Pardee Const. Corp., No. D037746, 2002 WL 254407, at * 5 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 22, 2002) (concluding that the class action representatives “did not meet their 
burden of showing how subclasses could be formed to lessen the problems inherent in 
class actions where some [complaining homeowners] were bound by an arbitration clause 
and others were not” (citing Wash. Mut. Bank, 15 P.3d at 1085 (holding that “a class 
action proponent must credibly demonstrate, through a thorough analysis of the applica-
ble state laws, that state law variations will not swamp common issues and defeat pre-
dominance”))). 
220 See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank, 15 P.3d at 1085 (concluding that a nationwide class ac-
tion representative’s “presentation must be sufficient to permit the trial court, at the time 
of certification, to make a detailed assessment of how any state law differences could be 
managed fairly and efficiently at trial”). 
221 See, e.g., Ex parte State Mut. Ins. Co., 715 So.2d 207, 212 (Ala. 1997) (outlining 
the “claim-jumping” problem and practice in which Plaintiff A files a purported class 
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Furthermore, like federal judges, state judges have broad discretion to 
decide whether to certify class actions for a settlement or a trial.224 Of 
course, a universal, iron-clad standard does not exist for determining 
whether state judges have abused their discretion.225 However, most state 
supreme courts have embraced a multipronged standard: abuse of discre-
tion occurs when a trial judge (1) acts arbitrarily, (2) acts unreasonably, 
(3) fails to apply the law properly to undisputed facts, or (4) uses insuffi-
cient evidence to fashion rulings.226 
                                                                                                                         
action in County Z and invests a considerable amount of time to certify a class, only to 
discover that another party—Plaintiff B—made an exact copy of Plaintiff A’s complaint, 
inserted the name of a different plaintiff and successfully certified a class action in a 
different court in County Y). 
222 See, e.g., S.W. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 440 (Tex. 2000) (discussing a 
personal-injury, class action suit and highlighting the problems of creating a class for 
“general causation” issues, and another class for “specific causation” issues); Charles I. 
Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 141 P.3d 824, 828 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (Baker, J., 
concurring) (“[The] class counsel filed a joint application for attorneys’ fees [for] $34.8 
million.... [and] provided evidence of risks that were inherent in the class action, such as 
... the difficulty of certifying a class ... and causation barriers.”). 
223 See Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 47 P.3d 1222, 1248 (Haw. 2002) (“Aggre-
gating the damage of the class presents its own problems .... Even assuming that each 
plaintiff’s ‘insubstantial loss’ may be aggregated [to meet] a substantiality threshold, an 
individual plaintiff’s claim, prior to certification, remains vulnerable to dismissal. Many 
class action lawsuits are initially begun by one plaintiff, who files a complaint, and ... 
attempts to certify the class. A defendant may file a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim prior to this certification.”); California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 
P.2d 564, 570 (Cal. 1986) (stressing that “[d]amage distribution ... poses special problems 
in consumer class actions. Often, proof of individual damages by competent evidence is 
not feasible. Each individual’s recovery may be too small to make traditional methods of 
proof worthwhile. In addition, consumers are not likely to retain records of small pur-
chases for long periods of time.”). 
224 See, e.g., Muise v. GPU, Inc., 851 A.2d 799, 810 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) 
(“Class certification decisions rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.”). But see St. 
Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 25, 29–30 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1996) (“[T]his [c]ourt should reverse the certification order only if the record shows 
a clear abuse of discretion.”). 
225 See Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 796 A.2d 182, 187 (N.J. 2002) (“Although 
the ordinary ‘abuse of discretion’ standard defies [a] precise definition, it arises when a 
decision is ‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established 
policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis.’” (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 779 
F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985))). 
226 See Kondos v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 110 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); see 
also Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985) (conclud-
ing that an abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court acts without reference to any guiding 
principles, arbitrarily, or unreasonably). 
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Also, like their counterparts in federal courts, state court defendants 
often assert that state courts are abusive and issue questionable class certi-
fications,227 and there is evidence that verifies that such accusations are 
very real and widespread.228 For example, even when a state statute clearly 
notes that a class representative must file an original class certification 
complaint, that rule has been ignored.229 In fact, one state court judge 
allowed a representative to commence a class action after instructing the 
representative to amend his personal complaint.230 The class representative 
only had to insert the new class action allegations and the names of addi-
tional parties.231 
Additionally, state court judges have committed major abuses by certi-
fying class actions when there is an “insufficient [amount of] community 
of interest” among class members,232 or when representatives fail to iden-
tify those who would comprise a “community of interest.”233 To illustrate, 
consider the facts and the trial court’s ruling in Gardner v. South Carolina 
Department of Revenue.234 In that case, the class action complaint had two 
defects: (1) factual differences among class members’ individualized cases 
were numerous, and (2) the named plaintiffs could not prove a common-
                                                 
227 See infra notes 230–32. 
228 See infra notes 230–32. 
229 See, e.g., PA. R. OF CIV. P. 1703(a) (“A class action shall be commenced only by 
the filing of a complaint with the prothonotary.” The explanatory note to Rule 1703 states 
in relevant part that “[a] class action may not be commenced by ... assumpsit, trespass or 
equity rules.... [Therefore,] if the complaint does not comply with Rule 1704, it will not 
commence a class action.”). 
230 See, e.g., Debbs v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137, 149–50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 
(“[T]he trial court abused its discretion when it permitted Debbs to amend his individual 
complaint with class action allegations and new parties because such was not permitted 
by Rules 1703 or 1704.”). 
231 Id. 
232 See City of San Jose v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cnty., 525 P.2d 701, 713 (Cal. 
1974) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by certifying a class action suit 
against the City of San Jose on behalf of all real property owners ‘in the flight pattern’ of 
the San Jose Municipal Airport, because there was an insufficient community of interest 
to sustain a class action suit). 
233 See Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Girards, No. 05-02-01604-CV, 2004 WL 
423115, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2004) (“[It is impossible to identify] the class mem-
bers from the voluminous list of telephone numbers .... Because there is no evidence in 
the record that the telephone logs can be used to determine the names of the class mem-
bers or that the class members are presently ascertainable from any other source, we 
conclude the class definition fails to show the class members are presently ascertainable. 
Accordingly, the trial judge abused his discretion in certifying the class.”). 
234 Gardner v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 577 S.E.2d 190 (S.C. 2003). 
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ality among defendants’ class defenses.235 Yet, the trial judge inappropri-
ately certified the class.236 
Perhaps, the most frequent abuse of discretion occurs when a state 
judge certifies a class without determining whether the proposed class 
action will be an efficient and a superior method to resolve the conflict.237 
To highlight this type of abuse, consider a few facts in Banks v. New York 
Life Insurance Co.
238 Plaintiffs filed a class action against the insurer,239 
petitioning the lower court to certify a class because the insurance con-
sumers did not have the financial means to file individual lawsuits to se-
cure damages for numerous small claims.240 The trial court certified the 
class,241 but the insurer appealed, asserting that the court abused its discre-
tion.242 A sympathetic Louisiana Supreme Court agreed, concluding that 
special circumstances required “a multitude of mini-trials” rather than the 
more superior and efficient class action.243 
4. Imaginary Risks of Litigating Class Actions in Federal and State 
Courts 
Even a cursory review of legal commentaries, editorials, and various 
trade publications reveals an inordinate amount of discussion about the 
                                                 
235 Id. at 201 (“A representative class cannot exist where the court must investigate 
each plaintiff’s prejudice claim where it is one of the two predominate issues in the case. 
Requiring such individualized examination negates the benefits of a class action suit.... 
Likewise, [n]amed [p]laintiffs cannot show that commonality exists for the defendant 
class. A court determines the existence of commonality among defendants by examining 
the plaintiffs’ claims and the defendants’ anticipated defenses.”). 
236 Id. (“[T]he trial judge erred by certifying both a plaintiff and a defendant class.”). 
237 See infra note 243. 
238 Banks v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 737 So.2d 1275 (La. 1999). 
239 Id. at 1277 (“Major Banks and Charles Edwards, individually and on behalf of all 
other persons similarly situated, filed [a] suit ... against New York Life Insurance Com-
pany ... and two Louisiana insurance agents for New York Life.... [alleging] that New 
York Life used unfair and deceptive practices [when issuing and selling] insurance poli-
cies. Plaintiffs sought damages and a judgment certifying a class composed of all persons 
who purchased whole or universal life policies ....”). 
240 Id. at 1277–78, 1283. 
241 Id. at 1277. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 1283 (“Moreover, we conclude that a class action would not be superior to 
other procedural methods in this case when we balance in terms of fairness and judicial 
efficiency the merits of a class action against alternative procedural methods.... Accord-
ingly, we find that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting class certification in 
this matter.”). 
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widespread “evils of class actions” in both federal and state courts.244 In 
fact, even otherwise intelligent and thoughtful members of Congress have 
cited such allegedly “widespread” imaginary perils as reasons to move 
substantially large numbers of so-called “class actions of national im-
portance” from state to federal courts.245 Arguably, the massive removal of 
state substantive law class actions from state to federal courts does not 
comport with longstanding principles of judicial federalism. But even 
more importantly, none of the alleged widespread evils or perils have been 
substantiated, using carefully designed empirical studies and sound statis-
tical analyses.246 
Make-believe federal class action “evils” appear under two headings—
the alleged perils of class action trials and the purported ills of class action 
settlements.247 Class action reformers—an assortment of commentators, 
insurers, and corporate entities—argue that federal class action trials are 
replete with a plethora of evils.248 The list includes allegedly “unmeritori-
ous claimants, greedy plaintiffs’ lawyers, a destroyed corporate citizen, 
and a besieged judiciary.”249 But to repeat, reformers have not cited any 
carefully constructed empirical studies or sound evidence to support their 
imaginations about the mass evils that are supposedly undermining federal 
class action trials and procedures.250 
In addition, class action reformers assert that even more pervasive, 
virulent, and unrelenting evils infect federal class action settlements. So-
called “sweetheart” and “blackmail” settlements have been cited as major 
                                                 
244 See, e.g., Nancy T. Bowen, Restrictions on Communication by Class Action Par-
ties and Attorneys, 1980 DUKE L.J. 360, 361 (“Attorney solicitation of clients, funds, and 
fee agreements is one of the most prevalent perceived evils of the class action proce-
dure.”). 
245 See, e.g., infra notes 249–54, 386–90 and accompanying text. 
246 See, e.g., infra notes 249–54. 
247 Infra notes 249–54. 
248 Infra notes 249–54. 
249 Cf. Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. 
REV. 157, 188 (1998) (asserting without proof or documentation that “widespread judi-
cial concern over the lack of concrete evidence of causation of harm paint[s] a picture 
representing all of the evils of mass tort class actions”). 
250 Id.; see also James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Feder-
alization of the Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 416 (2004) (“[W]hile 
little empirical research has been done fleshing out the evils of class actions or even 
firmly establishing that such demons exist, a widespread perception exists among the 
public, politicians, scholars and reformers, that there is a problem with class actions as 
they are currently maintained in our courts.” (citation omitted)). 
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examples of class action horrors.251 More specifically, reformers accuse 
class counsels of fashioning self-interested “sweetheart” agreements, un-
der which the attorneys secure favorable sums of money while compro-
mising class members’ interests.252 Attorneys are also accused of using 
blackmail to force federal defendants to settle class actions for more than 
the suits are worth.253 Furthermore, without presenting a modicum of pro-
bative or statistical evidence, one reformer lengthened the list of imagi-
nary evils by asserting that: (1) “pro-settlement incentives” cause federal 
district judges to make questionable class action decisions, and (2) large 
class actions impair or undermine federal district judges’ ability to discern 
whether settlements are employed to bribe “abusive” class action com-
plainants.254 
Perhaps reformers, national insurers, and corporate entities have 
lobbed the most abrasive and unsupported perceptions about class actions 
that have been litigated in state courts. For example, from 2003 to 2006, 
the American Tort Reform Foundation (ATRF)255 published documents 
                                                 
251 See Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements 
in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378–79 (2000) 
(documenting and explaining critics’ assertions that “sweetheart” and “blackmail” set-
tlements are two dangers inherent in class actions). But see Allan Kanner and Tibor 
Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 
BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 693–97 (2005) (“[T]he Blackmail Myth fails to comport with 
factual reality.... [because] available empirical evidence and a consideration of how 
federal judges typically manage class actions each suggest that the alleged ‘hydraulic 
pressure on defendants to settle’ is itself more myth than reality.” (citation omitted)). 
252 See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 251, at 1377. 
253 See id. at 1391. But see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining 
Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 665–66 
(1979) (“[L]awyers and litigants on both sides of [class action lawsuits]” have abused 
Federal Rule 23 and engaged in “unprofessional practices” involving “attorneys’ fees, 
‘sweetheart’ settlement deals, dilatory motion practice, harassing discovery, and misrep-
resentations to judges.”). 
254 See, e.g., Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem: Unconstitutional Class Actions 
and Options for Reform, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 855, 880–81 (2005) (“[L]arge class 
actions result in twin, related evils: courts make decisions under the influence of pro-
settlement incentives and ... are unable to accurately identify when settlements are simply 
pay-offs to abusive ... litigants.”). 
255 See About ATRA, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N (ATRA), http://www.atra.org/about 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (“[ATRA is a] nationwide network of state-based liability 
reform coalitions .... [that is] dedicated exclusively to tort and liability reform .... ATRA’s 
membership is diverse and includes nonprofits, small and large companies, as well as 
state and national trade, business, and professional associations.... ATRA supports an 
aggressive civil justice reform agenda that includes ... class action reform ....”). 
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that listed and criticized so-called “judicial hellhole” jurisdictions.256 Ac-
cording to ATRF, certain state courts257 are “abusive,” because those tri-
bunals allegedly decide questions of law and fact against defendants con-
sistently—large insurers, insured corporate entities and the medical indus-
industry to name a few.258 
ATRF developed an extensive list of purported abuses that appear in 
state courts.259 Several class action ills appeared among the purported state 
court evils.260 Specifically, ATRF asserted that state court judges consist-
ently “[join claims to form] mass actions that do not have common facts 
and circumstances.”261 ATRF also maintained that state court judges con-
stantly “certify classes that do not have sufficient commonality of facts or 
law, which may confuse a jury and make the case difficult to defend.”262 
Even more relevant, ATRF shared its findings with members of Congress, 
                                                 
256 See generally Archive, Judicial Hellholes, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., http:// 
www.judicialhellholes.org/archive-2005/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
257 See id. (showing that ATRA identified the following jurisdictions as the 2005 “ju-
dicial hellholes”: The Rio Grande Valley and Gulf Coast in Texas; Cook County, Illinois; 
the entire State of West Virginia; Madison County, Illinois; St. Clair County, Illinois; and 
South Florida). 
258 See generally Judicial Hellholes 2005, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., 13–37, availa-
ble at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2005.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 9, 2012). 
259 See id. at 8–9 (“Judges in Judicial Hellholes hold considerable influence over ... 
cases that appear before them.... [and] are known for being plaintiff friendly.” Therefore, 
those allegedly pro-plaintiffs’ judges (1) “do not stop ... forum shopping”; (2) “allow 
lawsuits to go forward that are not supported by the law”; (3) “allow unnecessarily broad, 
invasive and expensive discovery requests to increase the burden on a defendant,” (4) 
“schedule cases [unfairly] .... [by] giving defendants [only a week’s notice before a trial 
begins],” (5) “allow plaintiffs’ lawyers to introduce highly questionable ‘expert’ testimo-
ny that purports to link the defendant to the plaintiffs’ injuries, but has no credibility in 
the scientific community,” (6) “allow plaintiffs [to introduce a greater variety ] of evi-
dence ... at trial while rejecting evidence that might be favorable to a defendant,” (7) 
“[give] improper or slanted jury instructions,” (8) “[do not overturn] extraordinary puni-
tive or pain and suffering awards,” (9) “[allow trial lawyers’ contributions to influence] 
their judicial decisions,” and (10) “[develop unwarranted] cozy relations ... [with] jurists, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers and government officials.”). 
260 See id. 
261 Id. at 9 (“In one notorious example, in 2002, West Virginia courts consolidated 
more than 8,000 claims and 250 defendants in a single trial. In situations where there are 
so many plaintiffs and defendants, individual parties are deprived of their rights to have 
their cases fully and fairly heard by a jury.”). 
262 Id. 
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and the organization reported that its findings helped to enact the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005.263 
Of course, using the most conservative measures and estimates, 
ATRF’s “judicial hellholes” data and conclusions are highly suspect.264 
Among other reasons, the organization selected just a few jurisdictions 
within some states and only a few courts within those jurisdictions to ex-
amine the disposition of class actions.265 Clearly, those less-than-random 
selections could easily support one’s imaginations about the prevalence of 
class action evils in state courts, because arguably unscientific sampling 
and methodological procedures generated ATRF’s questionable data. Even 
a cursory analysis strongly suggests that “selectivity bias”266 permeates 
ATRF’s findings and conclusions.267 But more importantly, those findings 
deviate substantially from findings that are based on considerably more 
sound empirical research.268 
                                                 
263 See id. at 4 (“The Judicial Hellholes report has been covered in nearly every major 
U.S. newspaper since the first report published in 2002. The term ‘Judicial Hellhole’ 
firmly entered the American lexicon when ... President George W. Bush ... visited the 
Number 1 Judicial Hellhole, Madison County, Illinois, to draw attention to the detri-
mental impact of litigation abuse on the local area. The Judicial Hellholes report also was 
central in the debate on the Class Action Fairness Act, which was ultimately enacted after 
languishing in Congress for nine years.” (footnote omitted)). 
264 See Judicial Hellholes 2005, supra note 258, at 5 (“ATRF interviewed individuals 
familiar with litigation in the Judicial Hellholes and verified their observations through 
independent research of press accounts, studies, court dockets and judicial branch statis-
tics, and other publicly available information. Citations for these sources can be found in 
the nearly 500 endnotes following this report.”). 
265 See id. at 4–5. 
266 See Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance Industry and Consumer Protec-
tion: An Empirical Analysis of State Supreme Courts’ Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract, 
Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900–1991, 41 
CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 375–76 (1992) (explaining, discussing and testing for “selectivity 
bias” in “choice data”—also known as “other- and self-selection data”). 
267 See Judicial Hellholes 2005, supra note 258, at 4–5. 
268 Cf. William S. Lerach, Securities Class Actions and Derivative Litigation Involv-
ing Public Companies: One Plaintiff’s Perspective, 670 PLI/Corp 471, *536 n.79 (1990) 
(“Contrary to much of the accepted ‘lore’ about abuses of the class action procedure, one 
recent empirical study has concluded ‘when shareholders press their cases, their chances 
of obtaining some measure of relief are quite good; over 75% of such cases resulted in 
either settlements, accommodation by the defendants, or a judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs.... Shareholder litigation is an important means of oversight.... The empirical evi-
dence also implies that in settled class actions, particularly in the securities and treble 
damage antitrust contexts, the great bulk of the money received from the defendants 
actually is distributed to class members, in contrast to the widely held notion that the fund 
is either devoured by avaricious attorneys or consumed by administrative expenses.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Miller, supra note 253, at 666–67 (“Even if the negative 
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III. THE CLASS ACTION DEBATE—INSURED CORPORATE ENTITIES, 
NATIONAL INSURERS AND “BRIGHT LINE” JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
Again, judicial federalism embodies “a proper respect for state func-
tions,”269 and it is built on a liberal conviction: a national government 
thrives and functions best when states and their institutions are free to 
perform their respective functions in different ways.270 In addition, judicial 
federalism does not draw a shimmering bright line between federal and 
state courts’ respective powers.271 Yet all too many large corporations, 
including national and multinational insurers, see a discernible, constitu-
tional bright line. On one side, companies see state courts, which generate 
and use fifty-one different sets of laws that are used to “regulate” com-
merce and resolve legal disputes within those respective jurisdictions. On 
the other side, corporate defendants see twelve federal circuits, which 
often employ conflicting laws of the circuits and conflicting laws of the 
panels to decide disputes involving interstate commerce. 
One insightful commentator has noted corporate America’s major un-
ease about litigating in dual judiciaries generally and about litigating class 
actions in particular.272 Paraphrasing, he described corporate entities’ 
concern this way: a fundamental conflict exists between the basic princi-
ples of federalism and the collective economic and survival interests of 
insurance companies and other multinational and national corporations.273 
Absent any meaningful uniform, predictable, objective or reliable rulings 
within and between the two judiciaries, corporations as well as insurance 
companies—on behalf of themselves and millions of insured businesses 
                                                                                                                         
effects of class actions were assumed, they would have to be balanced against the societal 
benefits derived from deterring socially proscribed conduct and providing small claim 
rectification.... The available information suggests that much of the debate has been based 
on erroneous assumptions.... Although there have been instances of undesirable or unpro-
fessional conduct, abuse does not appear to have been widespread. Stories about a few 
questionable occurrences have been repeated so often at professional meetings that they 
have created the impression that evils are commonplace in class action practice.” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
269 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
270 See id. 
271 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (“[W]hile the Tenth 
Amendment makes explicit that ‘[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people[,]’ the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and state 
power has given rise to many of the Court’s most difficult and celebrated cases.”). 
272 See generally Arthur Bryant, The Conflict Between Federalism and Corporate In-
terests, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 734, 734–36 (2001). 
273 See id. at 734–35. 
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and corporate entities—must spend enormous amounts of money if they 
expect to prevail in state and federal courts.274 
Therefore, viewed from this perspective, one’s discovering that corpo-
rations, insurers, and their insured corporate entities campaign fervently 
and spend lots of money to fashion a “more efficient” judicial federalism 
should produce little surprise. 
But again, corporate entities’ generalized concerns about litigating in 
dual judiciaries are arguably unfounded. On the one hand, large corporate 
conglomerates and insurers bellow for a set of standardized, substantive 
rules that would produce more predictable, uniform, and reliable judicial 
rulings—regardless of the court in which they litigate.275 Yet the same 
corporate entities arguably want a set of loosely defined procedural rules 
that would allow corporate defendants to move freely between state and 
federal courts—always having the option to litigate in either forum to help 
increase their likelihood of securing more favorable judicial hearings and 
dispositions.276 
Using the recently enacted Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 as a 
point of reference, this Part discusses insurers and other corporate entities’ 
ostensible quests for more efficient judicial proceedings as well as for 
more favorable and predictable judicial outcomes. The evidence, however, 
reveals the following: large insurers and other corporations’ calls for class 
action reforms are likely a stellar campaign to win the majority of class 
actions, either in federal courts or by preventing disgruntled consumers 
and third-party victims from litigating those actions in allegedly biased 
and hostile state courts.277 Finally, as some commentators have observed, 
                                                 
274 See TOWERS PERRIN, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY: 2006 SURVEY OF 
INSURANCE PURCHASING AND CLAIMS TRENDS 10 (2006), available at http://www 
.directorsandboards.com/DBEBRIEFING/May2007/TowersSurvey.pdf (last visited Mar. 
9, 2012) (reporting that over 99% of public, private and nonprofit corporations and busi-
ness purchased D&O insurance); see also Martin Boyer, Is the Demand for Corporate 
Insurance a Habit? Evidence of Organizational Inertia from Directors’ and Officers’ 
Insurance, CENTER FOR INTERUNIVERSITY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ON ORGANIZATIONS 
1, 3 (2004), available at http://www.cirano.qc.ca/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (“[P]ublic 
access to corporate insurance purchases and risk management strategies is limited.... 
[But] corporate demand for ... Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance [is available].... 
[Therefore,] directors and officers’ [demand for insurance] is a proxy for the firm’s risk 
management strategy.... D&O insurance is quite common amongst U.S. and Canadian 
public corporations. According to Tillinghast-Towers Perrin ... the proportion of U.S 
firms that had D&O insurance was 92% in 1998 and 93% in 1999, up from 81% in 
1992.”). 
275 Bryant, supra note 272, at 735. 
276 See id. at 735–36. 
277 See id. at 736. 
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large corporate entities and their insurers are willing to use their individual 
and combined substantial political clout to achieve that goal,278 even if 
corporate defendants’ activism against class actions will ultimately un-
dermine or destroy longstanding tenets of judicial federalism. 
A. National and Multinational Insurers and Corporate Entities’ Mission: 
Eradicating Allegedly “Biased” State Court Class Action Proceedings, 
or “Turning 200 Years of Judicial Federalism on Its Head”? 
Consider the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association.279 Asserting that state insurance com-
missioners and regulators failed to curtail insurers’ highly questionable 
ratemaking activities in the early 1940s, a concerned U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral (AG) filed an antitrust suit in a federal district court against South-
Eastern Underwriters Association (SEUA)—a conglomerate of insurers 
and agents.280 According to the AG’s theory, SEUA violated the Sherman 
Act by conspiring to fix and maintain arbitrary and non-competitive pre-
mium rates for fire and specified “allied lines” insurance in six southeast-
ern states.281 The AG also alleged that SEUA tried to monopolize trade 
and commerce by selling those same insurance contracts across those 
southeastern states.282 
                                                 
278 See, e.g., William M. Welch & Jim Drinkard, ‘Patients’ Bill of Rights’ Pushes 
Closer to Passage, USA TODAY, Jun. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 3764716 (“For 
five years, health insurance companies have succeeded in blocking proposals to establish 
broad federal rights for patients covered by managed-care plans. And they have done it 
against all odds.... Fueled by millions of dollars in political contributions, fat advertising 
budgets and armies of blue-chip lobbyists, the health insurance industry and its business 
allies have exercised big-time political clout in spite of managed care’s image prob-
lems.”); see also Editorial, Insurance, Leader of the PACs, Ready for Capitol Hill Battles, 
ATLANTA J. - CONST., May 7, 1991, available at 1991 WLNR 3587217 (“Who has the 
deepest pockets on Capitol Hill? The insurance industry does. Last year its political 
action committees contributed $8.7 million to congressional candidates, earning the 
industry the distinction of ‘leader of the PACs.’ According to investigations by the Center 
for Responsive Politics in Washington, congressional incumbents received most of the 
insurance money, 13 of whom accepted more than $50,000 apiece .... With the insurance 
industry spending so much money on political clout, it’s worth wondering what it wants 
in return.”). 
279 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
280 See id. at 534–35. 
281 Id. 
282 See id. at 535 (describing the Attorney General’s charges that “S. E. U. A. [com-
panies] controlled 90 per cent of the fire insurance and ‘allied lines’ sold ... in the six 
states where the conspiracies were consummated. Both conspiracies consisted of a con-
tinuing agreement and [concerted] action .... The conspirators ... fixed premium rates[,] ... 
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As a defense, SEUA asserted that the Sherman Act did not apply to it, 
because the business of fire insurance was neither intrastate nor interstate 
commerce.283 The federal district court agreed and dismissed the case.284 
The AG appealed.285 In a narrow-majority decision, the Supreme Court 
determined that the district court’s analysis and conclusion were un-
sound.286 Reversing the lower court’s holding, the Court held that the 
business of insurance involves interstate commerce; therefore, the federal 
government may regulate it under the Commerce Clause.287 The Supreme 
Court’s decision generated a considerable amount of anger and ill-will 
among insurers and their congressional supporters,288 so in response, Con-
gress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA)289 to affirm the princi-
ple of state control: barring a few exceptions, only state governments—
                                                                                                                         
agents’ commissions, [and] employed boycotts ... to force non-member insurance compa-
nies into the conspiracies, and to compel persons who needed insurance to buy only from 
S. E. U. A. ... Companies not members of S. E. U. A. were cut off from the opportunity to 
reinsure their risks, and their services and facilities were disparaged ....” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
283 See id. at 536. 
284 See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 51 F. Supp. 712, 713–14 
(D.C. Ga. 1943) (“The business of insurance is not interstate commerce or interstate 
trade, though it might be considered a trade subject to local laws, either State or Federal, 
where the commerce clause is not the authority relied upon.”). 
285 See South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 533. 
286 See id. at 537–38 (The court found the district court’s analysis lacking, stating that 
“[a]ll of [the] alleged transactions ... constituted a single continuous chain of events, 
many of which were multistate in character, and none of which ... could possibly have 
been continued but for that part of them which moved back and forth across state lines .... 
[The district court concluded that] the indictment [was] bad for the sole reason that the 
entire ‘business of insurance’ ... can never under any possibly circumstances be ‘com-
merce’, and that therefore, even though an insurance company conducts a substantial part 
of its business transactions across state lines, it is not engaged in ‘commerce among the 
States’ within the meaning of ... the Commerce Clause ....”). 
287 See id. at 552–53 (“[The Court’s] basic responsibility [when] interpreting the 
Commerce Clause is to make certain that the power to govern intercourse among the 
states remains where the Constitution placed it. That power ... is vested in the Congress, 
available to be exercised for the national welfare as Congress shall deem necessary. No 
commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been 
held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
We cannot make an exception [for] the business of insurance.”). 
288 See generally 90 CONG. REC. 6,526–27 (1944) (statement of Rep. Larry Miller) 
(discussing a newspaper article examining the South-Eastern Underwriters’ case). 
289 McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006)). 
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legislatures, regulators, and courts—have supreme authority to regulate 
the business of insurance.290 
Significantly, when Congress was debating whether to enact the MFA 
in 1944, national insurers and some of their staunch supporters291 pro-
claimed loudly that the Court’s South-Eastern Underwriters ruling would 
seriously undermine fundamental principles of judicial federalism.292 In 
fact, insurance companies’ supporters accused the Supreme Court of 
“stretching” constitutional principles to the point of undermining and 
interfering with state courts’ constitutional powers to regulate and fashion 
laws to decide business of insurance controversies.293 But even more im-
portantly, if one carefully searches mid-twentieth century primary and 
secondary legal sources, one would be hard pressed to find any evidence 
of multinational and national insurers embracing this position: state court 
judges are biased and hostile against insurance companies. 
In fact, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, in part, because 
mid-twentieth century insurance companies and their congressional sup-
porters insisted that federal courts were improper forums; thus, those tri-
bunals should not have jurisdiction to hear and decide business of insur-
                                                 
290 See, e.g., 90 CONG. REC. 6,559 (statement of Rep. Hatton Sumners) (“[T]he bill H. 
R. 3270 [is designed] to affirm the intent of Congress that the regulation of the business 
of insurance [shall] remain within the control of the several States and that the [antitrust] 
acts of July 2, 1890 and October 15, 1914, as amended [shall not be] applicable to that 
business ....”). 
291 See, e.g., id. at 6,564 (statement of Rep. Vorys). Representative Vorys, one of the 
insurance industry’s most vociferous and unwavering advocates, used even stronger 
language. He voiced the sentiment of many members by stating, “[m]y father was chair-
man of a committee of the American Bar Association which drafted a model law[.] ... [It] 
had a profound effect upon the insurance laws of the Nation .... [because the model 
helped to fashion] local laws and regulations to meet local conditions, problems and 
abuses .... The Supreme Court has power to construe the Constitution [and decide] what 
is interstate commerce[.] [But the Court] does not yet possess the power to make laws. 
When it attempts to exercise such power, Congress must be vigilant to nullify judicial 
usurpation.” Id. 
292 See, e.g., id. at 6,561. 
293 See id. at 6,559–6,560 (statement of Rep. Hatton Sumners) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court—and we have helped, too—has been stretching and stretching ... [Constitutional 
provisions] like the interstate commerce clause, ... stretching them in order to increase 
Federal power until they have been stretched absolutely beyond where common sense 
and common honesty .... [I]t is time the judiciary begins to get back on its own side of the 
fence .... God Almighty has imposed some natural laws that govern the business of judg-
ing .... The judges of this country have to be governed by the rules that govern the busi-
ness of judging.”). 
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ance lawsuits and other insurance-related disputes.294 To repeat, large 
insurers attacked the South-Eastern Underwriters decision, claiming that 
the ruling severely undermined fundamental principles of judicial federal-
ism by interfering with and weakening state courts’ jurisdictional pow-
ers.295 Yet, while insisting that only state courts should resolve insurance-
related legal disputes, national and multinational insurance companies—as 
plaintiffs—have not hesitated to file all sorts of actions in federal courts 
against small-to-large corporations, seeking a variety of equitable and 
common-law remedies 296 
In truth, like disgruntled classes of consumers, insurers as plaintiffs 
have a long history of filing multibillion dollar class actions against other 
national and multinational corporations in state and federal courts.297 For 
example, in 1995, the Federal District Court of New Jersey decided a class 
action controversy in Northland Insurance Co. v. Shell Oil Co.298 North-
land Insurance Company (Northland) filed a putative class action against 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, Hoechst-Celanese Corporation, 
and Shell Oil Company (Shell Oil).299 Suing on behalf of all similarly 
situated insurers, Northland accused Shell Oil and others of manufacturing 
defective polybutylene plumbing systems that damaged homeowners’ 
property.300 Citing their respective subrogation rights under the consum-
ers’ property insurance contracts, the class of insurers sought declaratory 
                                                 
294 See id. at 6,563 (statement of Rep. Charles La Follette) (“Mr. Chairman, I am of 
the opinion, based upon the language used in this act, that it is specially designed to 
prevent any Federal court [from] having jurisdiction of pending legislation once this 
becomes law”). 
295 See supra notes 290–93 and accompanying text. 
296 See generally Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over 
Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral 
Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory 
Judgments—1900–1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1194–214 (1998) (presenting a case 
study of insurers, various corporate entities and insurance consumers’ litigation and 
theories of recovery in state and federal courts). 
297 See, e.g., Northland Ins. Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 930 F. Supp. 1069 (D. N.J. 1996). 
298 Id.; see also infra note 894 and accompanying text (presenting evidence of nation-
al and multinational corporations’ filing class actions against other corporations in state 
courts). 
299 See Northland, 930 F. Supp. at 1070. 
300 See id.; see also Rodd Zolkos, Insurers Sue Pipe Makers: Class Action Brought by 
Insurers Breaks New Ground, BUS. INS., Feb. 16, 1998 (“A class-action suit by insurers 
seeking to recover hundreds of millions of dollars in payment for leaking polybutylene 
plumbing could have far-reaching implications for both sides.... Leading the suit, which 
involves a ‘tight group of 40’ insurers and ultimately could take in hundreds ... is North-
land Insurance Co.”). 
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and injunctive relief.301 However, more relevant, the class of property and 
casualty insurers wanted Shell Oil to reimburse millions of dollars that the 
insurers spent to settle homeowners’ claims.302 
Six years after Northland, a federal district judge in New York decided 
In re Simon II, Litigation.303 In that case, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
New Jersey (BCBS)—along with smokers and labor unions—filed a class 
action against Philip Morris, Inc., the American Tobacco Company, and 
other cigarette manufacturers.304 Actually, Simon II consolidated all the 
tobacco-related lawsuits to include punitive damages claims for the vari-
ous class members.305 Exercising their respective subrogation rights under 
health insurance contracts, the insurers alleged that the tobacco industry 
used deceptive marketing practices that caused policyholders’ tobacco-
related illnesses and addictions.306 Therefore, the health insurers sought 
reimbursement from the tobacco companies to cover the insureds’ health 
costs.307 
Also, between 2001 and 2004, large health insurers filed three addi-
tional class actions in federal courts against large pharmaceutical compa-
nies.308 First, in Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co.,309 two large health in-
surance companies filed a consolidated class action in 2001 against 
Warner-Lambert.310 Before the federal district judge in New York, the 
insurers argued that the pharmaceutical company aggressively marketed 
Rezulin, which was allegedly “the first anti-diabetes drug designed to 
                                                 
301 See Northland, 930 F. Supp. at 1070. 
302 See id. 
303 In re Simon II, Litig., No. 00-CV-5332, 2002 WL 32155895, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
19, 2002). 
304 See id. at *1. 
305 See Judge Certifies Class-Action Suit Against Tobacco Firms, RICH. TIMES 
DISPATCH, Sept. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 1452025. 
306 See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 138 F. 
Supp. 2d 357, 360, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (permitting insurer to recover extra healthcare 
expenditures for smokers and to provide evidence of “pass on” premium practice). 
307 See id. at 363. 
308 See, e.g., Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co., 326 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2003); In re 
Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Int’l Union of Operating 
Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 929 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 2007); In 
re Abbott Laboratories Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., Nos. C 04-1511 (CW), C 04-4203 (CW), 
2007 WL 1689899 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
309 Desiano, 326 F.3d at 339. 
310 See id. at 340–41 (“Louisiana Health Service Indemnity Company ... is a Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield health benefit provider ... with headquarters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
.... Eastern States Health and Welfare Fund ... [is an Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act] plan that provides benefits to members of the Needletrades, Industrial, and 
Textile Employees Union [and] is based in New York.”). 
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[improve one’s] insulin resistance”; however, the company priced the drug 
“at nearly three times the cost” of other diabetic medication.311 Also, the 
medication had a greater likelihood of causing liver damage than a place-
bo.312 Thus, the insurers sought class relief on behalf of all health benefit 
providers that paid for Rezulin between 1997 and 2001.313 And the insur-
ers wanted to recoup “approximately $1.4 billion” that they had paid for 
the defective drug.314 
The second case, In re Buspirone Patent Litigation,315 highlights the 
class action that dozens of health insurance companies or “end payors”316 
filed against Bristol-Myers Squibb pharmaceutical company.317 The class 
of insurers alleged that Bristol-Myers violated federal antitrust laws by 
paying Schein Pharmaceuticals Inc. $72.5 million to keep its generic ver-
sion of BuSpar off the market.318 The insurance companies sought class 
certification to recover large sums of money that they paid to purchase 
Bristol-Myers’ brand-name drug, since the generic drug was not availa-
ble.319 
In re Abbott Laboratories Norvir Anti-Trust Litigation
320 involved a 
heated conflict between Abbott Laboratories and a group of very diverse 
plaintiffs, including multiple health insurers.321 Abbott designed and pro-
duced Norvir to fight HIV.322 As a stand-alone drug, Norvir was only 
minimally effective and its price was relatively low.323 However, when 
administered along with a combination of other drugs, Norvir was very 
                                                 
311 Id. at 342 (internal quotations omitted). 
312 See id. 
313 See id. at 344. 
314 See id. at 345. 
315 In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
316 See id. at 365. 
317 See Marie Suszynski, Health Insurers Sue Bristol-Myers Squibb, Alleging a Drug 
Monopoly, BESTWIRE, Dec. 6, 2002 (“The lawsuits [named] several Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield plans and other health insurers as plaintiffs .... One lawsuit, filed in the Southern 
District of New York by Blue Cross of California, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Geor-
gia, Pacific Life & Annuity Insurance Co., Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City, 
Unicare Life & Health Insurance Company and others, said Bristol-Myers enjoyed a 
monopoly on the drug and illegally delayed the introduction of a generic drug ....”). 
318 See id. 
319 See In re Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 365–66. 
320 In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., Nos. C 04–1511 (CW), C 04-4203 
(CW), 2007 WL 1689899, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2007). 
321 See id. 
322 See id. 
323 See id. 
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potent and effective.324 Therefore, Abbott raised the wholesale price for 
one hundred and twenty 100-milligram Norvir capsules from about $206 
to $1,028.325 That was nearly a four hundred percent increase in the 
wholesale price of the drug.326 
Aetna Insurance Company sued Abbott in 2004.327 And that same 
year, various other health insurers and health plans commenced a class 
action against Abbott.328 Both complaints alleged that the pharmaceutical 
company unjustly enriched itself by violating Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and the California Business and Professions Code.329 For unexplained 
reasons, Aetna dropped its lawsuit.330 
Finally, Merck & Company manufactured and marketed Vioxx, an an-
ti-inflammatory arthritis and acute pain medication.331 Therefore, in Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. 
Merck & Co.,332 another diverse group of large health insurers and other 
corporate entities filed a nationwide class action against Merck in 2005.333 
                                                 
324 See id. 
325 See Business Digest, Aetna Sues Abbott over 400% Increase in AIDS Drug’s Cost, 
BALT. SUN, May 28, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 1483785. 
326 See In re Abbott Labs., 2007 WL 1689899 at *1. 
327 See Business Digest, supra note 325 (“Aetna Inc. has sued pharmaceutical maker 
Abbott Laboratories Inc., accusing it of seeking a monopoly on AIDS drug by raising the 
price of its popular drug Norvir by 400 percent.”). 
328 See In re Abbott Labs., 2007 WL 1689899 at *1 (“Plaintiffs now seek to certify the 
following class: All persons or entities ... who purchased or paid for, or who reimbursed 
another person or entity who purchased or paid for, Norvir ... plan participants and bene-
ficiaries or insureds, and who paid all or part of the cost of Norvir ... during the period 
December 3, 2003 through such time in the future as the effects of Defendant’s illegal 
conduct, as alleged, have ceased ....”). 
329 See id. 
330 See Diane Levick, Aetna Dropping Lawsuit, HARTFORD COURANT, May 28, 2004, 
available at 2004 WLNR 19969645 (“Aetna ... abruptly moved to dismiss its own lawsuit 
against Abbott Laboratories two days after filing it and alleging Abbott’s price increase 
for an AIDS medicine violated federal antitrust law. Aetna wouldn’t say why it had a 
sudden change of heart. But sources familiar with the case say Abbott is an Aetna health 
plan customer and that certain high-ranking Aetna officials weren’t aware that the suit 
had been filed.”). 
331 See Alex Berenson, Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 21, 2007, at A1 (chronicling the history of legal and medical problems that Merck 
& Company have faced before and after the large pharmaceutical company withdrew 
Vioxx from the market in 2004). 
332 Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 929 
A.2d 1076 (N.J. 2007). 
333 Id. at 1078. 
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Describing themselves as “third-party payors,”334 the large health insurers 
and other entities initiated the state law class action in a New Jersey state 
court rather than in federal court.335 According to their complaint, Merck 
violated New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act.336 
More specifically, the insurers asserted that Merck represented Vioxx 
as a safer and more effective alternative to other pain medications.337 
Therefore, from the insurers’ perspective, the large pharmaceutical com-
pany fraudulently inflated the price of Vioxx and induced all third-party 
payors to provide unwarranted sums of money.338 The lower court certi-
fied the class that would have allowed the insurance companies and other 
end-payors to receive reimbursements for their expenditures.339 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court, however, decertified the class, finding that the 
proposed class action was not superior to traditional legal methods of 
securing various remedies.340 
Why is the above discussion relevant? Sixty-five years after the Su-
preme Court’s South-Eastern Underwriters decision in the mid-twentieth 
century, we find large groups of consumers and their supporters claiming 
that national and multinational insurers as well as corporations are the 
twenty-first century culprits who are undermining and interfering with 
state courts’ constitutional powers.341 More precisely, opponents of com-
prehensive class action reforms assert that today’s corporations, insurers, 
and their congressional supporters are “turn[ing] 200 years of federalism 
on its head,” by sanctioning wholeheartedly the unwarranted removal of 
arguably purely substantive state law class actions from allegedly preju-
diced and hostile state courts to purportedly impartial and judicious federal 
courts.342 
                                                 
334 Id. at 1079 (“[A] a third-party payor ... makes payments to pharmaceutical compa-
nies for prescription medications [on behalf of insured participants under] its benefit 
plans ....”). 
335 Id. at 1076. 
336 Id. at 1079. 
337 Id. 
338 Int’l Union, 929 A.2d 1076 at 1079. 
339 See id. at 1153–54. 
340 Id. at 1089. 
341 See infra notes 391"97 and accompanying text. 
342 See 151 CONG. REC. 2086 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“There have 
been many claims about ‘judicial hellholes’ and ‘magnet jurisdictions,’ but the evidence 
shows that these claims are ... overstated, and are certainly not so widespread so as to 
justify passage of this legislation .... There is also no reasonable basis for the assertion 
that this legislation ‘will restore the intent of the framers’ [respecting] the role of our 
federal courts.”). 
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That insurers—as plaintiffs—have filed numerous class actions in fed-
eral and state courts is significant, because insurers—as defendants—have 
been unable to explain their obvious conundrum. As stated earlier, on 
some occasions insurers—as defendants—assert that state courts are hos-
tile and biased against corporations generally and insurers in particular.343 
However, on other occasions, insurers—as plaintiffs—insist that state 
courts rather than federal courts are the only proper forums in which to 
litigate business of insurance and insurance-related disputes.344 
There is more. That large national insurance companies themselves 
were filing massive class actions in state courts against other large corpo-
rate entities between 1998 and 2004 is highly significant. During that very 
period, those insurers—as defendants—as well as their insured corporate 
clients used their substantial political clout,345 and asked Congress for a 
second form relief.346 In particular, insurers and other national and multi-
national corporations encouraged Congress to enact strong legislation that 
would “rein in” or reduce altogether a wide spectrum of industries’ expo-
sure to class action lawsuits in federal courts and in allegedly hostile and 
biased state courts.347 
                                                 
343 See supra text accompanying notes 63–67. 
344 See supra text accompanying notes 63–67. 
345 See David R. Francis, Insurance Firms Fight New Bill, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Jun. 27, 1991, at 8 (“Because the insurance industry has so many agents, agencies, and 
employees scattered around the country, it has considerable political clout in Washing-
ton.”); Editorial, A Victory for Patients, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 9, 1999, at 14A 
(“The House Republicans’ courageous stand to join Democrats against the HMO lobby 
and Republican leaders puts health care reform back on the national agenda .... In a rare 
display of bipartisan cooperation, a surprisingly large House majority bucked the political 
clout of the health insurance industry and approved serious legislation to bolster the 
rights of patients”); Steve Weinberg, How the Press Keeps the Lid on Itself, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 2000, at F10 (“The failure in newsrooms to report extensively 
about insurance is baffling .... The failure to investigate insurance issues is a classic case 
of journalistic self-censorship .... The insurance industry carries lots of clout in the politi-
cal realm.”). 
346 See, e.g., Unfairness Incorporated: The Corporate Campaign Against Consumer 
Class Actions, PUB. CITIZEN, 31 (June 2003), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF2B 
13.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (“No industry has thrown more manpower into federal-
izing class-action lawsuits than the combined efforts of insurance companies and associa-
tions, which have devoted at least 193 lobbyists to the issue from 2000 through 2002. 
They have been divided among life insurance (79), property and casualty insurance (60) 
and HMOs (59). Some worked for more than one segment of the industry.”). 
347 See generally Joan Claybrook, The Special Interests Behind “The Class Action 
Fairness Act,” PUB. CITIZEN (May 20, 2004), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Special 
_Interests_Behind_Class_Action_Bill.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (citing a 94-page 
Public Citizen’s report that was released in 2003 and reporting that “[a]t least 100 major 
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Finally, it is debatable whether insurers and corporations’ removal-of-
class actions campaign was designed to turn two centuries of judicial fed-
eralism on its head. But one point is indisputable: like their mid-twentieth 
century counterparts, twenty-first century corporations and insurance 
companies’ concerted efforts to implement class action reforms were ex-
tremely successful, because Congress passed the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005.348 As briefly discussed below, it is possible that CAFA will 
actually create significantly more perils for multinational corporations and 
national insurance companies, even though those corporate entities cur-
rently have the power to remove numerous state law class actions from 
professedly prejudiced, ineffectual, and unsympathetic state courts to 
allegedly fairer and more competent federal courts. 
                                                                                                                         
corporations and pro-business associations ... banded together to spend millions of dollars 
and to employ at least 475 lobbyists from 2000 to June 2003 to make sure that class-
action legislation [tilted] in their favor.” The report listed the following corporate entities 
and industries as the primary instigators of major class action reforms: Insurance compa-
nies and their industry associations; credit card companies, mortgage lenders and their 
trade associations; retail corporations; America’s largest pharmaceutical companies; the 
gas and oil industry; and at least two major tobacco companies); Demetri Sevastopulo, 
U.S. Class-Action Lawsuits Face Reform Congress, FIN. TIMES (London, England), Jun. 
13, 2003, at 11 (“The U.S. House of Representatives was yesterday poised to approve [a 
bill that would move] class-action lawsuits from state to federal courts, where awards 
tend to be smaller. It has been widely welcomed by industry groups, which claim that 
class-action suits harm commerce and benefit lawyers more than their clients .... ‘It is a 
very encouraging step that the Senate judiciary committee has already approved a bill,’ 
said Joe Manero of the Alliance of American Insurers, which represents 340 insurance 
companies.”); Jonathan Weisman, Lawsuit Reform a Bush Priority: President Seeks to 
Limit Class-Action, Malpractice Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at A6 (reporting that 
“President Bush ... demanded congressional action on legislation to rein in class-action ... 
lawsuits”). See infra note 894 and accompanying text (presenting evidence of national 
and multinational corporations’ filing class actions against other corporations in state 
courts between 1998 and 2004). 
348 See Industry Basks in Class-Action Victory: Congress Finally Limits Venue-
Shopping, but Frivolous Suit Bill Hits Dead End, National Underwriter, PROP. & 
CAS./RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Dec. 3, 2005, at 24 (“For eight long years, the 
insurance industry battled on Capitol Hill to put a lid on what they considered to be an 
out-of-control tort system. With Republicans firmly in control of both houses of Congress 
and the White House ... [i]nsurers were positively giddy when President George W. Bush 
signed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 into law. After all, the law moves a lot 
more cases into the more predictable federal courts ....”). 
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B. Brief Overview—The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
1. Findings and Purpose of CAFA 
To justify CAFA’s enactment, the majority of Congress made an argu-
ably highly questionable and contentious finding, which has no support in 
fact or in law. The finding stated in relevant part: during the decade before 
February 19, 2005, states’ class action practices, procedures, and lawsuits 
eroded significantly fundamental principles of judicial federalism.349 More 
specifically, the majority of the 109th Congress concluded that state 
courts’ class action “abuses” had undermined “the national judicial sys-
tem, the free flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity 
jurisdiction” as the framers of the Constitution had intended.350 
Furthermore, the congressional majority found that state courts’ class 
action “abuses” keep “cases of national importance out of federal 
court,”351 and allow state courts to issue biased rulings against out-of-state 
defendants,352 allow certain state courts to impose their judgments and 
“view of the law” on other states,353 and permit certain state tribunals to 
make declarations that “bind the rights” of out-of-state defendants.354 
Therefore, Congress enacted CAFA to restore the Framers of the Constitu-
tion’s original intent—to give federal courts the sole jurisdiction to hear 
and decide class action “cases of national importance” between diverse 
citizens and persons.355 
2. The Scope of Federal Courts’ Diversity Jurisdiction to Certify and 
Decide Class Actions of “National Importance” 
Depending on the circumstances, CAFA requires federal courts to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over certain class action lawsuits,356 and it is immaterial 
if plaintiffs’ file those actions in federal court initially, or defendants re-
move the actions from state to federal courts.357 On the other hand, federal 
                                                 
349 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 4. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. 
355 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
356 Id. 
357 See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (“A class action may be removed to a district court of the 
United States in accordance with section 1446 (except that the 1-year limitation under 
section 1446(b) shall not apply), without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of 
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district courts have no authority to hear and decide those controversies if 
class members qualify for a local-controversy exception under several 
multipronged and complicated tests.358 However, if a proper set of condi-
tions present themselves, a federal court may refuse to exercise jurisdic-
tion over class actions of “national ... interest.”359 
More precisely, under CAFA, federal courts must exercise original ju-
risdiction over class actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds 
$5,000,000.360 In addition, CAFA requires only minimal diversity between 
class action litigants, which can be established relatively easily.361 One 
only needs to show that: (1) at least one class member and one defendant 
are citizens of different states,362 (2) at least one foreign class member—a 
state, citizen or subject—and one defendant have different citizenship,363 
or (3) at least one state class member and one foreign defendant—a state, 
citizen or subject—are among the litigants.364 
But again, CAFA creates an exception that prevents federal district 
courts from certifying and adjudicating class actions that involve “truly 
local controversies.”365 However, to qualify for the “local controversy ex-
ception” and keep class actions in state courts, in-state complainants must 
satisfy five hierarchical and nearly insurmountable tests.366 
First, the “two-thirds citizenship” test requires the class representative 
to prove that more than two-thirds of all proposed class members are citi-
zens of the state in which the action originated.367 Next, the “significant 
relief” test requires class members to prove that at least one defendant is a 
citizen of the state in which the class action originated,368 and that the 
defendant can provide significant relief.369 The third standard—the “sig-
nificant basis” test—requires complainants to prove that at least one de-
fendant’s conduct “forms a significant basis” for class members’ claims,370 
                                                                                                                         
the State in which the action is brought, except that such action may be removed by any 
defendant without the consent of all defendants.”). 
358 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). 
359 Id. at § 1332(d)(3). 
360 Id. at § 1332(d)(2). 
361 Id. at § 1332(d)(2)(A"C). 
362 Id. at § 1332(d)(2)(A). 
363 Id. at § 1332(d)(2)(B). 
364 28 U.S.C. at § 1332(d)(2)(C). 
365 Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A). 
366 Id. 
367 Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I). 
368 Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc). 
369 Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa). 
370 28 U.S.C. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(bb). 
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and the “principle injuries” test requires members to prove that their 
“principle injuries” occurred in the state where they filed the class action 
initially.371 Finally, to invoke the “local-controversy exception,” class 
members must also establish that a prior class action—asserting identical 
or similar allegations against any of the defendants—was not filed during 
the 3-year period before the “current” class action.372 
Again, after considering “the totality of the circumstances” and “the 
interests of justice,” federal district courts may decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion over class actions.373 But before exercising that discretion, federal 
judges must consider a number of extremely complicated factors to pre-
vent an abuse of judicial discretion.374 Those factors appear under three 
headings or tests that may be described loosely as “federalism,” 
“numerosity,” and “commonality.” Under the first heading, district judges 
must determine whether plaintiffs fashioned the class action complaint to 
avoid federal jurisdiction,375 and whether their claims concern issues of 
national importance or an interstate conflict.376 In addition, federal courts 
must uncover whether the laws of the state in which the action originated 
or the laws of other states will govern the disposition of the class action.377 
The “numerosity” test requires federal district judges to determine 
whether the primary defendant and one- to two-thirds of the proposed 
class members are citizens of the state in which the action originated.378 It 
also mandates a determination of: (1) whether the proposed class compris-
es substantially larger numbers of citizens from the state in which the class 
action originates or larger numbers of out-of-state citizens,379 and (2) 
whether substantial diversity in state citizenship exists among other mem-
bers in the proposed class.380 
Finally, federal district judges must apply a “commonality” test and 
assess whether the proposed class commenced the lawsuit in a forum that 
has “a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the 
defendants.”381 Also, to avoid an abuse-of-discretion charge, the judges 
must determine whether plaintiffs filed at least one class action—asserting 
                                                 
371 Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III). 
372 Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii). 
373 Id. at § 1332(d)(3). 
374 Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(A"F). 
375 Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(C). 
376 28 U.S.C. at § 1332(d)(3)(A). 
377 Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(B). 
378 Id. at § 1332(d)(3). 
379 Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(E). 
380 Id. 
381 Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(D). 
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identical or similar claims on behalf of the same or similarly situated per-
sons—anytime during the preceding three years.382 And once more, de-
pending on the judges’ findings, they may decline to exercise federal ju-
risdiction over the proposed class action.383 
IV. CLASS ACTION REMOVALS FROM ALLEGEDLY “BIASED” STATE COURTS 
TO FEDERAL COURTS—ARGUABLY NEWLY CREATED PERILS UNDER 
CAFA FOR CORPORATIONS AND INSURERS AS PLAINTIFFS AND 
DEFENDANTS 
During the House and Senate’s debates on whether to enact CAFA’s 
potentially “radical” class action reforms, members on both sides of the 
political divide cited numerous reasons to embrace or reject the proposed 
legislation.384 Among those supporting the legislation, class action reform-
ers stressed that CAFA would strengthen fundamental principles of judi-
cial federalism.385 How? The proponents asserted: (1) CAFA would allow 
corporate defendants to remove “copycat”386 and very large “national” 
                                                 
382 28 U.S.C. at § 1332(d)(3)(F). 
383 Id. at § 1332(d)(3). 
384 Depending on a congressional member’s political leanings or biases, the following 
reasons were listed frequently as the “true” justifications for CAFA’s enactment: 151 
CONG. REC. 2653 (2005) (statement of Rep. Joe Baca) (“[This Act is] going to signifi-
cantly harm small consumers who want to hold large companies accountable for defraud-
ing them.”); id. at 2645 (statement of Rep. Linda Sanchez) (“[T]his bill really is about .... 
doing a favor for unscrupulous, negligent corporations by making it harder for their 
victims to sue them.”); id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“[Regarding 
CAFA’s purported goal to assure] ‘fair and prompt recoveries’ hundreds of consumer 
rights, labor, civil rights, senior, and environmental organizations, esteemed legal experts, 
and many State Attorneys General believe as I do that this legislation will do just the 
opposite.”); id. at 2072 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[O]ur class action system is 
rife with abuses. It is gamed. It is broken. We need to fix it .... [W]e need to fix it for the 
consumers who are hurt by alleged abuses.”); id. at 1670 (statement of Sen. Sam Brown-
back) (“[M]oving more class actions to federal court would actually reduce the burden 
for everyone. Ultimately, this bill will allow claims with merit to go forward while pre-
venting judicial blackmail.”); id. at 1664 (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“We heard about 
class action lawyers entering into collusive settlements with defendant attorneys which 
were not in the best interest of class members. These are only a few of the gamesmanship 
tactics lawyers like to utilize to bring down the entire class action legal system.”); id. at 
1650 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“This bill is [fashioned] to ... stop the forum shop-
ping, [a practice of] finding jurisdictions that will render outrageous verdicts that basical-
ly benefit the attorneys [rather than] the people for whom they are suing.”). 
385 See infra notes 386"90. 
386 See 151 CONG. REC. 2645 (statement of Rep. Christopher Cannon) (“[W]e need to 
understand the game the class action lawyers play ... and how they [abuse] the court 
systems. I call it Class Action Monopoly .... Rule 23 is the rule that would apply in Fed-
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class actions to federal courts—the allegedly intended and proper forums 
for litigating such lawsuits,387 (2) CAFA’s liberal removal provision will 
help to foster a more efficient form of judicial federalism,388 (3) the new 
statute would prevent supposedly biased state court judges—in “magic 
jurisdictions”389—from employing unprincipled procedures to decrease 
corporate defendants’ likelihoods of winning, and, (4) the new law would 
prevent class members from undermining federalism by taking away their 
“home-court” advantage in state courts.390 
Generally, opponents of class action reforms argued that CAFA 
“[would turn] 200 years of federalism on its head.”391 More explicitly, 
they insisted that CAFA would severely undermine judicial federalism by: 
(1) blocking or limiting state courts’ right392 and competence to enforce 
                                                                                                                         
eral courts that defines when a class action can be certified consistent with fundamental 
fairness and due process considerations. But in this game, there is no fairness. There is no 
due process. So they easily convince their magnet State to certify ... a class and at the 
same time they file copycat lawsuits in State courts all over the country. These are the 
same class actions asserting the same claims on behalf of the same people. These copycat 
lawsuits clog the State courts.”). 
387 See id. at 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
388 See id. at 2092 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“[C]urrent pleading practice 
by the class action plaintiffs bar has very effectively denied Federal jurisdiction over 
cases that are predominantly interstate in nature. These are precisely the kinds of cases 
the Framers thought deserve to be heard in Federal courts .... [This Act only brings] 
pleading practice more into line with constitutional requirements. Cases that are primarily 
intrastate rather than interstate in nature may continue to be heard in State courts. But ... 
clearly interstate [cases] will now be more likely to be heard in Federal court, where they 
belong.”). 
389 See id. at 1828 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, quoting Plaintiffs’ Attorney Rich-
ard Scruggs) (“[In] ‘Magic Jurisdictions,’ trial lawyers have established relationships 
with [elected, populists] ... State court judges .... [Given that political force], it’s almost 
impossible to get a fair trial if you’re a defendant in some of these places.”). 
390 See, e.g., id. at 2084 (statement of Sen. Mike Enzi) (“The class action system in 
our country is broken .... The U.S. Constitution gives jurisdiction to the Federal Govern-
ment when cases involve citizens of differing states. It makes sense ... that no party 
[should have] the inevitable ‘home-court’ advantage ... when a case is tried in [one’s] 
backyard.”). 
391 See id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“There have been many claims 
about ‘judicial hellholes’ and ‘magnet jurisdictions,’ but the evidence shows that these 
claims are ... overstated, and are certainly not so widespread so as to justify passage of 
this legislation .... There is also no reasonable basis for the assertion that this legislation 
‘will restore the intent of the framers’ [respecting] the role of our federal courts.”). 
392 151 CONG. REC. 1647 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“When States act ahead 
of the Federal Government to provide greater rights for their citizens, State courts should 
be allowed to interpret their own laws. State courts, not Federal courts, have the expertise 
in exerting the will of the State legislature and they should have the right to do so. ... We 
should call this bill the ‘Class Action Hypocrisy Act of 2005.’ Our colleagues love to 
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state and local laws,393 (2) allowing federal laws to preempt additional 
state court procedures and rulings,394 (3) reducing aggrieved citizens’ 
constitutional right to secure remedies in both state and federal courts,395 
(4) clogging federal courts with substantially more class actions—which 
will reduce speedy trials and the effective administration of justice,396 and 
(5) allowing an out-of-state or a foreign corporate defendant to move a 
truly local, massive class action “into [a federal court] even if all ... under-
lying facts in the case happened in a single state.”397 
In light of the pre-CAFA federalism debate, this Part presents an anal-
ysis of whether CAFA’s newly minted procedural requirements are more 
likely to restore, support or undermine fundamental principles of judicial 
federalism. Furthermore, as reported above, CAFA created many new 
tests.398 It leaves, however, the burden of defining and explaining the pa-
rameters of those tests for federal courts of appeals or for various panels 
within those circuits. Therefore, a discussion of some newly generated 
substantive questions and conflicts—involving the Erie doctrine, choice of 
                                                                                                                         
proclaim States rights when Congress tries to expand the rights of law in all 50 States, but 
they do not hesitate to override States rights to help their business friends. This bill is a 
windfall for guilty corporate offenders.”). 
393 See id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton, quoting Arthur Miller) (“[The 
Act is] a radical departure from one of the most basic, longstanding principles of federal-
ism [and] is a particular affront to state judges when we consider the unquestioned vitali-
ty and competence of state courts to which we have historically and frequently entrusted 
the enforcement of state-created rights and remedies”). 
394 See id. at 2082 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (“I would hate to see this 
bill which already turns the idea of federalism on its head preempt any more State 
rules and procedures than it already does with the diversity provisions.”). 
395 See id. at 2647 (statement of Rep. Jay Inslee) (“[Presently, there are] two arms to 
protect Americans, the State judicial system and the Federal judicial system. This [bill] 
reduces by half the resources that are available to Americans to get redress when Enron 
steals from them or when Vioxx kills them.... [I]n our system of federalism, Americans 
deserve the full protection, not just half the protection. This [bill] cuts the available 
judicial resources in half.”). 
396 See id. at 2646 (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt) (“[H]aving practiced law for over 
20 years, [I’m certain] the core provisions of this bill will invite prolonged satellite litiga-
tion into ill-defined or undefined terms in this bill, clogging the Federal courts and deny-
ing prompt justice to worthy claimants.”); id. at 1657 (statement of Sen. Russell 
Feingold) (“Criminal cases ... take precedence in the federal courts, because of the 
Speedy Trial Act. So if you look at this [Act] in ... context, the net result of removing 
virtually all class actions, civil cases, of course, to federal court will be to delay those 
cases.”). 
397 151 CONG. REC. at 1646 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy). 
398 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A) (2006). 
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law rules, and the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act—appear 
here as well. 
A. Allegedly “Biased” State Courts, Class Action Removals Under CAFA 
and the Erie Doctrine—Arguably a Catch-22 for Corporations and In-
surers Who Are Plaintiffs in Federal Courts 
Writing for the majority in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,399 Associate 
Justice Brennan used Catch-22—a widely used idiom—to describe per-
sons who found themselves in a “no-win situation” or in a “double 
bind.”400 He wrote: “An employer who objects to aggressiveness in wom-
en but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable 
and impermissible Catch-22: [Women are] out of a job if they behave 
aggressively and [they are] out of a job if they do not. Title VII [of the 
Civil Rights Act] lifts women out of this bind.”401 On another occasion, 
then Associate Justice Rehnquist used the idiom to illustrate the majority’s 
arguably absurd holding in Aguilar v. Felton.402 He wrote: “[Today,] the 
Court takes advantage of the ‘Catch-22’ paradox of its own creation.... [It 
declares that] aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the 
supervision itself is held to cause an entanglement. The Court ... strikes 
down nondiscriminatory nonsectarian aid to educationally deprived chil-
dren from low-income families. [However, the] Establishment Clause does 
not prohibit such sorely needed assistance ....”403 
CAFA creates a Catch-22 for a proposed class of complainants in a di-
versity lawsuit. Consider the evidence and settled law. Rule 23(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a federal district court to certify 
a class action.404 To achieve that end, the district court must determine 
whether a certification would satisfy four requirements under Rule 
23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and representativeness.405 In 
                                                 
399 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
400 See id. at 251. 
401 Id. 
402 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420–21 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
403 See id.; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (“Interferences with religion should arguably be dealt with under the Free Exer-
cise Clause .... [However, we] have not always followed Walz’s reflective inquiry into 
entanglement. ... One of the difficulties with the entanglement prong is that, when di-
vorced from the logic of Walz, it creates an ‘insoluable paradox’ in school aid cases: we 
have required aid to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use, 
yet this close supervision itself will create an entanglement.”). 
404 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
405 Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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addition, if the proposed class wants damages, Rule 23(b)(3) requires the 
district court to determine whether the class representative has satisfied the 
predominance and superiority requirements.406 Again, the predominance 
element requires a court to find that common issues of law or fact “pre-
dominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”407 
In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., the Supreme 
Court declared that when a federal district court exercises diversity or 
supplemental jurisdiction over a controversy, the Erie doctrine408 requires 
that court to apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.409 In 
light of Klaxon’s ruling, federal district courts have grappled with the 
predominance requirement for at least thirty-five years.410 The reason for 
this is not complex. Fairly often, a Rule 23(b)(3) class action includes 
extremely large numbers of complainants who reside in every state.411 
Consequently, as the variability among proposed class members’ domicil-
iary states increases, variances among those states’ laws also increases.412 
Under our system of federalism, each state wants its citizens to be 
treated fairly and receive adequate damages in a federal diversity trial. 
Thus, to address each class member’s individual claims and causes of 
action, a federal district court must perform a thorough choice of law 
analysis.413 In the process the district judge might feel compelled to apply 
the laws of fifty states and the District of Columbia, a conclusion that 
certainly conflicts with Klaxon.414 At that point the court could deny class 
                                                 
406 See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004). 
407 Id. at 52. 
408 See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 
1992) (“[I]t is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can, what the highest 
court of the state would decide.”). 
409 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that the 
federal court sitting in Delaware must apply conflict of law rules in conformity with those 
applied in Delaware state courts). 
410 See Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 104 (D.C. Colo. 
1971) (certifying a class after determining that common issues were predominant). 
411 See, e.g., Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2007) (accepting 
the district court’s finding that the laws of all fifty-one jurisdictions applied to the class 
action); Marino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 245 F.R.D. 729, 734 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (certi-
fying a class that would involve a breach-of-contract claim for all fifty states). 
412 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995). 
413 Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d Cir. 2006). 
414 See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496 (stating that a state has the right to pursue local poli-
cies that the federal courts cannot thwart by enforcing other general laws). 
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certification,415 concluding that the variations among states’ laws “swamp 
any common issues and defeat predominance.”416 
In view of the Erie-Klaxon requirements, choice of law problems gen-
erally, and the predominance requirement in particular, CAFA creates an 
indefensible Catch-22 for persons who ask federal courts to certify a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action.417 The paradox is this: a stated purpose of CAFA is 
to ensure that class actions of national importance are certified and litigat-
ed in federal courts,418 given state courts’ alleged incompetency and the 
wide variances among state laws.419 But federal courts may not certify 
class actions of national importance given the predominance requirement 
and wide variances among state laws.420 
Undeniably, during the Senate and House’s debates CAFA’s support-
ers and opponents were very cognizant of federal district courts’ immense 
propensity to deny Rule 23(b)(3) certification motions when wide vari-
ances appear in the proposed class members’ state laws.421 To correct that 
perceived injustice, Senators Feinstein and Bingaman offered an amend-
ment.422 It read in the pertinent part, “the district judge shall not deny class 
certification, in whole or in part, on the ground that the law of more than 
one State will be applied.”423 The Senate majority, however, rejected the 
Feinstein-Bingaman amendment.424 
Essentially, the majority of CAFA’s supporters concluded that adopt-
ing the amendment would undermine fundamental principles of federalism 
                                                 
415 See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“Appellants argue that the Rule 23(a) commonality and Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 
requirements were not satisfied in this case because of variations in the claims and inju-
ries of the plaintiffs ... as well as differences in the laws of the 50 states which form the 
basis of several of the class’ claims.”). 
416 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (citing Georgine v. Amchem 
Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
417 Compare id. (stating that a court must consider the variations in state law across 
multiple jurisdictions when considering class certifications), with Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (establishing that CAFA’s intent is to 
ensure interstate cases of national importance are considered under diversity jurisdiction). 
418 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 119 Stat. at 5. 
419 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995). 
420 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 752. 
421 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2083 (2005) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); id. at 2657 
(statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner). 
422 See id. at 1832 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (offering an amendment to 
address federal judges’ ability to deny class certifications due to immense variance across 
state law). 
423 Id. at 1814. 
424 Id. at 1832. 
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because it would have allowed federal courts to apply a single state’s law 
in a nationwide class action.425 But was CAFA’s supporters’ concern justi-
fied? Arguably it was not, serving only as a specious reason to reject the 
Feinstein-Bingaman amendment.426 If CAFA’s supporters had carefully 
reviewed the Supreme Court’s choice of law ruling in Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts,427 they would have discovered that the Feinstein-Bingaman 
amendment simply embraced that ruling.428 
In Shutts at least 28,000 aggrieved royalty owners filed a class action 
against Phillips Petroleum to secure interest payments on the owners’ 
suspended royalties.429 Although the complainants resided “in all 50 
States, the District of Columbia, and several foreign countries,” the class 
representatives filed the nationwide class action in a Kansas state court.430 
The judge certified the class and ruled in favor of the class on the mer-
its.431 The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the decision,432 concluding that 
“the law of the forum control[s] all claims unless ‘compelling reasons’ 
existed to apply a different law.”433 Failing to find a compelling reason to 
apply the substantive law of another state, the Kansas Supreme Court 
concluded that the entire cause of action had to proceed under Kansas’s 
class action statute.434 Phillips petitioned the Supreme Court for review.435 
Before the Court, Phillips argued that “Kansas courts could not apply 
Kansas law to every claim in the dispute.”436 According to the company, 
“total application of Kansas substantive law violated the constitutional 
limitations on choice of law mandated by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, 
§ 1.”437 Phillips also stressed that Kansas’s trial court “should have looked 
to the laws of each State where the leases were located to determine ... 
                                                 
425 See id. at 1820 (Letter submitted by Mr. Walter E. Dellinger of O’Melveny & My-
ers, LLP). 
426 See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822–23 (1985) (providing support 
for the amendment’s goals in its conclusion that the application of Kansas law to every 
claim was arbitrary and unfair to substantive conflicts with other applicable jurisdictions). 
427 Id. at 823. 
428 See id. at 822–23 (concluding that applying Kansas law to every claim was arbi-
trary and unfair due to substantive conflicts with the law of other jurisdictions). 
429 Id. at 799. 
430 Id. at 803. 
431 Id. 
432 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799. 
433 Id. at 803. 
434 See id. 
435 Id. at 799. 
436 Id. at 802. 
437 Id. at 816. 
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whether interest on the suspended royalties was recoverable, and at what 
rate.”438 
To determine whether Kansas’s court exceeded constitutional, choice-
of-substantive-law limits, the Shutts Court applied a two-part test. First, a 
court must find that “common issues of law or fact” predominate among 
class members before certifying a class action.439 Second, a state “must 
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, [with 
class members] creating state interests, such that choice of its law is nei-
ther arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”440 In the end, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the courts in Kansas failed to satisfy the second element. 441 
Before the enactment of CAFA, the significant-contact, choice of law 
principle in Shutts was clear: when adjudicating a nationwide class action, 
“a state court may be free to apply one of several choices of law,” as long 
as there are significant contacts and the choice of law is not arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair.442 Simply put, the pre-CAFA Feinstein-Bingaman 
amendment would have codified Shutts’s choice of law ruling and in-
structed federal district courts to apply that rule and certify a class action 
even if multiple states’ laws were applicable in a certain controversy.443 
So, what would be an unintended adverse consequence for corpora-
tions as plaintiffs in class actions? Like complaining consumers, multina-
tional corporations and insurance companies may also file class actions, 
often citing numerous violations and claims under various state laws. In 
light of Rule 23(c)(4)’s predominance requirement and Congress’s refusal 
to insert the Feinstein-Bingaman language into CAFA, disgruntled corpo-
rate entities will also probably have more difficulty certifying their clas-
ses. At this point, one congressman’s insightful observation and conclu-
sions in speaking against CAFA are worth repeating: 
                                                 
438 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 802–03. 
439 Id. at 821. 
440 Id. at 818 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)). 
441 See id. at 822 (citing Pac. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 
493, 502 (1939); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930)). 
442 See id. at 823 (stating that the state court is free to apply a choice of law as long as 
the requirements of Allstate and Home Insurance Co. are met). 
443 See 151 CONG. REC. 1813 (2005). 
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Do you want to know why the Chamber of Commerce is spending $1 
billion to lobby on what seems to be a procedural issue? Because they 
throw out class actions where there is any difference in States[’ sub-
stantive laws], meaning you will not be able to have a class action an-
ywhere, anywhere, Federal or State.444 
Arguably, this conclusion applies to corporate complainants who 
commence class actions against corporations generally and insurance 
companies in particular.445 
B. CAFA’s “Minimal Diversity” and “Cases of National Importance” 
Rules—“Trojan Horses” for Insurers as Defendants in Federal Courts? 
Once more, it is important to distinguish national insurance companies 
as plaintiffs from national insurers as defendants in class actions as well as 
in other consumer-initiated lawsuits. As corporate defendants, national 
insurers face a conundrum—determining whether federal or state courts 
should have greater power to “regulate” insurers’ business practices gen-
erally or to hear and decide consumers’ insurance-related claims and caus-
es in particular. As discussed in Part III.A, insurers as defendants have 
campaigned long and aggressively to ensure that state courts rather than 
federal courts hear and resolve most “business of insurance” disputes as 
well as consumers’ complaints against insurers.446 In fact, by embracing a 
                                                 
444 Id. at 2647 (statements of Rep. Jay Inslee); see also id. at H742 (statements of Rep. 
William Delahunt) (“[W]e have before us a bill that would sweep aside generations of 
State laws that protect consumers. Citizens will be denied their basic right to use their 
own State courts to file class action lawsuits against companies.”). But see Gunnells v. 
Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[S]uperiority requirements in 
Rule 23(b)(3) do not foreclose the possibility of mass tort class actions, but merely ensure 
that class certification in such cases ‘achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and 
promote ... uniformity of decision ... without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing 
about other undesirable results.’” (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
615 (1997))). It is worth stressing, however, that federal courts have “relaxed” the pre-
dominance requirement when class representatives’ federal-statutory rather than state law 
claims formed the basis of the class action complaints. See, e.g., Kohen v. Pac. Inv. 
Mgmt. Co. LLC, 244 F.R.D. 469, 480 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding predominance, certifying 
a class, and allowing the action to proceed under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 25(a)(1)(D)); New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. First Databank Inc., 
244 F.R.D. 79, 89 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding predominance, certifying a class, and allow-
ing the action to proceed under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). 
445 See, e.g., J.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., 225 F.R.D. 208, 210 (S.D. 
Ohio 2003) (deciding class certification for corporate complainant attempting class action 
against corporation). 
446 See supra notes 279–94 and accompanying text. 
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states’ rights argument and insisting that state courts are more likely to 
issue fairer and more favorable equitable rulings, insurers as defendants 
have a rich history of removing, or trying to remove, declaratory judgment 
and subrogation actions from federal courts to state courts.447 
Yet, insurers as defendants lobbied passionately for CAFA’s enact-
ment and embrace wholeheartedly that statute’s class action reforms that 
allow insurers-defendants to remove large blocks of class actions and, 
indirectly, business of insurance controversies from state courts to federal 
courts.448 So it is worth asking why insurers as defendants would endorse 
CAFA’s removal rule in one instance, and, in another instance, campaign 
to keep business of insurance and insurance-related lawsuits in state 
courts. Apparently, when it is fitting, multinational insurers will argue that 
federal courts are “highly principled,” “unbiased,” and exceedingly more 
competent to hear and decide business of insurance and class action law-
suits.449 On other occasions, when procedural and substantive hurdles are 
perceived as being too onerous in federal courts, insurers as defendants are 
likely to embrace a contradictory position and assert that only state courts 
should have the sole authority to hear and decide insurance-related contro-
versies.450 
However, in light of CAFA’s questionable findings, one may assume 
that federal courts are indeed significantly less likely to be biased against 
multinational insurers who are defendants in class actions. Still, insurers-
defendants as well as plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsels should ask 
whether CAFA’s newly enacted reforms contain any hidden procedural 
perils for insurers who decide to remove class actions from allegedly bi-
ased and unsympathetic state courts to professedly impartial and more 
proficient federal courts. Without a doubt, the legal literature and federal 
                                                 
447 See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. ABB Lummus Global, Inc., 
2004 WL 224505, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2004) (petitioning district court to remove the 
action to a New York state court to declare whether the underwriters had a contractual 
obligation to indemnify their insured’s for settling third-party claims); La. Farm Bureau 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 207 F. Supp. 2d 524, 526–27 (M.D. La. 2002) 
(granting insurer’s request to remand the subrogation action to state court because the 
removal to federal court was untimely); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Daybreak Express, 
Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 538, 539 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (describing insurers’ petitioning to 
remove the controversy to state court given the district court’s lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction). 
448 See Claybrook, supra note 347 (stating that the insurance industry provided signif-
icant support to CAFA due to the industry’s tendency to federalize class action lawsuits). 
449 See infra notes 491–97 and accompanying text. 
450 See Certain Underwriters, 2004 WL 224505, at *3. 
2012] ALLEGEDLY “BIASED,” “INTIMIDATING” 493 
 
cases are replete with examples of modern-day “Trojan horses”451—newly 
enacted statutes which contain unanticipated and effective stratagems or 
weapons for one’s legal adversaries.452 CAFA embraces the “minimal 
diversity rule”453 and allows “cases of national importance” to be removed 
from state to federal courts.454 Even more importantly, the insurance in-
dustry lobbied effectively for those two provisions to help increase corpo-
rate defendants’ likelihood of litigating and winning most class actions in 
federal courts.455 
However, as discussed below, CAFA’s procedural hurdles, the mini-
mal diversity and cases of national importance rules, are likely to become 
“Trojan horses” for defendant insurance companies.456 Put simply, classes 
of aggrieving consumers may cite those rules and force reticent corporate 
defendants to litigate ancillary state law controversies in federal courts 
rather than in state courts. But even more importantly, CAFA’s “cases of 
national importance” rule is likely to enhance federal courts’ ability to 
accomplish what the Supreme Court’s decision in South-Eastern Under-
writers Association could not accomplish and undo what the McCarran-
Ferguson Act has tried to prevent.457 Debatably, CAFA’s “cases of nation-
al importance” provision gives federal courts greater powers to regulate 
more extensively the “business of insurance” generally, as well as the 
business affairs and conduct of individual insurers in particular.458 
1. Class Action Lawsuits, CAFA’s “Minimal Diversity Rule” and Po-
tential Unintended Consequences for Corporate Defendants 
How might CAFA’s “minimal diversity rule” adversely affect insurers 
as defendants? More than a century ago, the Supreme Court decided 
Strawbridge v. Curtiss and restricted inferior federal courts from exercis-
                                                 
451 A search of Westlaw’s JLR database using the query ti(“Trojan horse”) generated 
fifty-one articles (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
452 See Ian D. Prior & Lisa Skehill, Beware the Federal Government Bearing Gifts: 
How the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Could Become a Whistle-
blowing Trojan Horse, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 565, 565–66 (2010) (discussing how the 
statute’s Trojan horse properties stem from an apparent windfall for plaintiff attorney’s 
while containing the many hidden downfalls). 
453 See infra notes 459–90 and accompanying text. 
454 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5. 
455 See Claybrook, supra note 347 (stating that the insurance industry provided signif-
icant support to CAFA due to the Act’s various provisions that would send more suits to 
federal court). 
456 See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1–B.2. 
457 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
458 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
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ing jurisdiction over certain legal controversies.459 More specifically, the 
Court fashioned the “complete diversity” rule and declared that federal 
district courts may have original jurisdiction over diversity cases only if 
the aggregate of plaintiffs and the aggregate of defendants were citizens of 
different states.460 In 1967, the Court decided State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. Tashire, explaining its decision in Strawbridge and declaring that 
the “complete diversity” rule is a statutory rather than a constitutional 
requirement.461 
The Tashire Court also held that Article III of the Constitution allows 
federal courts to decide diversity cases when one establishes only “mini-
mal” diversity—a standard requiring a movant to prove that at least one 
plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of different states.462 Two years 
later, the Supreme Court decided Snyder v. Harris and reduced the mo-
vant’s burden even further.463 In Harris the Court held that federal district 
courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over class actions by de-
termining only the citizenship of the plaintiffs named in the complaint.464 
CAFA adopts the minimal diversity rule.465 Therefore, looking pro-
spectively, insurers as defendants—on behalf of themselves and their 
insured corporate entities—will possibly have less difficulty removing 
allegedly “frivolous” state law class actions from purportedly hostile state 
courts to federal courts.466 It is also important to stress that on numerous 
occasions before class action reforms, insurers as defendants praised state 
court judges and fought vigorously to remove “business of insurance” as 
well as state law class actions from federal to state courts, insisting em-
phatically that federal courts did not have jurisdiction.467 
The next point, however, is even more important. Before CAFA, some 
insurers-defendants argued in federal courts that complete diversity was 
                                                 
459 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267–68 (1806) (stating that 
where there is a joint interest, each individual concerned in that interest must be liable to 
sue or be sued in that court). 
460 Id. 
461 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967). 
462 See id. at 531. 
463 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969). 
464 Id. 
465 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 9. 
466 See Harris, 394 U.S. at 340 (permitting a showing of diversity of citizenship when 
any one member of a class of plaintiffs and any one member of a class of defendants are 
citizens of different states). 
467 See supra note 450. 
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absent between themselves and their insured customers.468 Thus, accord-
ing to the insurers, federal district court judges had a constitutional duty to 
remove the insurance litigation from federal to state courts, since most of 
the consumers and insurers were citizens of the same state.469 To illustrate, 
consider a few pertinent facts in Schlumberger Industries, Inc. v. National 
Surety Corp.
470 Schlumberger and its predecessor in interest purchased 
comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance contracts from numerous 
insurance companies.471 In the course of events Schlumberger released 
hazardous substances contaminating the soil and water at certain sites in 
South Carolina.472 State and federal environmental-protection agencies 
ordered Schlumberger to decontaminate the areas.473 
After Schlumberger complied, its two liability insurers, National Sure-
ty Corporation and American Insurance Company, commenced a declara-
tory judgment action in a federal district court in South Carolina.474 The 
insurers asked the district court to determine their rights and responsibili-
ties under the CGL insurance contracts (Anderson suit).475 Schlumberger 
filed a similar declaratory judgment suit in a South Carolina court in 
Greenville County (Greenville suit) about a month after the two insurers 
filed the Anderson suit.476 The Greenville complaint listed numerous in-
surers, including National and American, as defendants and petitioned the 
state court to determine whether each CGL insurer had a contractual duty 
to reimburse Schlumberger’s expenditures for decontaminating the pollut-
ed sites.477 
After some complicated procedural maneuvers, the cases were consol-
idated in the federal district court.478 The insurance companies moved to 
dismiss and remand the Greenville suit to state court,479 insisting that 
complete diversity among the Greenville litigants was absent.480 The dis-
                                                 
468 See, e.g., Schlumberger Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 36 F.3d 1274, 1277 (4th 
Cir. 1994). 
469 See id. at 1284 (mentioning insurers’ assertion that the insured argue in favor of ju-
risdictional manipulation and overrode interests of domestic insurers to remain in federal 
court). 
470 Id. at 1274–75. 
471 Id. at 1277. 
472 Id. at 1276–77. 
473 Id. at 1277. 
474 Schlumberger, 36 F.3d at 1277. 
475 Id. 
476 Id. 
477 Id. 
478 Id. at 1277–78. 
479 See id. at 1277. 
480 Schlumberger, 36 F.3d at 1277. 
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trict court refused to remand the Greenville suit.481 On appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling.482 
The Fourth Circuit reiterated that “removal jurisdiction raises signifi-
cant federalism concerns.”483 Citing Strawbridge and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), 
the Court of Appeals stressed that federal courts may not exercise diversi-
ty jurisdiction unless the plaintiff establishes complete diversity among the 
parties.484 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit found “only minimal diversity” 
after the federal district court dismissed a key insurer from the Greenville 
suit. 485 Therefore, the appellate court remanded the case to the state court, 
declaring that the federal district court did not have jurisdiction over the 
Greenville suit.486 
Again, satisfying corporate defendants’ wishes, CAFA clearly em-
braces the “minimal diversity” rather than “complete diversity” rule.487 
But note: in Schlumberger, the insurers as defendants unmistakably did 
not want the federal district court judge to decide the case.488 However, in 
a post-CAFA era, disgruntled consumers, like the insured-company-
consumer in Schlumberger, may prefer to litigate mixed federal and state 
law class actions in federal courts rather than in state courts. Before 
CAFA, such an effort would have been thwarted if the consumers did not 
satisfy Strawbridge’s “complete diversity” rule.489 Arguably, in a post-
CAFA era, the minimal diversity rule will allow corporate defendants as 
well as allegedly injured consumers to remove certain state law class ac-
tions to federal courts, even if the aggregates of aggrieved consumers and 
corporate defendants are not completely diverse.490 
                                                 
481 Id. 
482 Id. at 1288. 
483 Id. at 1284 (“[W]here federal [removal] jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is neces-
sary.” (quoting Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 
1994))). 
484 See id. (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)). 
485 Id. 
486 Schlumberger, 36 F.3d at 1284. 
487 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5. 
488 See Schlumberger, 36 F.3d at 1284 (mentioning insurers’ assertion that the insured 
argue in favor of jurisdictional manipulation and overrode interests of domestic insurers 
to remain in federal court). 
489 See Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267–68. 
490 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Class-Action Bill Favorable to Business Passes House, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A5 (“[CAFA] give[s] federal courts jurisdiction over any 
class action lawsuit with claims totaling more than $2 million if at least one plaintiff and 
one defendant were from different states.”). 
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2. CAFA’s “Cases of National Importance” Rule and Some Potential 
Unintended Consequences for Insurers as Defendants in Class Ac-
tions 
To reiterate, a major purpose of CAFA is to restore the framers’ intent 
by allowing federal rather than state courts to hear and decide “interstate 
cases of national importance.”491 According to class action reformers, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers often abuse class action procedures by filing “nation-
wide class actions” in state courts that have a history of favoring plain-
tiffs.492 Therefore, as reported earlier, CAFA makes it easier for corporate 
defendants to remove such actions “from state courts to federal courts, 
where rules of evidence and procedure are often viewed as more favorable 
to defendants.”493 
Possibly the “cases of national importance” rule will present unintend-
ed risks and complications for insurers.494 Again, in South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Association, the Supreme Courts gave federal courts expansive 
powers to regulate the “business of insurance” under the Commerce 
Clause and, by implication, the business activities of insurance compa-
nies,495 but large insurance conglomerates vigorously attacked the Court’s 
allegedly “hostile” decision in that monumental case.496 However, as of 
this writing and in the wake of CAFA, large insurance conglomerates are 
celebrating their statutory right to remove so-called “cases of national 
importance” from supposedly unprincipled, unfriendly, and biased state 
courts.497 Thus, it is warranted to ask: will CAFA’s “cases of national 
importance rule” adversely affect insurers—class action defendants who 
might prefer to litigate certain insurance-related disputes in state courts 
                                                 
491 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. at 5. 
492 Pear, supra note 490. 
493 Id. 
494 See, e.g., Blackfeet Nat’l Bank v. Nelson, 171 F.3d 1237, 1244 n. 10 (11th Cir. 
1999) (“[F]ederal laws involving issues of paramount national concern ... have been held 
to be exempt from the reverse preemption provisions of McCarran-Ferguson” (citing 
Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1231 (2d Cir. 1995))). 
495 See Margo Beller, History Repeats Insurance Debate Before US Courts, J. OF 
COM., June 9, 1994, at 9A (“The decision in United States vs. South-Eastern Underwrit-
ers Association had two immediate consequences. One was to overturn its own previous 
case law that had given states the power to regulate insurance transactions within their 
borders. The other was to provoke Congress into passing legislation that amended the 
Sherman Act and others so that federal antitrust law would not apply to ‘the business of 
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law’ except for inci-
dents of coercion, intimidation or boycott.”). 
496 See supra notes 279–96 and accompanying text. 
497 See id. 
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rather than in federal courts? Debatably, CAFA’s rule will undermine the 
very purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, by decreasing state courts’ 
powers and increasing federal courts’ powers to “regulate” the insurance 
industry.498 As support for this point of view, consider the following dis-
cussion. 
The United States Constitution, federal laws, and treaties create vari-
ous rights and obligations,499 and Congress has given federal district 
courts original jurisdiction over civil actions when those rights and obliga-
tions generate federal questions of law and fact.500 The “well-pleaded 
complaint” rule, however, is strict: federal district courts may not exercise 
federal question jurisdiction unless a “substantial question of federal law” 
appears on the face of a plaintiff’s complaint.501 Stated slightly differently, 
a plaintiff must prove that he has a right to be in federal court and a federal 
right has been violated.502 
Certainly, aggrieving insurance consumers’ ability to file class actions 
against insurers in federal courts would be challenging if those plaintiffs 
                                                 
498 See Beller supra note 495 (“[E]ven after McCarran became law, questions over 
what parts of the insurance business are state-regulated have continued to bedevil insur-
ers, legislators and regulators alike. Or as one legal scholar, Robert E. Keeton, a professor 
and associate dean at Harvard University Law School ... put it in his write-up of the 
South-Eastern case ... ‘Underlying this continuing controversy over federal-state alloca-
tion of regulatory responsibility is a set of unanswered questions about the relative effec-
tiveness of state and federal agencies. The answers to these questions may differ from 
generation to generation, and they are likely to be debatable in every generation.’”); see 
also Robert L. Redding, Will 110th Congress Open the Door on the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act?, AUTOINC. (Feb. 2, 2007), http://www.autoinc.org/archives/2007/feb2007/legis.htm 
(“The 110th Congress has an opportunity to revisit repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
It is encouraged by the last Congress’s interest in insurance reform, life insurance com-
panies’ desire for federal regulation of their industry and consumers and small business’ 
longing for the regulation of an industry that could create a more level playing field. Fear 
in the insurance industry [of] strong federal regulation ... led to Congress passing the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945.... Interest in repealing McCarran-Ferguson is not 
new.”). 
499 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 
U.S. 546, 552 (2005). 
500 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Exxon, 545 U.S. at 552. 
501 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 
(1983) (“Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by 
removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establish-
es either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief 
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”); Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908). 
502 See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974) 
(“The threshold allegation required of such a well-pleaded complaint—the right to pos-
session—was plainly enough alleged to be based on federal law.”). 
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could not identify specific rights and remedies under federal statutes. And, 
without a doubt, CAFA’s “cases of national importance” rule is a proce-
dural rather than a substantive rule.503 But a fairly liberal reading of 
CAFA’s procedural rule is arguably ambiguous. Thus, that ambiguity 
could create an opening for class action complainants to remove purely 
substantive state law, business of insurance disputes from state courts to 
federal district courts. Quite simply, aggrieved consumers could assert that 
their substantive, “business of insurance” claim involves an issue of “na-
tional importance.” Would that argument work? The aggrieved insurance 
consumers probably would prevail, because federal courts have a long 
history of ignoring insurers/defendants’ numerous protestations and con-
cluding that clearly substantive state law, business of insurance disputes 
were “matters of national concern.”504 
                                                 
503 Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(“CAFA was clearly designed to prevent plaintiffs from artificially structuring their suits 
to avoid federal jurisdiction. The statutory language notes that ‘[c]lass action lawsuits are 
an important and valuable part of the legal system’ because they allow aggregation of 
claims so that a defendant faces only a single action. Furthermore, CAFA states that 
‘there have been abuses of the class action device,’ including that ‘[s]tate and local courts 
are ... keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court.’ According to the rele-
vant Senate Report, CAFA was necessary because the previous law ‘enable[d] lawyers to 
‘game’ the procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state 
courts whose judges have reputations for readily certifying classes and approving settle-
ments without regard to class member interests. CAFA provides defendants with access 
to the federal courts, ‘mak[ing] it harder for plaintiffs’ counsel to game the system by 
trying to defeat diversity jurisdiction, creat[ing] efficiencies in the judicial system by 
allowing overlapping and copycat cases to be consolidated in a single federal court, [and] 
plac[ing] the determination of more interstate class action lawsuits in the proper forum-
the federal courts.’ ... CAFA [does] not to permit the splintering of lawsuits solely to 
avoid federal jurisdiction in the fashion done in this case.” (citing CAFA § 2(a)(1), 
(4)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 1711; S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 4–5; U.S. Code Cong & Admin. News 
2005 at 3 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
504 See, e.g., Blackfeet Nat’l Bank v. Nelson, 171 F.3d 1237, 1244 n.10 (11th Cir. 
1999) (“[F]ederal laws involving issues of paramount national concern—such as the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)—
have been held to be exempt from the reverse preemption provisions of McCarran-
Ferguson.”); Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers and Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (citing the “national concern” ruling in Spirt, reiterating that it would defy 
common sense and congressional policy to exempt the insurance industry from the reach 
of federal anti-discrimination and labor-relations laws, stressing that the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act reflects an equally important national concern—foreign policy, and 
concluding that “[o]ur precedent in Spirt requires us to apply federal law to the insurance 
industry, in spite of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, whenever federal law clearly intends to 
displace all state laws to the contrary”); Klosterman v. W. Gen. Mgmt., Inc., 32 F.3d 
1119, 1120 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he state of health care insurance in our country” is a 
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Furthermore, citing the “national importance” language in CAFA’s 
class action removal rule, disgruntled insurance consumers might be able 
to commence purely substantive state law disputes against insurers in 
federal courts for another reason.505 First, insurers as well as corporate 
defendants generally have asserted unambiguously that the CAFA creates 
various substantive and procedural “rights” for corporations as well as for 
those litigants who would sue corporations.506 But even more importantly, 
federal courts could possibly: (1) cite CAFA’s “national importance” 
language, (2) create substantive rights “out of thin air,” and (3) declare 
that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over purely state law, 
business of insurance controversies.507 Most assuredly, such judicial crea-
tivity has happened before.508 
                                                                                                                         
“national concern”); Metrolina Family Practice Grp., P.A. v. Sullivan, 767 F. Supp. 1314, 
1321 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (“The mere fact that an activity has been considered to be a ‘local 
interest’ in the past does not invalidate Congressional legislation: ‘Needs that were nar-
row or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the 
Nation.’ The problem of limiting physicians’ fees in the federal health insurance program 
is indisputably of national concern.” (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 
(1936)); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1065–66 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“The McCarran Act was never meant to prevent, and could not prevent, Congress from 
explicitly imposing requirements on employers and their agents under [federal] civil 
rights statutes, the National Labor Relations Act, or any other [federal] statute” designed 
to secure compliance with federal civil-rights and labor-relations policies as well as with 
other areas of national concern); Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 506, 
521 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to dismiss insureds’ putative class action against a life 
insurer who allegedly violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO), reiterating that RICO’s purpose involves matters of “national concern,” and 
concluding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reverse-preemption doctrine did not bar 
the insureds’ RICO claims); In re Laitasalo, 193 B.R. 187, 192 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(finding that federal bankruptcy laws recognize and embrace “important national con-
cerns” involving “the treatment of foreign debtors, U.S. and foreign creditors and interna-
tional commerce” and concluding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reverse-preemption 
doctrine did not bar the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction). 
505 See infra note 506. 
506 See, e.g., Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“[G]iven CAFA’s purpose to increase class action litigants’ access to federal courts,” 
Progressive argued that federal courts “should interpret CAFA as allowing a plaintiff 
forced to defend a class action on the basis of a cross-complaint to have the same right to 
remove the class action as a defendant.”); Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070, 1073–
74 (8th Cir. 2006) (considering Merck’s argument that “CAFA confers a right to be in 
federal court” and concluding that “nothing in CAFA grants such a right”—but noting 
that CAFA’s emphasis on litigating “interstate cases of national importance” in federal 
courts was inserted for the benefits of society-at-large). 
507 See infra note 508. 
508 See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Servs., 
Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1302 & n.32 (11th Cir. 2003) (Tjoflat, J., and Birch, J., dissenting) 
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Furthermore, a very liberal interpretation of the phrase “national im-
portance” could encourage dissatisfied insurance consumers to file more 
class actions against insurers in federal courts. And if consumers pre-
vailed, each successful lawsuit could allow federal judges to micromanage 
insurers’ business activities incrementally, state by state. To be sure, in 
recent years, federal courts have issued fairly far-reaching rulings that 
interfered with insurers’ ability to manage their core activities of assessing 
risks, setting and adjusting rates, setting premiums, and developing un-
derwriting standards.509 Dehoyos v. Allstate Corporation presents an ex-
cellent illustration of how federal courts could interfere effectively and 
increasingly with otherwise federally unregulated insurers’ freedom to 
manage their corporate activities and practice the business of insurance in 
a post-CAFA era.510 
In Dehoyos, subsidiaries of Allstate Corporation (Allstate), the second 
largest liability insurer in the nation,511 insured six racial minorities under 
                                                                                                                         
(“After incorrectly asserting jurisdiction, I can hardly fault the district court for pulling 
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard out of thin air, giving only a ‘Cf.’ citation to a 
Supreme Court case ....”); In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156, 174 (2d Cir. 
1987) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (“There are only three instances when a district court’s 
action is not limited by its jurisdictional power .... From these three precisely defined 
rules the majority creates out of thin air an unprecedented fourth ....”); Jersey Cent. Pow-
er & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 768 F.2d 1500, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Mikva, J., dissenting) 
(“What is most startling is that the court’s opinion produces this new substantive right 
virtually out of thin air; the majority just makes it up. It is apparently of no concern to the 
majority that the Supreme Court has never suggested such a limit ....”). 
509 See, e.g., Nat’l Distillers, 69 F.3d at 1231 (“[T]he McCarran-Ferguson Act [did] 
not preclude the preempting of New York’s pre-judgment security requirement.”); Spirt, 
691 F.2d at 1069–70 (concluding that the insurer’s use of sex-distinct mortality tables 
constituted unequal treatment and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not exempt the 
insurer’s business of insurance activities from complying with Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act); Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 467 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that an 
insurer’s premium financing does not constitute the “business of insurance,” and there-
fore the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude the application of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act’s disclosure requirements of the transactions since the McCarran Act must be 
“narrowly construed in the face of valid federal regulatory interests”). 
510 Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2003). 
511 See Michael Schroeder, Insurers Fight to Save Terrorism Safety Net—Opponents 
Say Taxpayers Shouldn’t Underwrite Industry’s Exposure to Losses from Attacks, WALL 
ST. J., May 5, 2005, at A4 (“The 2002 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which is set to 
expire at the end of the year, requires insurers to offer terrorism insurance to businesses 
and in return limits the industry’s losses in the case of attacks by foreign terrorists.... 
[The] chairman of Allstate Corp., of Northbrook, Ill., the second-largest home and auto 
insurer ... called on Congress to ... apply the backstop to losses of cars and homes due to 
terrorism.”). 
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various automobile and homeowners’ insurance contracts.512 The minori-
ties accused Allstate of employing an impermissible discriminatory credit-
scoring system.513 More specifically, the racial minorities alleged that 
Allstate sold identical insurance contracts to all persons regardless of their 
racial or ethnic identities.514 However, using an allegedly discriminatory 
credit-scoring system, Allstate required non-Caucasian applicants to pay 
substantially more for the same coverage.515 
The racial minorities filed a class action.516 The complaint alleged that 
Allstate violated sections 1981517 and 1982518 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.519 The complainants also alleged that Allstate violated the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968 (FHA).520 Allstate filed a Rule 12(b)(6)521 motion to 
dismiss, arguing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA)522 preempted the 
application of the federal anti-discrimination statutes to the controversy.523 
The district court denied the motion, finding that the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act did not preclude the application of the civil rights statutes.524 The 
lower court, however, granted a leave for an interlocutory appeal.525 
                                                 
512 Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 293, 303. 
513 Id. at 300 (“[T]his nationwide class action challeng[es] insurers’ use of credit scor-
ing in the pricing of automobile and home owners’ policies.”). 
514 Id. at 301. 
515 Id. at 290. 
516 Id. 
517 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 
every kind, and to no other.”). 
518 Id. § 1982 (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every 
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property.”). 
519 Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 293. 
520 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) states: “[I]t shall be 
unlawful ... [t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection 
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Id. 
§ 3604(b). 
521 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (stating that a party may assert a defense by motion of 
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). 
522 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1999). 
523 Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 293–94. 
524 Id. at 294. 
525 Id. 
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Before the Fifth Circuit, Allstate argued again that that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act barred the nationwide class action.526 As discussed earlier, 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in pertinent part: “No Act of Con-
gress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enact-
ed by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... 
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”527 In 
Humana Inc. v. Forsyth,528 the Supreme Court outlined the methodology 
that courts must apply when deciding preemption questions under the 
MFA.529 
First, the Court expressly rejected the assumption that the MFA au-
thorized a state supremacy “field preemption” approach to the application 
of federal law to the insurance industry.530 Instead, the Court emphasized 
that courts must employ a “direct conflict” analysis to determine whether 
federal laws impair states’ authority and ability to regulate the business of 
insurance.531 And the Supreme Court stated that the following formulation 
captures the meaning of impairment under 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b): “When 
federal law does not directly conflict with state regulation, and when ap-
plication of the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or 
interfere with a State’s administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
does not preclude its application.”532 
However, to actually decide whether the MFA prevents federal laws 
from impairing state agencies’ ability to regulate the business of insur-
ance, the Court ordered federal courts to consider and satisfy three criteria: 
                                                 
526 Id. at 296. 
527 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 
1363 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act is a form of inverse preemption, so 
principles defining when state remedies conflict (and so are preempted by) federal law 
are pertinent in deciding when federal rules ‘invalidate, impair, or supersede’ state rules.” 
(citation omitted)). 
528 Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999). 
529 See id. at 301. 
530 Id. at 300 (“The Court rejects the Humana petitioners’ suggestion that the word 
‘impair,’ in the McCarran-Ferguson Act context, signals Congress’s intent to cede the 
field of insurance regulation to the States, saving only instances in which Congress ex-
pressly orders otherwise. If Congress had meant generally to preempt the field for the 
States, Congress could have said either that ‘no federal statute [that does not say so 
explicitly] shall be construed to apply to the business of insurance’ or that federal legisla-
tion generally ... would be ‘applicable to the business of insurance [only] to the extent 
that such business is not regulated by state law.’”). 
531 Id. at 305. 
532 Id. at 310. 
504 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:419 
 
(1) [T]he federal law in question must not be specifically directed at in-
surance regulation; (2) there must exist a particular state law (or de-
clared regulatory policy) enacted for the purpose of regulating insur-
ance; and (3) application of the federal law to the controversy in 
question must invalidate, impair or supersede that state law.533 
Applying Humana’s preemption standard, the Fifth Circuit declared 
that MFA did not bar the racial minorities in Dehoyos from suing Allstate 
under federal civil-rights statutes.534 The Court of Appeals found that the 
federal anti-discrimination laws did not interfere with Florida’s and Tex-
as’s insurance statutes or regulations, and did not undermine those states’ 
ability to regulate the business of insurance.535 Justice Edith Jones, how-
ever, wrote a compelling dissent, which describes and discusses the types 
of interferences that insurers are likely to encounter increasingly from 
federal courts in a post-CAFA era.536 She wrote: 
                                                 
533 Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Humana 
Inc., 525 U.S. at 307, 310); see also Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 708 
(5th Cir. 2002) (declaring that “[t]he test under McCarran-Ferguson is not whether a state 
has enacted statutes regulating the business of insurance, but whether such state statutes 
will be invalidated, impaired, or superseded by the application of federal law,” and con-
cluding that MFA preemption would not be found merely because a state has a mecha-
nism in place for regulating insurance contracts (quoting Miller v. Nat’l Fidelity Life Ins. 
Co., 588 F. 2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1979))). 
534 Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 299. 
535 Id. at 298 (“Appellants argue that the application of the civil rights statutes at issue 
here would frustrate Texas and Florida state insurance policy by frustrating the ability of 
those states to regulate insurance pricing policies.... Obviously this assertion is not nearly 
enough to withstand Humana scrutiny. Appellants cannot demonstrate that the federal 
law in question frustrates a policy associated with the regulation of insurance pricing 
without identifying an actual policy.”). 
536 Id. at 300–01. 
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The majority ... fails to recognize that a disparate impact claim goes to 
the heart of the risk adjustment that underlies the insurance business .... 
“Risk discrimination is not race discrimination.” Every insurer sets ... 
prices according to the risk [associated with] particular categories of 
customers.... Since risk determinations are mathematically complex and 
multi-faceted, unraveling a single thread, like credit scoring ... neces-
sarily affects the entire fabric.... [T]he instant class action inevitably 
draws federal courts into the mechanics of insurance pricing .... The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act was designed precisely to prevent this type of 
federal interference .... [because] federal courts are not competent to 
tread in the essential domain reserved to state regulators. [Today], cred-
it scoring is alleged to have a disparate impact. Tomorrow, some other 
facially neutral criterion ... may fall under legal attack.537 
Quite interestingly, around the time Justice Jones was writing her fair-
ly prescience dissent in 2003, lobbyists for the largest alliance of insurance 
associations and companies were gathering frequently in the halls of Con-
gress.538 They were encouraging legislators to allow corporate defendants 
                                                 
537 Id. (Jones, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
538 Cf. Editorial, Stop Class-Action Abuses, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 22, 2003, at 
A10 (“Class-action lawsuits sometimes serve a useful purpose by combining the com-
plaints of many people into a single action. But abuses such as venue shopping are le-
gion. After five years of trying, Congress appears ready to curtail the worst abuses. The 
Class Action Fairness Act was approved 253-170 in the House and waits Senate action.... 
No one in Congress is proposing doing away with class-action lawsuits. Rather, this 
overdue legislation would curtail some of the worst abuses. Legislators have debated the 
issue long enough. There’s no good reason to wait another year to adopt this important 
reform.”); Steven Brostoff, Congressional Motion Can Be Deceiving, PROP. & CAS./RISK 
& BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION (Oct. 1, 2003), http://web3.propertycasualty360.com/2003 
/10/01/congressional-motion-can-be-deceiving (“Periodically, I like to review some of 
the Congressional issues facing the insurance industry based on two dimensions—the 
probability of motion and the probability of movement. Motion means all the procedural 
doings on Capitol Hill relating to legislation, such as hearings, markups, negotiations, etc. 
Think of it in terms of the phrase ‘going through the motions.’ Movement is much more 
serious. It means that at least one branch of Congress, either the House or the Senate, 
actually passes a bill.... By civil justice reform, I mean everything other than asbestos, 
including class action ... When the 108th Congress convened, I thought civil justice 
reform would be one of the defining issues of the new Republican-led government. Not 
only were the primary advocates of civil justice reform in charge of the agendas in both 
the House and the Senate, but President Bush was committed to signing any reform bill 
that crossed his desk.... I really expected insurance regulatory reform to exhibit a little 
more life than it has so far. After all, there is a surprising amount of support for some 
type of federal action, even if there is no consensus. Within the insurance industry, the 
American Insurance Association, the American Council of Life Insurers, and the Council 
of Insurance Agents and Brokers back optional federal chartering. The Independent 
Insurance Agents & Brokers of America, which is still fleshing out its proposal, supports 
federal legislation maintaining state regulation....”). 
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to remove so-called “class actions of national importance” from allegedly 
biased and intimidating state courts to professedly more judicious and 
proficient federal courts.539 But, that same year, attorneys for that same 
alliance filed an extremely telling and ostensibly “pro-federalism” amici 
curia brief in the Eleventh Circuit.540 In that brief, the alliance of insurance 
conglomerates encouraged the appellate court to preserve fundamental 
principles of federalism by dismissing a class action of national im-
portance, and reversing the district court’s ruling in Gilchrist v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
541 
In Gilchrist, aggrieved consumers complained about insurers’ alleged 
violation of federal antitrust laws, an issue of unquestionable “national 
importance.”542 Therefore, the consumers filed a nationwide class action 
asserting that various automobile insurers conspired and prevented 
insureds from purchasing automotive replacement parts from the “original 
equipment manufacturer.”543 According to plaintiffs, the automobile in-
surers violated federal antitrust laws by causing the insureds to pay anti-
competitive insurance premiums for expensive and inferior insurance 
contracts.544 The federal district court certified a nationwide class, com-
prising of approximately 70 million insured consumers.545 The property 
and casualty insurers appealed the decision. 
Before the Eleventh Circuit, the defending insurers and those who 
filed the amici curia brief argued that when federal judges certify class 
actions like the one in Gilchrist and issue pro-consumer rulings, those 
judges effectively: (1) seize state insurance regulators’ authority to set 
rates,546 (2) “impair [state regulators’] statutory authority” generally to 
                                                 
539 See supra note 538. 
540 See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at iii, Gilchrist v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Gilchrist Brief] 
(“Amici Curiae Alliance of American Insurers, American Insurance Association, Nation-
al Association of Independent Insurers, and National Association of Mutual Insurance 
Companies are among the largest national trade associations of property and casualty 
insurance in the United States.”). 
541 Id. at 21. 
542 See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Fed. Reserve Bd., 509 F.2d 363, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(stressing that anti-competitive considerations and antitrust policy are issues of national 
importance). 
543 Gilchrist, 390 F.3d at 1329. 
544 Id. 
545 Id. 
546 See id. at 1331 (insurers’ arguing that the class members’ claim is “clearly about 
rate-making and performance of the insurance contract”); Gilchrist Brief at 1 (“The 
District Court’s certification ruling arrogates to a single jury the power to set rates for 
auto insurance across the country—an essentially regulatory function that juries are ill-
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regulate the business of insurance,547 and (3) violate principles of federal-
ism.548 Ultimately, citing prior rulings, the Eleventh Circuit embraced the 
insurers’ defense, remanded the class action, and ordered the district court 
to dismiss it.549 Nevertheless, we should not miss the important point: in 
Gilchrist, the insurers did not want the consumers’ class action to be liti-
gated in federal court. Like the insurers-defendants in Gilchrist, insurance 
companies generally do not want to be the “named defendants” in federal 
class action lawsuits, when the complaint concerns insurers’ alleged busi-
ness of insurance irregularities or violations under state or federal anti-
discrimination, antitrust, and consumer-protection statutes.550 
Again, consumers citing the “class actions of national importance” rule 
and filing an ever-increasing number of “business of insurance” disputes 
in federal court could arguably undermine state regulators’ and courts’ 
authority to regulate the business of insurance and increase federal judges’ 
authority to micromanage the affairs of insurance companies. If a critical 
mass of federal district judges issued rulings like the one in Gilchrist, 
CAFA’s removal provisions and its emphasis on litigating “cases of na-
tional importance” in federal courts would arguably accomplish effective-
ly and inadvertently what many have advocated: more federal regulation 
of the insurance industry and a repeal of insurers’ “scarecrow”—the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act and its “reverse pre-emption doctrine.”551 
                                                                                                                         
equipped to discharge.... [B]y centralizing the resolution of a rate dispute instead of 
deferring to state regulators, the District Court’s decision subverts the delicate federal-
state balance that has long governed insurance regulation across the nation.”). 
547 Gilchrist Brief at 21. 
548 Id. (“When the policy considerations underlying the filed rate doctrine are consid-
ered together with the federalism principles codified in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, it is 
clear that class treatment of Plaintiffs’ claims illegitimately ousts the rate-setting preroga-
tives of state legislatures and therefore cannot be a method of resolving this case that is 
‘superior to other available methods.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3))). 
549 Gilchrist, 390 F.3d at 1335 (“As Gilchrist’s claim attacks rate-making and the per-
formance of the insurance contract, both the business of insurance, and does not allege a 
cognizable antitrust boycott, the McCarran-Ferguson Act removes her claim from our 
jurisdiction.”); see also Slagle v. ITT Hartford, 102 F.3d 494, 498 (11th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that allegations of premium stabilization—through horizontal market allocation of the 
windstorm insurance market—was an attack on insurance rate-making); Uniforce Temp. 
Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 87 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(awarding no relief and dismissing plaintiff’s antitrust claims because they centered on 
premiums and the insurers’ rate-making activity). 
550 See Gilchrist, 390 F.3d at 1335; see also Slagle, 102 F.3d 494; Uniforce, 87 F.3d 
1296. 
551 Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that the reverse preemption doctrine permits a state law to reverse preempt a federal 
statute if “(1) the federal statute does not specifically relate to the ‘business of insurance’, 
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V. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY: THE DISPOSITION OF CONSUMERS’ CLASS 
ACTION AGAINST MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INSURANCE 
COMPANIES IN PURPORTEDLY “BIASED” AND “HOSTILE” STATE COURTS 
AND IN ALLEGEDLY “UNBIASED” AND “MORE COMPETENT” FEDERAL 
COURTS, 1925–2011 
Again, CAFA allows class actions of “national importance” to be re-
moved from state to federal courts.552 To justify that policy, a majority in 
Congress concluded that “[s]tate and local courts ... sometimes [act] in 
ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants.”553 To help 
prove that state courts are biased against “foreign” class action defendants, 
CAFA’s supporters cited a purportedly substantial body of statistical evi-
dence; for example, to justify their votes for class action reforms, several 
senators cited a RAND Corporation’s study554 and a Manhattan Institute’s 
                                                                                                                         
(2) the state law was enacted for the ‘purpose of regulating the business of insurance;’ 
and (3) the federal statute operates to ‘invalidate, impair, or supercede’ the state law” 
(quoting Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1998))). 
552 See, e.g., Pear, supra note 490 (“The bill [makes] it easier for defendants to shift 
such lawsuits from state courts to federal courts, where rules of evidence and procedure 
are often viewed as more favorable to defendants.... [T]he author of the bill, said, ‘Class 
actions of national importance should be heard in federal court by a federal judge, not by 
a state or county court judge in one region of the country.’”). 
553 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5. 
554 See 151 CONG. REC. 2085–86 (2005) (statement of Sen. George Allen) (“[S]ome 
opponents of the Class Action Fairness Act are still urging that the current class action 
system works well and that class action reform is unnecessary.... [However], numerous 
studies have documented class action abuses taking place in a small number of ‘magnet’ 
State courts, and by now, it is beyond legitimate debate that our class action system is in 
shambles.... A RAND Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ) Study on U.S. class actions released 
at the end of 1999 empirically confirms what has long been widely believed—State court 
consumer class actions primarily benefit lawyers .... The ICJ Study contains no data 
indicating that this problem exists in Federal court class actions.”); id. at 1825–26 (state-
ment of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Abuse of the class action system has reached a critical point, 
and it is time that we as a legislative body address the problem. The public is increasingly 
aware of the system’s unfairness. News programs ... have covered the rise in class action 
jurisdictions in certain magnet jurisdictions, magnet meaning jurisdictions where these 
extortionate suits are brought because they can get a tremendous advantage regardless of 
whether they are right or wrong.... It is evident that a few key courts have been singled 
out by a small group of legal players in the class action world. This point is reinforced by 
a 2003 study conducted by the Institute for Civil Justice/RAND and funded jointly by the 
plaintiffs and defense bar to determine who gets the money in class action settlements.”); 
id. at 1659 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl) (“A RAND study offered three primary expla-
nations for why national class action cases should be in federal court. First, Federal 
judges scrutinize class action allegations more strictly than State judges.... Second, State 
judges may not have adequate resources to oversee and manage class actions with a 
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report to prove that a “class action problem” existed and that class action 
reforms were necessary.555 
However, after carefully weighing the allegedly sound statistical evi-
dence, anti-reformers correctly noted that no one had presented any com-
pelling empirical evidence to justify Congress changing the practice of 
letting state courts adjudicate class actions that involve primarily state law 
issues.556 In fact, after reviewing all proffered data and statistics, the Board 
of Directors for the Conference of Chief Justices concluded that CAFA is 
simply unwarranted, because state judiciaries are fair and competent to 
“hear and decide fairly class actions brought in state courts.”557 
In addition, opponents of class action reforms argued that documented 
“judicial bias” was not rampant in federal courts; therefore, they argued 
that forcing aggrieved class members to litigate clearly substantive state 
law claims in federal courts unjustifiably victimizes those complainants 
and undermines the principle of judicial federalism.558 To illustrate the 
tenor of the argument and consumer advocates’ concerns, consider one 
senator’s observations during the CAFA debate. He stated: “Federal courts 
are not friendly to class actions. They are very strict [about selecting cases 
to] consider, and [federal courts severely limit the] scope of liabilities. The 
business interests that are pushing [CAFA] know ... if they can get these 
lawsuits into a federal court, they are less likely to be found liable.”559 
                                                                                                                         
national scope. Finally, if a single judge [will decide] what law will apply in a multistate 
class action, it is more appropriate that this take place in Federal court than in State 
court”). 
555 See id. at 1659 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl) (“The class action process is clearly 
in serious need of reform. Comprehensive studies support this position. For example, a 
study on the class action problem by the Manhattan Institute finds that class action cases 
are being brought disproportionately in a few State courts so that the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
may take advantage of those specific courts that have relaxed class action rules”). 
556 See id. at 1649 (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from Fifteen State At-
torneys General) (“There is no compelling need or empirical support for such a sweeping 
change in our long-established system for adjudicating state law issues.”). 
557 See id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“That evidence simply does not 
exist.”); id. at 1658 (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold) (“One frequent argument is that 
businesses cannot get a fair day in court because of renegade State court judges. Yet, 
there really is no evidence to back up these claims. Of the 3,141 counties, parishes, and 
boroughs in the State court systems of the United States, the so-called American Tort 
Reform Association could only identify nine jurisdictions that they consider ‘unfair’ to 
defendants. Four other jurisdictions were declared as ‘dishonorable mentions.’ But, the 
association only provided data on two of these jurisdictions Madison County, Illinois ... 
and St. Clair County, Illinois.”). 
558 See 151 CONG. REC. 1645 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin). 
559 Id. at 1660. 
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During those same debates, another legislator embraced those remarks 
and added the following: “[CAFA] reduces each state’s power to protect 
its own citizens and enforce its own laws. Moving these cases to federal 
court will often end them for all practical purposes. Federal courts may 
decide [that such cases] do not meet the federal rules for class certifica-
tion. Even if the cases are not dismissed, plaintiffs [who are] forced into 
federal court on state law claims have the decks stacked against them ... 
because [f]ederal [judges] take the narrowest possible view [when] inter-
preting state laws.”560 
Without a doubt, it is a serious charge when one asserts or even sug-
gests that state or federal judges are prejudiced and have hostilities against 
certain classes of litigants. But that charge is even more severe and trou-
blesome when: (1) out-of-state defendants claim that elected state court 
judges allow personal and local prejudices to adversely affect judicial 
proceedings and outcomes, or (2) federal diversity litigants believe that 
politically appointed federal judges wittingly or unwittingly allow region-
al, racial or political biases to determine the disposition of cases. 
Thus, at this point, it is appropriate to ask: do state court and federal 
judges allow their alleged biases, as well as irrelevant factors, affect the 
administration of justice and the disposition of class actions? At another 
time, and after carefully examining a large number of reported cases, the 
author gathered empirical evidence to determine whether “judicial bias” 
was present in state and federal courts, and, if so, whether such bias col-
ored judges’ substantive and procedural rulings.561 In a series of published 
law review articles, the author documented and reported that state and 
federal judges allow immaterial or extralegal variables to significantly 
influence plaintiffs and defendants’ likelihoods of winning procedurally 
and on the merits in a variety of lawsuits.562 
Therefore, considering the continuing and heated class action debates 
and litigation, the author decided to conduct an empirical study to deter-
mine whether irrelevant or prejudicial factors were systematically affect-
                                                 
560 See id. at 1646 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy). But see id. at 1821 (quotes from a 
letter submitted by Walter E. Dellinger of O’Melveny & Myers, LLP) (“To the contrary, 
federal ‘[c]ourts have expressed a willingness to certify nationwide classes on the ground 
that relatively minor differences in state law could be overcome at trial by grouping 
similar state laws together and applying them as a unit,’” (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998))). 
561 See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 77, 88, 90–91 nn.58, 103 & 111–12 (2008) (presenting a 
fairly comprehensive history and description of Professor Rice’s published content-
analysis studies and theoretical analyses of various common-law and statutory questions). 
562 Id. 
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ing, either intentionally or unintentionally, the disposition of class actions 
in allegedly “impartial” and “competent” federal courts as well as in sup-
posedly “biased” and “incompetent” state courts. In light of the author’s 
prior studies and findings, the results appearing in this study were not 
surprising: although learned and well-intentioned judges profess to use 
only established legal doctrines and public policy to achieve fair out-
comes, the evidence in this class action study suggests otherwise.563 
A. Data Sources and Sampling Procedures 
The dominant general proposition in this study is that no statistically 
significant difference exists between the disposition of complainants’ class 
actions against multinational corporations and insurers in federal and state 
courts. To construct the class action database, the author employed a mul-
tipronged methodology. First, Westlaw and Lexis data retrieval systems 
were used to locate every reported class action decision that had terminat-
ed in a trial, an appellate, or a supreme court. Second, if the electronically 
reported cases mentioned or cited other unreported class action cases, the 
author canvassed various regional reporters to locate those latter cases. 
Third, the author wanted to secure a representative sample of corporate or 
business related class action cases. Therefore, the author took a propor-
tional stratified random sample564 of all class action cases that had been 
decided procedurally or on the merits between 1925 and 2011.565 Those 
efforts produced 824 corporate entities and insurance related class ac-
tions.566 But note that the author’s entire database comprises 2,657 state 
and federal court decisions.567 
                                                 
563 See infra Part V.C–E. 
564 See, e.g., Ratanasen v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs.,11 F.3d 1467, 1470–72 (9th Cir. 
1993) (discussing the differences between and the efficacy of employing “simple random 
sampling” and “stratified random sampling”); Bruce M. Price, From Downhill to Slalom: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (And Some Unintended Conse-
quences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 138 (2007) (“Using a proportional, stratified, 
random sample of bankruptcy cases from [two twelve-month periods, the author created 
a] ... database of cases for every state in the Tenth Circuit.”). 
565 The investigator searched Westlaw’s MIN-CS, ALLSTATES, ALLFEDS, CTA 
and DCT databases between May 2008 and June 2011. In addition, the author searched 
various regional reporters as well as LEXIS’s Genfed Library, COURTS File during the 
same period. 
566 See supra note 565. 
567 The study was also designed to perform a small, exploratory comparative analysis 
of class actions and non-class action dispositions in state and federal courts between 1925 
and 2011. Therefore, see infra Table A in the Appendix, along with a brief discussion of 
the most relevant variables and statistics in that table. 
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Again, the author’s general and corollary hypotheses are these: (1) No 
statistically significant difference exists between class action plaintiffs and 
defendants’ likelihood of prevailing in state and federal courts; (2) class 
action defendants rather than class members are significantly more likely 
to prevail in class action controversies regardless of whether the actions 
originated in state courts or in federal courts; and (3) both state and federal 
courts are likely to permit immaterial factors such as complainants’ ethnic-
ity, litigants’ geographic origin, and litigants’ legal status to influence 
complainants’ or defendants’ likelihood of winning or losing class actions 
procedurally or on the merits. To test these hypotheses, the author per-
formed a content analysis of each case in the study.568 
B. Background Characteristics of Class Action Litigants in State and Fed-
eral Courts, 1925–2011 
There are 824 class action cases in the study, 407 and 417 state and 
federal class actions, respectively.569 Table 1 presents frequencies and 
percentages that illustrate the disposition of those class actions.570 First, 
“Litigants’ Ethnicity” is a variable that appears in Table 1.571 The results 
show very little difference in the racial composition of class members who 
initiated class actions in state and federal courts.572 As would be expected, 
nearly 90% of the members comprising both state and federal class actions 
have diverse ethnic backgrounds.573 The reported percentages are 88.2% 
and 85.6%, respectively.574 The results do reveal, however, that a higher 
percentage of “African-American, only” class actions are filed in federal 
courts than in state courts—9.8% versus 1.5%.575 Perhaps, this tendency 
                                                 
568 See Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive 
Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 567, 588–95 (1991) (performing a content analysis to examine Justices 
Brennan and Rehnquist’s opinions and learning that both justices employed precedents 
rather than other methods to reach conclusions); Darrell L. Ross, Emerging Trends in 
Correctional Civil Liability Cases: A Content Analysis of Federal Court Decisions of 
Title 42 United States Code Section 1983: 1970–1994, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 501, 506–07 
(1997) (performing a content analysis of 3,205 reported decisions and finding an unex-
pected overrepresentation of jail inmates in the sample). 
569 See infra Table 1. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of 
the William & Mary Business Law Review. 
570 See infra Table 1. 
571 See infra Table 1. 
572 See infra Table 1. 
573 See infra Table 1. 
574 See infra Table 1. 
575 See infra Table 1. 
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can be explained by looking at the second variable, “Claims & Causes of 
Action,” in Table 1.576 
TABLE 1 
THE DISPOSITION OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS IN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS BY VARIOUS DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, 1925–2011 
(N = 824) 
Demographics State Class Actions  (N = 407)  Federal Class Actions  (N = 417) 
 Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
    
Litigant’s Ethnicity:  
Diverse Groups 359 88.2 357 85.6 
Anglo-American, only 18 4.4 5 1.2 
African-American, only 6 1.5 41 9.8 
Other Minorities 24 5.9 14 3.4 
  
+
Claims & Causes of Action:  
Common-Law Contracts 185 45.5 111 26.6 
Common-Law Torts 117 28.8*** 103 24.7*** 
Consumer-Protection 132 32.4*** 157 37.7*** 
Civil-Rights 20 5.0*** 92 22.1*** 
Securities 30 7.4 73 17.5 
Antitrust 10 2.5*** 23 5.5*** 
Environmental 16 3.9 5 1.2 
  
Circuits:  
First 6 1.5 16 3.8 
Second 24 5.9**** 41 9.8**** 
Third 78 19.2**** 45 10.8**** 
Fourth 16 3.9 17 4.1 
Fifth 41 10.1**** 58 13.9**** 
Sixth 35 8.6 31 7.4 
Seventh 35 8.6 41 9.8 
Eighth 38 9.3 37 8.9 
Ninth 37 9.1 44 10.5 
Tenth 19 4.7 12 2.9 
Eleventh 75 18.4**** 66 15.8**** 
Federal 3 0.7 9 2.2 
  
+
The sums of these columns exceed unity (100%), since multiple claims and causes appeared in many class-action 
complaints. 
 
Levels of statistical significance: 
**** Chi Square = 27.1669,  df =11,  p # 0.001 
*** Spearman’s rank test: rho = 0.86,  p # 0.01 
  
First, when complainants commenced class actions in state courts, a 
greater proportion of class members are more likely to sue corporate enti-
ties and insurers for allegedly breaching contracts, committing various 
common law torts and violating consumer-protection laws.577 The per-
                                                 
576 See infra Table 1. 
577 See supra Table 1. 
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centages are 45.5%, 28.8%, and 32.4%, respectively.578 Although the 
order and magnitudes of the percentages differ a bit, class members pre-
sented the same theories of recovery when members filed class actions in 
federal courts—26.6%, 24.7% and 37.7%, respectively.579 
There are, however, three notable variations when comparing state and 
federal class members’ theories of recovery.580 Among federal class ac-
tions, greater numbers of class members sued multinational insurers and 
other corporate entities for violating federal antitrust, securities, and civil 
rights statutes.581 The corresponding percentages are 5.5%, 17.5% and 
22.1%, respectively.582 And very likely, the fairly large percentage of 
federal civil rights claims explains the relatively larger percentage of “Af-
rican-American, only” class actions that are litigated in federal courts 
rather than in state courts—9.8% versus 1.5%.583 
“Circuits” is the last variable appearing in Table 1.584 It identifies the 
location of both state and federal courts within the twelve federal circuits; 
it also shows the numbers of and percentages for class actions that com-
menced within those respective courts.585 First, the results show that state 
courts within the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits heard and tried a 
significant percentage (47.7%) of state law class actions.586 The respective 
individual percentages are 19.2%, 10.1%, and 18.4%.587 Likewise, federal 
courts within those same circuits, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh, also heard 
and resolved an appreciably large percentage (40.5%) of federal class 
actions.588 Those corresponding percentages are 10.8%, 13.9%, and 
15.8%.589 The majority of the remaining class actions were distributed 
among state and federal courts in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits.590 In the next section, the relevance of these particular numbers 
and percentages will be discussed more fully.591 
                                                 
578 See supra Table 1. 
579 See supra Table 1. 
580 See supra Table 1. 
581 See supra Table 1. 
582 See supra Table 1. 
583 See supra Table 1. 
584 See supra Table 1. 
585 See supra Table 1. 
586 See supra Table 1. 
587 See supra Table 1. 
588 See supra Table 1. 
589 See supra Table 1. 
590 See supra Table 1. 
591 See infra Part V.C. 
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TABLE 2 
THE PROCEDURAL AND FINAL DISPOSITION OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS IN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 1925–2011 
(N = 824) 
Demographics State Class Actions  (N = 407)  Federal Class Actions  (N = 417) 
 Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
    
Disposition—Trial Courts:  
Procedural 317 77.9 328 78.6 
Merits 90 22.1 89 21.4 
  
Disposition—Appeals Courts:  
Procedural 232 57.0*** 154 37.0*** 
Merits 73 17.9 60 14.4 
No Appeals 102 25.1*** 203 48.6*** 
  
Disposition—Supreme Courts:  
Procedural 108 26.5*** 2 0.50*** 
Merits 31 7.6 1 0.25 
No Appeals 268 65.9*** 414 99.3*** 
  
  
Outcome—Trial Courts:  
Class Members Won 179 44.0 170 40.8 
Class Members Lost 228 56.0 247 59.2 
  
Outcome Among Class 
Members Who Appealed 
to Appellate Courts: 
     
Class Members Won 138 45.2** 81 37.9 
Class Members Lost 167 54.8 133 62.1** 
  
Outcome Among Class 
Members Who Appealed 
to Supreme Courts: 
     
Class Members Won 60 43.2 2 66.7** 
Class Members Lost 79 56.8** 1 33.3 
  
Levels of statistical significance: 
*** Spearman’s rank-order test: States vs. Federal Comparison—rho = 0.84,  p   0.01 
** Spearman’s rank-order test: States vs. Federal Comparison—rho = -0.54,  Prob|t| = 0.2657 (ns) 
  
Table 2 presents the procedural and final dispositions of class actions 
in state and federal courts, without knowing any of the litigants’ demo-
graphic characteristics, theories of recovery, or other attributes.592 The first 
half of Table 2 shows the procedural dispositions of class actions in state 
and federal judiciaries’ respective trial, appellate, and supreme courts.593 
Overall, the percentages reveal that class actions in both state and federal 
                                                 
592 See supra Table 2. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of 
the William & Mary Business Law Review. 
593 See supra Table 2. 
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courts are significantly more likely to be decided procedurally rather than 
on the merits.594 
To illustrate, the first two rows of percentages show that state trial 
courts and federal district courts decided relatively smaller numbers of 
class actions on the merits.595 The reported percentages are 22.1% and 
21.4%, respectively.596 Conversely, the overwhelming majority of class 
actions in those lower state and federal courts were decided procedural-
ly—77.9% and 78.6%, respectively.597 More telling, the percentages are 
nearly identical for both state and federal lower courts. 
Furthermore, although there are some notable differences in the mag-
nitudes of the percentages, state and federal appellate courts generally 
resolve class actions in a similar pattern.598 Consider Table 2 again and 
look at the percentages appearing in the third and fourth rows. Of the class 
actions reaching state and federal courts of appeals, only a few were de-
cided on the merits—17.9% and 14.4%, respectively.599 On the other 
hand, state appellate courts decided 57.0% of all cases procedurally; and 
federal courts of appeals decided 37.0% of all class actions procedural-
ly.600 But it is significant to note that 25.1% of state court litigants decided 
not to appeal state trial courts’ class action decisions.601 However, nearly 
48.6% of federal court litigants did not appeal federal district courts’ class 
action rulings.602 And even fewer state and federal litigants appealed ad-
verse class action decisions to the various supreme courts.603 The corre-
sponding percentages in that table’s eighth row are 65.9% and 99.3%, 
respectively.604 
The remaining numbers and percentages in the bottom half of Table 2 
illustrate state and federal class members’ win/loss ratios within various 
state and federal courts. First, consider the variable “Outcome-Trial 
Courts.”605 The results indicate that class members were more likely to 
lose than win class actions in state trial courts—56.0% versus 44.0%.606 
                                                 
594 See supra Table 2. 
595 See supra Table 2. 
596 See supra Table 2. 
597 See supra Table 2. 
598 See supra Table 2. 
599 See supra Table 2. 
600 See supra Table 2. 
601 See supra Table 2. 
602 See supra Table 2. 
603 See supra Table 2. 
604 See supra Table 2. 
605 See supra Table 2. 
606 See supra Table 2. 
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And the pattern was similar for class members who filed class actions in 
federal district courts.607 Those federal complainants lost and won 59.2% 
and 40.8% of the cases, respectively.608 
The next variable, “Outcome Among Class Members Who Appealed 
to Appellate Courts,” shows win/loss ratios for litigants who decided to 
appeal adverse class action rulings to state and federal courts of appeals. 
Again, the results are clear: on appeal, class defendants rather than class 
members won the majority (54.8%) of class actions in state appellate 
courts.609 Furthermore, among litigants who appealed disappointing feder-
al district court decisions, class members’ likelihood of success deteriorat-
ed considerably.610 Specifically, before federal courts of appeals, class 
members prevailed in just 37.9% of the class actions, while class defend-
ants won an impressive 62.1% of the cases.611 In addition, the last variable 
in Table 2 shows a similar win/loss ratio in state supreme courts. Again, 
class defendants won 56.8% of the class actions in state supreme courts, 
while class members won 43.3% of the cases in state supreme courts.612 
C. Bivariate Relationships Between Litigants’ Characteristics and the 
Disposition of Class Actions in Allegedly “Biased” State Courts and in 
Purportedly “Impartial” Federal Courts 
Again, the percentages in the previous section present a description of 
class members and defendants’ demographic characteristics as well as 
litigants’ win/loss ratios in various state and federal courts between 1925 
and 2011. Thus, in light of those findings, reconsider briefly the general 
tone of the Senate and House debates just before Congress enacted the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Class action reformers strongly assert-
ed that “class action reform [was] badly needed.... [because] crafty law-
yers [were] gam[ing] the system by filing large, nationwide class action 
suits in certain preferred State courts.”613 Other reformers embraced that 
view and added a little more: “[I]n recent years, class actions have been 
subject to abuses that actually work to the detriment of individual con-
sumers [and] plaintiffs .... [Therefore such] gaming of the system clearly 
                                                 
607 See supra Table 2. 
608 See supra Table 2. 
609 See supra Table 2. 
610 See supra Table 2. 
611 See supra Table 2. 
612 See supra Table 2. 
613 151 CONG. REC. 2645 (2005) (statement of Rep. Ric Keller). 
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works to the detriment of business [as well as the economy and jobs crea-
tion].”614 
Still, other reformers asserted that lawyers’ “gaming of the system” 
and class action abuses only occurred in “sympathetic courts known as 
‘magnet courts.’”615 In fact, CAFA’s supporters called such state courts 
“judicial hellholes,”616 because state court judges allegedly certified “friv-
olous class actions,”617 created “judicial cultures that ignore legal protec-
tions,” and “intimidate[d] proponents of tort reform.”618 But even more 
importantly, class action reformers claimed that biased state judges—who 
hear and decide cases in “judicial hellholes”—are more concerned about 
protecting the interests of in-state class members619 than about protecting 
out-of-state corporate defendants’ and insurers’ due-process rights.620 
Where are the purportedly biased and anti-corporate state courts locat-
ed? According to some class action reformers, those tribunals are distrib-
uted nationwide—within and across the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
respective federal circuits.621 But other reformers assert that “judicial hell-
                                                 
614 Id. at 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter). 
615 See, e.g., id. (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“Often the [class action] decisions 
coming out of ... hand-picked and carefully selected venues are huge windfalls for trial 
lawyers and big law firms and a punch line for consumers and the people the lawyers 
claim to represent. There is now ... a full blown effort aimed at mining for jackpots in 
sympathetic courts known as ‘magnet courts’ for the favorable way they treat these 
cases.”). 
616 Id. at 2081 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (“Forum shopping occurs when the at-
torney sets out to try to find the best place to file the class action lawsuit.... [T]hat is not 
healthy. A report issued this year by the American Tort Reform Association about the 
abuse of this choice named ... various counties around the country as ‘judicial hell-
holes.’”). 
617 See id. (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions); see also id. at 1664 (statement of Sen. 
Chuck Grassley) (“[M]any of these class actions are just plain frivolous lawsuits that are 
cooked up by the lawyers to make a quick buck, with little or no benefit to the class 
members who the lawyers are supposed to be representing. Out-of-control frivolous 
filings are a real drag on the economy. Many a good business is being hurt by this frivo-
lous litigation cost. Unfortunately, the current class action rules are contributing to the 
cost of business all across America, and it particularly hits small business .... Too many 
frivolous lawsuits are being filed. Too many good companies and consumers [must] pay 
for this lawyer greed.”). 
618 Id. at 2081 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions). 
619 See generally supra notes 389–90 and accompanying text. 
620 See 151 CONG. REC. 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (claiming that “magnet 
courts” in certain states violate class action “defendants’ due process rights”); id. at 2081 
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions). 
621 See, e.g., id. at 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“I [strongly] support ... the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.... [W]e need to pass this bill [because] there are 
loopholes in the class action system .... Such abuses happen mainly in State and local 
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holes” are located in only a few states and counties within the Fifth, Sev-
enth, and Eleventh Circuits.622 In particular, reformers alleged that state 
court judges in Florida, Illinois, and Texas—in Palm Beach County,623 
Madison County,624 and Jefferson County,625 respectively—have the worst 
records for (1) certifying frivolous class actions, (2) allowing class mem-
bers’ lawyers to corrupt the legal system, (3) issuing pro-plaintiff rulings, 
and (4) violating class action defendants’ procedural-due-process rights.626 
                                                                                                                         
courts in cases that really ought to be heard in Federal court.... Often, these suits have 
very little, if anything, to do with the place in which they are brought. Rather, lawyers 
select the venues for strategic reasons, or for political reasons, a practice known as forum 
shopping.”); id. at 1670 (2005) (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback) (“Over the past 
decade, class action lawsuits have grown by over 1,000 percent nationwide, spurring a 
mass of these kinds of hasty, unjust [class action] settlements.”). 
622 See infra notes 623–26. 
623 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“[I]n their effort 
to gain a financial windfall in class action cases, some aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyers file 
copycat class action lawsuits. This tactic helps explain the dramatic increase in filings in 
these magnet courts.... [T]hese duplicative actions are the product of forum shopping by 
the original lawyers who file similar actions in different State courts ... perhaps with the 
sole purpose of finding a friendly judge willing to certify the class.... There is not a single 
magnet State court in this country that has not encountered the copycat phenomenon.... 
[One] example of copycat lawsuits is Flanagan v. Bridgestone/Firestone, filed in Palm 
Beach County, FL. [That] lawsuit was but one of the approximately 100 identical class 
actions filed in State courts throughout the country ....”). 
624 See, e.g., id. at 2663 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) (“What has hap-
pened as a result of the abuse of the class action system is that judges in small out-of-the-
way counties, like Madison County, Illinois and Jefferson County, Texas end up being 
the ultimate arbiters of interstate commerce. [CAFA] puts some balance back into the 
system.”). 
625 Id. 
626 See, e.g., id. at 2072 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“Madison County is a great 
example of one of these magnet jurisdictions. Once their reputation as a magnet jurisdic-
tion is established, they attract major nationwide [class action] lawsuits that deal with 
interstate commerce—exactly the types of lawsuits that should be decided in the Federal 
court. As noted in one study: ‘Virtually every sector of the United States economy is on 
trial in Madison County, Palm Beach County, FL, and Jefferson County, TX—long 
distance carriers, gasoline purchasers, insurance companies, computer manufacturers and 
pharmaceutical developers.’”); id. at 1654–55 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Lin-
coln’s words no longer carry much meaning for some of the lawyers who have descended 
on Madison County. In the land of Lincoln, the rule of law has too often been corrupted 
almost beyond recognition by self-interested plaintiffs’ lawyers and seemingly pliant 
public officials. Some unscrupulous personal injury attorneys go forum shopping to find 
friendly jurisdictions. Certainly Madison County, IL is one of them.... [L]awyers often 
pick Madison County.... because it is what some call a magic jurisdiction.”). 
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First, to prove that “judicial hellholes” really exist, pro-CAFA sup-
porters have cited year-to-year class action filings across all states. 627 
When the number of filings appeared to be greater or worse than “ex-
pected” in certain state courts, class action reformers concluded that those 
were “judicial hellholes,” “magnet” jurisdictions or “magic courts.”628 
Stated another way, since class action filings allegedly “skyrocketed” in 
Madison County, Jefferson County, and Palm Beach County,629 class 
action reformers maintained that state court judges in those jurisdictions 
are appreciably more likely to be biased against out-of-state corporate 
defendants and more likely to undermine or violate fundamental principles 
of judicial federalism.630 
Second, to prove that supposedly “corrupt” and “self-interested” plain-
tiffs’ lawyers’ and “enabling” and “biased” state court judges’ collusive 
acts631 prevent class action defendants from securing favorable outcomes, 
                                                 
627 See, e.g., id. at 2636 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) (“I rise in strong 
support of ... the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Today marks the culmination of 
nearly a decade of legislative efforts to end systematic abuse of our Nation’s class action 
system.... Since these reforms were first proposed, the magnitude of the class action crisis 
... has become more and more urgent. The crisis now threatens the integrity of our civil 
justice system and undermines the economic vitality upon which job creation depends. A 
major element of the worsening crisis is the exponential increase in State class action 
cases in a handful of ‘magnet’ or ‘magic’ jurisdictions, many of which deal with national 
issues in classes. In the last 10 years, State court class actions filings nationwide have 
increased over 1,315 percent.”). 
628 151 CONG. REC. at 2636. 
629 See, e.g., id. at 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“It has not taken the plain-
tiffs’ lawyers long to figure out which courts are good for their bank accounts. There was 
an 82-percent increase in the number of class actions filed in Jefferson County, TX, 
between the years of 1998 and 2000. During the same time span, Palm Beach County, 
FL, saw a 35-percent increase. The most dramatic increase, however, has occurred in 
Madison County, IL. Madison County has seen an astonishing 5,000-percent increase in 
the number of class action filings since 1998.... [T]he number of class actions filed in 
State courts has skyrocketed under current law: Palm Beach County, 35 percent in just 2 
years or 3 years; Jefferson County, 82 percent in the same 2 or 3 years; and Madison 
County, over 5,000 percent.... [T]he overall increase in State courts [has been a] 1,315-
percent growth.”). 
630 See infra notes 642, 644 and accompanying text. 
631 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2636 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) 
(“[W]hen the House considered this important [class action] reform in the last Congress, I 
remarked that, ‘[t]he class action judicial system has become a joke, and no one is laugh-
ing except the trial lawyers ... all the way to the bank.’ I imagine that laughter turned to 
nervous chuckles when [CAFA] emerged unscathed from the gauntlet in the other body 
with 72 votes last week .... [A]s the House prepares to pass this bill, I suspect you could 
hear a pin drop in the halls of infamous courthouses located in Madison County, Illinois 
and Jefferson County, Texas, where for so long the good times have rolled for forum-
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class action reformers have cited purportedly large numbers of “forced 
settlements” and “judicial blackmails” in “magic jurisdictions.”632 For 
example, during the fairly recent class action debates in the Senate, one 
influential pro-CAFA legislator asserted emphatically: “Many class ac-
tions appear to be filed solely for the purpose of forcing a settlement, not 
the protection of an interest of a class.”633 Thus, according to that senator, 
and many other class action reformers, allegedly “forced settlements” are 
nothing less than “judicial blackmail.”634 In addition, class action reform-
ers have concluded that “judicial blackmail” only benefits class members’ 
unscrupulous lawyers,635 while undermining the Nation’s economy,636 
consumers’ interests,637 and the legitimate business interests of multina-
tional corporations and insurers.638 
Certainly, anti-reformers dispute multinational corporations’,639 large 
insurance conglomerates’,640 and other class action reformers’ allegations 
                                                                                                                         
shopping plaintiffs’ attorneys and the judges who enable them.”); see also id. at 1654–55 
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
632 See, e.g., id. at 1670 (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback) (“[E]ven if [a] class certi-
fication ruling is unmerited or even unconstitutional, it often cannot be appealed until 
after an expensive trial on the merits of the case. Facing the cost of litigation often forces 
defendants to settle out of court with sizable payments, even when the defendant will 
likely prevail under the law.”). 
633 See id. at 1081 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions). 
634 Id. (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (“[F]orcing a settlement ... has been referred 
to in debate frequently as ‘judicial blackmail.’”). 
635 See supra notes 629, 631 and accompanying text. 
636 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1670 (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback) (“These set-
tlements have come to be known as a form of traditional blackmail and are problematic to 
all Americans because they make trial lawyers rich while imposing increased costs on the 
economy, causing lower wages and higher prices for consumers.”). 
637 Id. 
638 See, e.g., id. at 2072 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[T]he [class action] system 
is broken and we need to fix it so we do not hurt legitimate business, legitimate job-
creation efforts .... Right now, businesses, fearing the mere threat of legal action, settle 
cases a form of judicial blackmail. The whole economy is dragged down and fewer jobs 
are created as a result.”). 
639 Cf. id. at 2653 (statement of Rep. Marty Meehan) (“I rise in opposition to ... the so-
called Class Action Fairness Act. Few of us would ... argue that there is too much ac-
countability in corporate America .... In recent years, millions of our constituents have 
been swindled out of their retirement savings by corporate crooks at Enron, WorldCom, 
and other companies.”). 
640 Cf. id. at 1094 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) (“The rejection of the Feinstein-
Bingaman amendment shows this bill’s true colors.... [W]ithout that change, the truth is 
plain to see: [CAFA] is designed to bury class action lawsuits, to cut off the one means 
by which individual Americans ripped off by fraudulent or deceptive practices can band 
together to demand justice from corporate America.... [I]nsurance companies are ripping 
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about the supposedly large prevalence of biased state court judges and the 
wanting administration of justice in so-called “judicial hellholes.”641 To 
counter the specific allegation that numerous “hellholes” exist and are 
undermining federalism,642 one senator has stressed: 
I oppose ... the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, because I do not be-
lieve it is fair to litigants who have legitimate claims that are most ap-
propriately addressed [in] state courts.... There have been many claims 
about ‘judicial hellholes’ and ‘magnet jurisdictions’ but the evidence 
shows that these claims are ... overstated, and ... not so widespread so 
as to justify passage of this legislation that turns 200 years of federal-
ism on its head.643 
In addition, class action reformers insist that state courts generally—
like the alleged “judicial hellhole” in Madison County, Illinois—“are 
quick to certify classes.”644 Therefore, reformers stress that it is unfair to 
force out-of-state corporations and their insurers to litigate “class actions 
of national importance” in those state courts.645 But anti-reformers empha-
size that class action reformers intentionally or unintentionally cloud the 
important distinction between the number of class action filings and the 
number of class certifications.646 Therefore, states’ righters or opponents 
of class action reforms argue that even if the numbers of class action fil-
ings have increased in recent years, state courts are likely to certify only 
an infinitesimal number of class actions for trial.647 
                                                                                                                         
people off all the time, and this legislation will give the biggest, best businesses in the 
world, the insurance companies, more money.”); id. at 2653 (statement of Rep. Joe Baca) 
(“[CAFA] is a payoff to large companies and special interests. It takes rights away from 
consumers in order to protect drug manufacturers, insurance companies, HMOs and 
negligent doctors. There is no accountability on their part.”). 
641 151 CONG. REC. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton). 
642 Cf. id. at 2072–73 (2005) (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[O]ur system of feder-
alism is undermined today because one State’s legal system, rather than the legal system 
of the Federal branch of the courts, is making [class action] decisions that affect many or 
even all other States. So the system is not working for anyone but the lawyers and law 
firms gaming that system.”). 
643 Id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton). 
644 See id. at 2645–46 (statement of Rep. Ric Keller) (“[Plaintiffs’ lawyers file] large, 
nationwide class action suits in certain preferred State courts such as Madison County, 
Illinois, where judges are quick to certify classes .... Let us take a look at Madison Coun-
ty .... In 2002 ... there were 77 class action filings, and in 2003 there were 106 class 
action lawsuits filed. The movie ‘Bridges of Madison County’ was a love story. The 
‘Judges of Madison County’ would be a horror flick.”). 
645 Id. (statements of Rep. Linda Sanchez). 
646 See infra note 647 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton). 
647 Compare 151 CONG. REC. 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“Perhaps the 
best example nationwide, in terms of preferred venues for trial lawyers, is Madison 
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TABLE 3 
THE DISPOSITION OF CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS BY SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF LITIGANTS 
(N = 519) 
  
State Courts’ Disposition of Actions 
From Class Members’ Perspectives  
Federal Courts’ Disposition of Actions 
From Class Members’ Perspectives 
Selected 
Demographics Subcategories Favorable Unfavorable (N = 305)  Favorable Unfavorable (N = 214) 
  Percent Percent Number  Percent Percent Number 
         
Class-Action Defendants Insurers 43.3 56.7 (N = 201) 31.3 68.7 (N = 99) 
 Corporations 56.3 43.7 (N = 94) 43.0 57.0 (N = 94) 
 Public Entities 39.4 60.6 (N = 10) 44.4 55.6 (N = 21) 
   
Claims & Causes Breach-of-Contract 35.6 64.4 (N = 90)** 20.8 79.2 (N = 24)*** 
 Common-Law Torts 68.6 31.4 (N = 51)** 18.8 81.2 (N = 16)*** 
 Consumer-Protection 44.0 56.0 (N = 109) 26.1 73.9 (N = 65)*** 
 Civil-Rights 44.4 55.6 (N = 9) 55.4 44.6 (N = 56)*** 
 Securities 46.3 53.7 (N = 10) 43.2 56.8 (N = 37) 
 Antitrust 50.0 50.0 (N = 4) 56.2 43.8 (N = 16)*** 
 Environmental 60.0 40.0 (N = 10)** ___ ___ ___ 
 Others 40.9 59.1 (N = 22)** ___ ___ ___ 
         
Region of Country East 31.0 69.0 (N = 42)*** 32.5 67.5 (N = 40) 
 Midwest 41.9 58.1 (N = 86)*** 37.8 62.2 (N = 45) 
 South 59.3 40.7 (N = 86)*** 46.3 53.7 (N = 54) 
 Southwest 51.0 49.0 (N = 51) 33.3 66.7 (N = 36) 
 West 35.0 65.0 (N = 40)*** 35.9 64.1 (N = 39) 
   
Courts’ Location First Circuit 16.7 83.3 (N = 6) 40.0 60.0 (N = 5)  
Within Second Circuit 18.2 81.8 (N = 11)** 33.3 66.7 (N = 12) 
Federal Circuits Third Circuit 38.0 62.0 (N = 21)** 33.3 66.7 (N = 18) 
 Fourth Circuit 64.3 35.7 (N = 14)** 44.4 55.6 (N = 9) 
 Fifth Circuit 46.3 53.7 (N = 41) 42.1 57.9 (N = 38) 
 Sixth Circuit 40.0 60.0 (N = 20)** 50.0 50.0 (N = 14) 
 Seventh Circuit 46.9 53.1 (N = 32) 15.8 84.2 (N = 19) 
 Eighth Circuit 47.2 52.8 (N = 36) 52.6 47.4 (N = 19) 
 Ninth Circuit 38.7 61.3 (N = 31) 41.4 58.6 (N = 29) 
 Tenth Circuit 22.2 77.8 (N = 18)** 18.2 81.8 (N = 11) 
 Eleventh Circuit 61.1 38.9 (N = 72)** 39.5 60.5 (N = 38) 
 Federal Circuit 33.3 66.7 (N = 3) 50.0 50.0 (N = 2) 
   
*** Chi square test statistically significant at p   0.01 
** Chi square test statistically significant at p   0.05 
  
Given the severity of class action reformers’ and anti-reformers’ 
charges and counter-charges, the author decided to test the proposition that 
out-of-state defendants—multinational corporate entities and insurers—
                                                                                                                         
County, IL, where class action filings between 1998 and 2000 increased nearly 2,000 
percent.”), with id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“[A] recent report by 
Public Citizen found that there were, at most, two jurisdictions—Madison County and St. 
Clair County, IL—of the 3,141 court systems in the United States for which bill propo-
nents have provided limited data that they are ‘magnet jurisdictions.’ As to Madison 
County in particular, the facts ... do not support the rhetoric. In 2002, only 3 of 77 class 
actions were actually certified to proceed to trial, and in 2003, only 2 of 106 class actions 
filed were certified.”). 
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are substantially more likely to lose class actions in allegedly “biased and 
hostile” state courts than in supposedly “more principled and competent” 
federal courts.648 Therefore, consider the information appearing in Table 3. 
At the outset, it is important to note that Table 3 presents the bivariate 
relationships between four independent variables and the outcome of class 
actions in both state and federal courts of appeals.649 The author decided to 
explore the disposition of class actions in state and federal appellate courts 
for two reasons. First, appellate-court cases comprise arguably the truly 
dissatisfied class members and defendants who received adverse proce-
dural and substantive outcomes in both state trial courts and federal dis-
trict courts. Second, as illustrated in Table 2 and discussed above, state 
and federal appellate-court class action decisions are substantially more 
likely to be the “final decisions” than either state or federal trial-court or 
supreme-court decisions.650 
The first variable in Table 3 is labeled “Class Action Defendants.”651 It 
describes the types of defendants that class members sued in both state and 
federal courts of appeals from 1925 to 2011,652 and the reported percent-
ages illustrate the courts of appeals’ dispositions of class actions from the 
perspectives of class members.653 The results are clear: when insurers and 
various public entities or corporations are sued, class members are more 
likely to lose in state courts of appeals.654 Class members’ state court per-
centages are 56.7% and 60.6%, respectively.655 On the other hand, when 
class members sue corporations in state appellate courts, plaintiffs are 
more likely to prevail. The reported percentage is 56.3%.656 
The results are fairly similar for class members who sought relief in 
federal appellate courts: when insurers and various public entities were 
class action defendants, class members were more likely to lose the law-
suits in federal appellate courts.657 The percentages are 68.7% and 55.6% 
respectively.658 And although class members are more likely to prevail 
(56.3%) in state appellate courts when multinational corporate entities are 
                                                 
648 See supra Table 3. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of 
the William & Mary Business Law Review. 
649 See supra Table 3. 
650 See supra Table 2. 
651 See supra Table 3. 
652 See supra Table 3. 
653 See supra Table 3. 
654 See supra Table 3. 
655 See supra Table 3. 
656 See supra Table 3. 
657 See supra Table 3. 
658 See supra Table 3. 
2012] ALLEGEDLY “BIASED,” “INTIMIDATING” 525 
 
defendants, class members are more likely to lose (57.0%) when multina-
tional corporations are class defendants in federal courts of appeals.659 
When reviewing the general effects of types of defendants on the disposi-
tions of class actions, the results show no statistically significant differ-
ence between class members’ win/loss ratios, when comparing class action 
outcomes in state appellate courts to those in federal courts of appeals.660 
These initial findings, therefore, do not support class action reformers’ 
broad assertion that corporate defendants are substantially more likely to 
lose class actions in allegedly “biased” and “unprincipled” state courts 
than in “competent” and “impartial” federal courts.661 
For added statistical evidence that class action defendants—rather than 
class members—are substantially more likely to prevail in state and feder-
al courts of appeals, one needs only to review the variable “Region of 
Country” in Table 3 and the corresponding percentages. First, the results 
are clear: multinational corporate entities, large insurance conglomerates 
and other class action defendants are more likely to prevail in federal 
courts of appeals than class members.662 That finding appears regardless 
of whether the federal appellate courts are located in the Eastern, Mid-
western, Southern, Southwestern, or Western regions of the country.663 
More precisely, federal class action defendants’ “win” percentages are 
67.5%, 62.2%, 53.7%, 66.7%, and 64.1%, respectively.664 
Also, barring two exceptions, class action defendants—rather than 
class members—are more likely to prevail in state courts of appeals.665 
Class members are more likely to win class action lawsuits in state courts 
of appeals that are located in the Southern and Southwestern regions of the 
country.666 Those “win” percentages are 59.3% and 51.0%, respective-
ly.667 On the other hand, class members are exceedingly more likely to 
lose in state courts of appeals, which are located in the Eastern, Midwest-
ern, and Western regions of the country.668 State-appellate-court class 
members’ “loss” percentages within these latter regions are 69.0%, 58.1%, 
and 66.0%, respectively.669 
                                                 
659 See supra Table 3. 
660 See supra Table 3. 
661 See supra Table 3. 
662 See supra Table 3. 
663 See supra Table 3. 
664 See supra Table 3. 
665 See supra Table 3. 
666 See supra Table 3. 
667 See supra Table 3. 
668 See supra Table 3. 
669 See supra Table 3. 
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The final variable in Table 3 is labeled “Courts’ Location Within Fed-
eral Circuits.”670 It has two meanings. First, when considering federal-
court class actions, the variable retains its ordinary meaning. It describes 
the proper names of the twelve federal courts of appeals that reviewed 
federal district courts’ class action rulings.671 The overwhelming majority 
of class action percentages reinforce earlier findings.672 The First, Second, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Courts of Ap-
peals were substantially more likely to decide against federal class mem-
bers and in favor of corporate defendants.673 Before those nine federal 
appellate courts, class members’ losses varied between 55.6% and 
84.2%.674 On the other hand, federal class members were more likely to 
win a majority (52.6%) of lawsuits only in the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit.675 And in the Sixth and Federal Courts of Appeals, federal 
complainants won just 50.0% of the class actions in each appellate 
court.676 
“Courts’ Location Within Federal Circuits” also has a second mean-
ing: it describes state class action litigants’ percentages of wins and losses 
in state appellate courts by considering whether a state court of appeal was 
located within the jurisdictional boundary of, say, the First Circuit, the 
Fourth Circuit, or some other federal circuit. Therefore, looking at the two 
left columns of percentages at the bottom of Table 3, we find generally no 
substantial statistical evidence suggesting that allegedly “prejudiced” and 
“hostile” state-appellate-court judges are more likely to decide class ac-
tions against out-of-state corporate defendants.677 Or stated slightly differ-
ently, the results do not support class action reformers’ general assertion 
that supposedly “unprincipled” and “less competent” state-appellate-court 
judges predictably and consistently violate class action defendants’ proce-
dural-due-process rights, and habitually undermine corporate and other 
defendants’ ability to win class actions procedurally or on the merits.678 
Instead, the results show generally that multinational corporations, in-
surers, and other class action defendants are substantially more likely to 
prevail than lose in state appellate courts.679 And the finding is consistent 
                                                 
670 See supra Table 3. 
671 See supra Table 3. 
672 See supra Table 3. 
673 See supra Table 3. 
674 See supra Table 3. 
675 See supra Table 3. 
676 See supra Table 3. 
677 See supra Table 3. 
678 See supra Table 3. 
679 See supra Table 3. 
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among state courts of appeals which are located within regions of the 
country over which the following federal circuits have jurisdictions: First, 
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal 
Circuits.680 Put simply, in those state courts of appeals, class members’ 
losses ranged between 52.8% and 83.3%.681 On the other hand, class 
members were more likely to prevail in in-state appellate courts that are 
located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits.682 Those “win” percentages are 64.3% and 61.1%, respective-
ly.683 
D. Choice of Law Questions—The Bivariate Relationships Between Liti-
gants’ Theories of Recovery and the Disposition of Class Actions in 
State and Federal Courts 
Earlier, this Article briefly discussed choice of law rules,684 and two 
important constitutional principles were highlighted: under the Klaxon-
Erie doctrine, a federal district court must apply the choice of law rules of 
the state in which it sits;685 under the principle appearing in Shutts, a state 
court may freely choose and apply one of several state laws in a nation-
wide class action as long as the parties have “significant contacts” with the 
states and the choice of law is not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.686 
Yet, conflicting opinions about choice-of-substantive-law rules still gener-
ate numerous problems for class action complainants who commence 
actions in state trial courts or in federal district courts.687 
Even more noteworthy, Congress spent an inordinate amount of time 
debating choice of law rules, before enacting CAFA and sanctioning de-
fendants’ right to remove allegedly “class actions of national importance” 
from state to federal courts.688 As reported earlier, both CAFA’s support-
                                                 
680 See supra Table 3. 
681 See supra Table 3. 
682 See supra Table 3. 
683 See supra Table 3. 
684 See supra Part IV.A. 
685 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (requiring a 
federal court that sits in Delaware to apply conflict of laws rules that mirror rules cited 
and applied in Delaware’s state courts); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. 
Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is the duty of the federal court to determine 
as best it can, what the highest court of the state would decide.”). 
686 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–22 (1985). 
687 See supra Part V.A. 
688 Cf. 151 CONG. REC. 1646 (2005) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“We were also 
told [CAFA] would not shift cases to Federal courts unless they truly involve national 
issues, while State cases would remain in state court. [CAFA’s] actual effects are quite 
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ers and opponents understood that federal district courts are substantially 
more likely to deny Rule 23(b)(3) certification motions when wide vari-
ances exist among proposed class members’ state law theories of recov-
ery.689 
Therefore, citing a need to remove a major class certification hurdle 
and codify Shutts’s constitutional principle in CAFA, legislators debated 
the merits of the earlier-discussed Feinstein-Bingaman amendment.690 
That proviso would have created an exception and allowed federal judges 
to certify a class, even though a class action pleading cited multiple and 
conflicting state laws.691 However, a majority of class action reformers 
rejected that amendment.692 The majority concluded that fundamental 
principles of federalism would have been undermined because the Fein-
stein-Bingaman proviso would have allowed federal district courts to 
apply a single state’s law in a nationwide class certification proceeding.693 
Conversely, anti-reformers were concerned about the adverse effects 
of CAFA’s removal provisions on class members’ ability to litigate federal 
substantive issues in state courts.694 Specifically, some legislators claimed 
that class action reforms would allow primarily corporate defendants to 
remove civil-rights,695 consumer-protection,696 and wage-and-hour697 class 
                                                                                                                         
different. It does not just affect cases where the events affect people in multiple States 
....” ). 
689 See supra notes 413–24 and accompanying text. 
690 See 151 CONG. REC. 1818. 
691 See id. at 1813 (Senator Feinstein’s outlining of the parameters of the defeated 
Feinstein-Bingaman choice of law amendment); id. at 1832 (“The [Feinstein-Bingaman] 
amendment ... was rejected.”). 
692 Id. 
693 See id. at 1820–21 (reporting CAFA supporters’ embrace of legal conclusions and 
cases in a letter that Walter E. Dellinger of O’Melveny & Myers, LLP submitted to help 
defeat the Feinstein-Bingaman amendment). 
694 See, e.g., id. at 1828–30 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy). 
695 See, e.g., id. at 1828 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“I urge all of my colleagues 
to support this amendment to exclude civil rights and wage and hour cases from the bill’s 
provisions on removal of cases to Federal court. Working Americans and victims of 
discrimination seeking justice under State laws don’t deserve to have the doors of justice 
slammed on such claims, but that is exactly what this bill will do.”); id. at 2646 (state-
ment of Rep. Bobby Scott) (“47 Attorneys General in States and territories, have come 
out against [CAFA] because it puts the Attorneys General in the same crack. They do not 
know where [a] case is going to be heard. If they bring a State action in State court, they 
may get removed. Some ... States have better wage laws, civil rights laws, sometimes 
consumer protections, and if the Attorneys General want to come in to protect their own 
citizens in their own States, they ought to have that right and not get jerked around to 
Federal court.”). 
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actions from state to federal courts. But class action reformers argued that 
such concerns were unfounded, and strongly asserted that federal rather 
than state courts have been more favorable forums for class action plain-
tiffs to litigate civil rights and other federal law disputes.698 
Finally, more than a century and a half ago, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the choice of law principle: to determine parties’ rights and obliga-
tions under a contract, the law of the place—where the contract was con-
summated—must govern the deliberations.699 And, nearly eighty years 
ago, the Court also reconfirmed an equally important choice of law rule in 
Ormsby v. Chase.700 In a tort action, a judge must apply the law of the 
                                                                                                                         
696 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2648 (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (“[CAFA] also 
makes it impossible for States to pursue actions against defendants who have caused 
harm to the State’s citizens. State attorneys general often pursue these claims under State 
consumer protection statutes, antitrust laws, often with the attorney general acting as the 
class representative for the consumers of the State. Under [CAFA], would we want these 
cases to be thrown into Federal court and severely impede the State’s ability to enforce its 
own laws for its own citizens? That is what will happen. That is what will take place.”). 
697 See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (“[I]t is very clear that ... this is not 
a simple procedural fix to class actions in our courts.... [And] it is clear that all of the 
totally unsatisfactory provisions have not been removed.... [CAFA] harms working 
Americans and victims of discrimination who are in no position to bring individual ac-
tions of wage-and-hour cases or civil rights discrimination claims. Moving the cases to 
federal court will result in many never being ever heard at all.”). 
698 See, e.g., id. at 1830–31 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (“[C]ontrary to what has 
been suggested ... Federal courts have a long record of protecting workers in employment 
class actions. Congress has passed strong laws, such as title VII, that were specifically 
crafted to give workers access to Federal courts so they could bring employment discrim-
ination cases in a fair forum. We have always believed Federal court is a fair, objective 
forum for people who have been discriminated against, whether they claim employment 
rights or civil rights. As a result, Federal courts already have jurisdiction over most 
employment discrimination and pension claims, and their record is in sharp contrast to 
courts such as in Madison County, IL and Jefferson County, TX.... [Therefore,] contrary 
to the position of the amendment’s proponents, [CAFA] will not impose new, burden-
some and unnecessary requirements on civil rights litigants and the federal courts.... This 
bill protects the rights of civil rights plaintiffs.”). 
699 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.11 (1981) (“Prior to the advent 
of interest analysis in the state courts as the ‘dominant mode of analysis in modern choice 
of law theory,’ ... the prevailing choice-of-law methodology focused on the jurisdiction 
where a particular event occurred.... For example, in cases characterized as contract 
cases, the law of the place of contracting controlled the determination of such issues as 
capacity, fraud, consideration, duty, performance, and the like.”); Le Roy v. Beard, 49 
U.S. 451, 464 (1850) (“[I]n the state of New York it has been repeatedly held ... that ... 
such device, without a wafer or wax, are not to be deemed a seal, and that the proper 
form of action must be such as is practi[c]ed on an unsealed instrument in the State where 
the suit is instituted ....”). 
700 Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933). 
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place where the tort occurred before determining whether to award dam-
ages as well as other common-law and equitable remedies.701 
Therefore, citing and fiercely embracing those choice of law princi-
ples,702 CAFA’s opponents had a major concern. They did not want feder-
al district court judges to ignore unwittingly, or wittingly, the “law of the 
place” rules when class members filed post-CAFA breach-of-contract and 
tort-based class actions against multinational corporations, insurers and 
other defendants in federal courts.703 In fact, after carefully reading the 
proposed legislation, many state attorneys general opposed it and conclud-
ed: 
[Class action reforms] would vastly expand federal diversity jurisdic-
tion, and ... [cause] most class actions [to be] filed in or removed to 
federal court. This transfer of jurisdiction in cases raising questions of 
state law will inappropriately usurp the primary role of state courts in 
developing their own state tort and contract laws, and will impair [state 
courts’] ability to establish consistent interpretations of those laws.704 
However, a majority of CAFA’s supporters stressed that these addi-
tional choice of law concerns were unfounded.705 Mirroring the sentiments 
of most reformers, one Senator stated: 
                                                 
701 Id. at 388 (“[T]he law of the place of the wrong determines whether the claim for 
damages survives the death of the wrongdoer.”) (citation omitted); see also Hague, 449 
U.S. at 308–09 n.11 (“In the tort context, the law of the place of the wrong usually gov-
erned traditional choice-of-law analysis.”). 
702 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1818 (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman) (“Under current 
doctrines, federal courts hearing state law based claims, must use the ‘choice-of-law’ rule 
of the state in which the federal district court sits. These procedural rules vary among 
states, but many provide that the federal court should apply the substantive law of a home 
state of the plaintiff, or the law of the state where the harm occurred. In a nationwide 
consumer class action, such a rule would lead the court to apply to each class member’s 
claim the law of the state in which the class member lives, or lived at the time the harm 
occurred.” (quoting a passage from a letter submitted by Arthur Miller, Harvard’s Bruce 
Bromley Professor of Law)). 
703 Id. 
704 Id. at 1649 (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from Fifteen State Attor-
neys General). 
705 See, e.g., id. at 2092 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“Opponents of 
[CAFA] claim that, by in any way altering the procedural rules governing class actions, 
substantive rights will be denied. However, this argument is trumped by a little document 
called the U.S. Constitution.”). 
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[These reforms do] not alter substantive law...or...affect any injured in-
dividual’s right to seek redress or to obtain damages. It does not limit 
damages .... [and] does not impose stricter pleading requirements.... 
Federal courts will continue to apply the appropriate State or States’ 
laws in adjudicating a class action suit.706 
On the other hand, a different reformer’s cautionary remarks rein-
forced anti-reformers’ general concerns. He stressed that when federal 
courts hear and decide class actions of national importance, a rational 
desire to achieve “efficient federalism” entails allowing federal judges to 
sort through complex substantive questions of law and apply “law of the 
place” rules if the application “would make sense.”707 
Finally, state attorneys general have successfully litigated illegal-trade-
practices class actions in state courts to protect consumers’ rights. For 
example, states have filed “enforcement actions on behalf of consumers 
against large, often foreign-owned, drug companies for overcharges and 
market manipulations that illegally raised the costs of certain prescription 
drugs.”708 Therefore, anti-reformers have argued that class action reforms 
would terminate or undermine the power of state attorneys general to 
litigate antitrust class actions in state courts.709 But class action reformers 
                                                 
706 Id. at 1670 (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback). 
707 Cf. id. at 2641 (statement of Rep. Rick Boucher) (“Suppose that a California State 
court class action were filed against a California pharmaceutical drug company on behalf 
of a proposed class of 60 percent California residents and 40 percent Nevada residents 
alleging harmful side effects attributed to a drug sold nationwide. In such a case, it would 
make sense to leave the matter in Federal court. After all, the State laws that would apply 
in all of these cases would vary, depending on where the drug was prescribed and pur-
chased.... [A]llowing a single Federal court to sort out such issues and handle the balance 
of the litigation would make sense both from added efficiency and a federalism stand-
point.”). 
708 151 CONG. REC. 2650 (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from National 
Association of Attorneys General); see id. (“Such cases have resulted in recoveries of 
approximately 235 million dollars, the majority of which is earmarked for consumer 
restitution.... This often meant several hundred dollars going back into the pockets of 
those consumers who can least afford to be victimized by illegal trade practices, senior 
citizens living on fixed incomes and the working poor who cannot afford insurance.”). 
709 See id. (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from National Association of 
Attorneys General) (“[We support the bipartisan amendment’s], clarifying that [CAFA] 
does not apply to, and would have no effect on, actions brought by any State Attorney 
General on behalf of his or her respective state or its citizens. As Attorneys General, we 
frequently investigate and bring actions against defendants who have caused harm to our 
citizens. These cases are usually brought pursuant to the Attorney General’s parens 
patriae authority under our respective consumer protection and antitrust statutes.... It is 
our concern that certain provisions of [CAFA] might be misinterpreted to hamper the 
ability of the Attorneys General to bring such actions .... We encourage you to support 
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have insisted that CAFA would not interfere with the ability of state attor-
neys general to enforce their respective antitrust statutes.710 In the end, the 
state attorneys’ general amendment to exempt state antitrust class actions 
under CAFA failed.711 
Breach-of-contract, tort-based, consumer-protection, civil-rights, anti-
trust, and securities causes of action—these theories of recovery have 
presented choice of law problems for both complainants and defendants 
who litigated class actions in state and federal courts. However, in the 
wash of CAFA’s new removal provisions, it would be difficult to measure 
at this point whether these specific choice of law challenges will substan-
tially increase or decrease defendants’ or complainants’ likelihood of 
winning or losing class actions in federal courts.712 
Still, consider the statistical findings in Table 4. They present a picture 
of the relationship between various theories of recovery and the disposi-
                                                                                                                         
the ... amendment [that exempts] all actions brought by State Attorneys General from the 
provisions [in CAFA].”); id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“[T]he National 
Conference of State Legislatures, NCSL, has noted ... its strong opposition to [CAFA], 
[because] the legislation ‘sends a disturbing message to the American people that state 
court systems are ... inferior or untrustworthy.’ The NCSL [also concluded] ... ‘that state 
laws in the areas of consumer protection and antitrust, which were passed to protect the 
citizens of a particular state against fraudulent or illegal activities, will almost never be 
heard in state courts. Ironically, state courts, whose sole purpose is to interpret state laws, 
will be bypassed and the federal judiciary will be asked to render judgment in those 
cases.’ Although bill proponents have sometimes suggested the contrary, make no mis-
take: if enacted, [CAFA] will [cause] the majority of class action lawsuits [to be] trans-
ferred from our state to Federal courts, [and will] ... terminate some class action lawsuits 
....”). 
710 See id. at 2077 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham) (“Valid trade secrets and pro-
prietary information—sensitive information that goes to the heart of a company being 
able to compete in the market place should and will be protected.... [T]hey have a right to 
protect valid trade secrets—patents and other proprietary information.... [W]e have ... 
tried to balance the legitimate interests of companies, who we want to remain strong 
competitors in the marketplace, with the public’s interest in disclosing potentially harm-
ful products or practices.”). 
711 See id. at 2083 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“[F]orty seven attorneys general ... 
expressed concern that [CAFA] could limit their powers to investigate and bring [anti-
trust class] actions in their State courts against defendants who have caused harm to their 
citizens. The attorneys general supported an amendment ... that would have exempted all 
[class] actions brought by State Attorneys General from the [CAFA] provisions stating, 
‘It is important to all of our constituents, but especially to the poor, elderly and disabled, 
that the provisions of the act not be misconstrued and that we maintain the enforcement 
authority needed to protect them from illegal practices.’ The ... amendment was defeat-
ed.”). 
712 As of this writing, CAFA has been enacted only six years; thus there are too few 
CAFA-related decisions to do a sound empirical study. 
2012] ALLEGEDLY “BIASED,” “INTIMIDATING” 533 
 
tion of class actions in state and federal courts of appeals.713 More im-
portantly, the reported percentages strongly suggest that both class action 
reformers and anti-reformers have sound reasons to be concerned about 
how federal and state courts will interpret and apply choice of law rules 
after CAFA.714 
TABLE 4 
CLASS MEMBERS’ WIN-LOSS RATIOS AGAINST NATIONAL AND 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INSURERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS 
 
Class Members’ Win/Loss Ratios Against 
National & Multinational Corporations & Insurers  
Class Members’ Win/Loss Ratios ONLY 
Against National & Multinational Insurers 
Variables State Courts Federal Courts  State Courts Federal Courts 
 Win/Loss 
Ratios 
(N = 295) Win/Loss 
Ratios 
(N = 193)  Win/Loss 
Ratios 
(N = 201) Win/Loss 
Ratios 
(N = 99)
    
Class Members’ Claims:    
Breach-of-Contract 0.325 / 0.675 (N = 83)** 0.259 / 0.741 (N = 24) 0.333 / 0.667 (N = 72)* 0.250 / 0.750 (N = 16) 
Common-Law Torts 0.667 / 0.333 (N = 48)** 0.333 / 0.667 (N = 21) 0.675 / 0.325 (N = 40)* 0.154 / 0.846 (N = 13) 
Consumer-Protection 0.432 / 0.568 (N = 118)** 0.377 / 0.623 (N = 77) 0.405 / 0.595 (N = 79)* 0.263 / 0.737 (N = 38) 
Civil-Rights 0.577 / 0.423 (N = 26)** 0.606 / 0.394 (N = 33) 0.500 / 0.500 (N = 2)* 0.667 / 0.333 (N = 9) 
Securities 0.444 / 0.556 (N = 9)** 0.412 / 0.588 (N = 17) 0.333 / 0.667 (N = 6)* 0.357 / 0.643 (N = 14) 
Antitrust 0.636 / 0.364 (N = 11)** 0.556 / 0.444 (N = 18) 0.500 / 0.500 (N = 2)* 0.444 / 0.556 (N = 9) 
    
** Chi square statistic = 17.4931,  df = 5,  p = 0.004 
* Chi square statistic = 13.0229,  df = 5,  p = 0.02 
  
First, it is important to note that two broad subheadings appear in Ta-
ble 4. One is labeled “Class Members’ Win/Loss Ratios Against National 
& Multinational Corporations and Insurers” (corporations and insurers 
cases).715 The other subheading is labeled “Class Members’ Win/Loss 
Ratios ONLY Against National & Multinational Insurers” (insurers only 
cases).716 The reason for constructing two broad subcategories is not com-
plicated. Depending on the types of insurance contracts, insurers have 
different contractual obligations.717 Here is a pertinent example: under 
residential and commercial property insurance contracts, property insurers 
promise to pay certain proceeds or to indemnify property owners when 
                                                 
713 See infra Table 4. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of 
the William & Mary Business Law Review. 
714 See infra Table 4. 
715 See supra Table 4. 
716 See supra Table 4. 
717 See infra notes 718–23. 
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“covered perils” produce tangible and intangible losses.718 If the property 
insurers breach those first-party agreements, the insured property owners 
may file first-party, direct actions—including class actions—against the 
insurers.719 
Here is another example: liability insurance contracts are essentially 
third-party contracts, since insureds purchase those contracts for the bene-
fit of third-party victims.720 In addition, under a variety of liability poli-
cies, multinational insurers promise to pay and/or settle third-party vic-
tims’ claims and lawsuits.721 But even more significantly, liability 
insurance contracts generally have duty-to-defend causes under which 
insurers promise to defend insureds against third-party victims’ law-
suits.722 However, when liability insurers breach duty-to-defend clauses, 
the insureds may also file first-party, direct actions—including class ac-
tions—against the insurers.723 In Table 4, the “Insurers’ Only Cases” com-
prise legal disputes like those appearing in the two examples. 
Case law is also replete with excellent examples of multinational lia-
bility insurers’ honoring their contractual obligations when third-party 
victims sue insureds in state and federal courts.724 Fairly often, multina-
tional liability insurers enthusiastically provide a legal defense for their 
insured, multinational corporations and businesses.725 And in those situa-
                                                 
718 See Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515, 527 (Tex. App. 1989) (explaining that 
to establish “coverage” under a property-insurance contract, one must prove that a cov-
ered peril—rather than an excluded peril—caused the loss); id. (“Property insurance, 
unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise 
assessing tort liability.” (quoting Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 
710 (Cal. 1989))); id. (“Coverage in a property policy is commonly provided by reference 
to causation, such as ‘loss caused by ...’ certain enumerated forces.... It is precisely these 
physical forces that bring about the loss.” (citing Garvey, 770 P.2d at 710)); id. (“In 
Texas, if one force is covered and one force is excluded, the insured must show that the 
property damage was caused solely by the insured force, or he must separate the damage 
caused by the insured peril from that caused by the excluded peril.” (citing Travelers 
Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1971))). 
719 Rice, supra note 266, at 346–47. 
720 See id. at 346 n.87 (“Liability insurance is purchased primarily to recompense in-
jured third parties. Therefore, one would expect such parties to have little difficulty 
obtaining the right to commence direct-action suits against liability carriers for 
extracontractual damages.”). 
721 Id. at 346. 
722 See WILLY E. RICE, CONSUMER LITIGATION AND INSURANCE DEFENSE 573–75 
(2011) (presenting a nutshell discussion of liability insurance contracts and insurers’ 
various obligations under duty-to-defend doctrines in multiple jurisdictions). 
723 Id. 
724 See id. 
725 Id. 
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tions, one can find allegedly third-party victims listing insurers and in-
sured corporate entities as joint defendants.726 Those lawsuits are usually 
called “third-party actions.”727 In Table 4, conflicts fitting this latter de-
scription are categorized as “Corporations and Insurers Cases.”728 
There is, however, one final important point: regardless of whether 
complainants sue insurance companies and corporations individually or 
jointly, complainants’ theories of recovery or claims are typically the 
following: breach-of-contract, tort-based claims, consumer-protection 
actions, civil-rights claims, antitrust actions, and securities-violation caus-
es of action.729 And these theories of recovery appear whether the lawsuits 
are first-party or third-party actions.730 
So, at this point, it is appropriate to ask: does Table 4 present any sta-
tistical findings that should generate or elevate choice of law concerns 
among class action reformers and anti-reformers? First, reformers believe 
that removing more civil-rights class actions from allegedly “biased” state 
courts to professedly “more competent and impartial” federal courts will 
significantly improve multinational corporations’ and insurers’ likelihoods 
of winning civil-rights disputes in federal courts.731 The percentages in 
Table 4, however, suggest otherwise.732 Class members are substantially 
more likely to win or prevail in the overwhelming majority of civil-rights 
cases.733 And those results appear repeatedly, regardless of (1) whether 
class members filed civil-rights actions in state or federal courts, or (2) 
whether civil-rights complaints named corporations and/or insurers as 
defendants in the class actions.734 The complainants’ “win” percent-
ages/ratios across the table are 0.557, 0.606, 0.500, and 0.667, respective-
ly.735 
                                                 
726 See Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2004–2005 Disposi-
tion of Insurance Decisions: A Survey and Statistical Review, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 821, 
878 nn.477–80 (2006) (discussing third parties’ right to sue the original parties who 
formed a contract). 
727 See RICE, supra note 722. 
728 See supra Table 4. 
729 See supra Table 4. 
730 See infra Appendix. 
731 Cf. 151 CONG. REC. 1646 (2005) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“[Under 
CAFA], a corporate defendant with headquarters outside [of a] State can move State class 
action cases, including civil rights cases and worker right cases, into Federal court, even 
if all the underlying facts in the case happened in a single State.”); see also supra note 
698 and accompanying text. 
732 See supra Table 4. 
733 See supra Table 4. 
734 See supra Table 4. 
735 See supra Table 4. 
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What have been corporations’ and insurers’ successes as defendants in 
antitrust class actions? Again, review the win/loss ratios in Table 4 under 
“Corporations and Insurers Cases.” The reported ratios reveal that, in both 
allegedly “biased” state courts and in supposedly “unprejudiced” federal 
courts, class members are substantially more likely to win antitrust class 
actions against the corporations and insurers.736 The class members’ “win” 
ratios in state and federal appellate courts are 0.636 and 0.556 respective-
ly.737 Furthermore, among “Insurers Only Cases,” class members won half 
(0.500) of antitrust class actions that were filed against insurers in state 
courts.738 On the other hand, national and multinational insurers were 
significantly more likely to win a majority (0.556) of federal antitrust class 
actions.739 
Arguably, this latter finding could partially explain insurers’ general 
perception: unlike state courts, federal courts are impartial forums; thus, 
insurers have a greater chance of defending themselves and their insured 
corporate clients against a variety of class actions, including antitrust ac-
tions.740 But if that conclusion is correct, it underscores and possibly justi-
fies anti-reformers’ concerns about class action reforms generally, and the 
previously discussed choice of law problems that class members might 
face in the wake of CAFA. To appreciate why anti-reformers’ concerns 
might be warranted, consider the first row of statistics in Table 4. 
Those ratios show the dispositions of class actions involving breach-
of-contract claims and the general finding is clear: insurers and corpora-
tions are overwhelmingly more likely to prevail in breach-of-contract class 
actions.741 More specifically, corporate defendants “win” repeatedly and 
consistently, regardless of (1) whether the breach-of-contract complaints 
named corporations or insurers as class action defendants, or (2) whether 
class members appealed breach-of-contract actions to state or federal ap-
pellate courts.742 Conversely, the meager “win” ratios for class members 
across all categories are just 0.325, 0.259, 0.333, and 0.250, respective-
ly.743 
Again, it is worth repeating class action reformers’ and corporate de-
fendants’ general assertion that removing allegedly “class actions of na-
                                                 
736 See supra Table 4. 
737 See supra Table 4. 
738 See supra Table 4. 
739 See supra Table 4. 
740 See supra Table 4. 
741 See supra Table 4. 
742 See supra Table 4. 
743 See supra Table 4. 
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tional importance” to federal courts is warranted because state court judg-
es are (1) inherently “biased” against out-of-state corporate defendants, 
and (2) significantly more likely to issue unfair and incompetent class 
action rulings.744 But the author invites the reader to inspect the third and 
fifth rows of ratios in Table 4. Those statistics do not support class action 
reformers’ arguments.745 First, consider the coefficients in the third row, 
which illustrate the disposition of consumer-protection class actions.746 
Again, the statistically significant findings are consistent.747 Class action 
defendants are substantially more likely to win the greater majority of 
consumer-protection class actions in courts of appeals.748 
More precisely, corporate defendants are significantly more likely to 
win consumer-protection, class action lawsuits regardless of (1) whether 
class members’ consumer-protection pleadings identified corporations or 
insurers as defendants, or (2) whether class members appealed consumer-
protection class actions to state or federal appellate courts.749 The corre-
sponding ratios for corporate defendants’ extremely greater likelihood of 
winning consumer-protection lawsuits—across all categories in the third 
row—are 0.568, 0.623, 0.595, and 0.737, respectively.750 
The fairly new class action removal provisions under CAFA do not 
apply to class actions that involve corporate defendants’ alleged securities 
violations.751 Nevertheless, a careful review of the statistics appearing in 
Table 4’s fifth row also undermine class action reformers’ and corporate 
defendants’ generally negative perceptions about state judges, and about 
the perceived administration of justice in state courts.752 An examination 
of the ratios illustrating the disposition of securities-violation class actions 
reveals that corporations and insurers are statistically and substantially 
more likely to win the greater proportion of securities-based class actions 
in appellate courts.753 And, like earlier findings, class action defendants 
                                                 
744 See supra Part V.B. 
745 See supra Table 4. 
746 See supra Table 4. 
747 See supra Table 4. 
748 See supra Table 4. 
749 See supra Table 4. 
750 See supra Table 4. 
751 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(d)(1), 119 Stat. 4, 13 
(“EXCEPTION.—This section shall not apply to any class action that solely involves a 
claim concerning a covered security as defined under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities 
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 78p(f)(3)) and section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(5)(E)).”). 
752 See supra Table 4. 
753 See supra Table 4. 
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are more likely to win: (1) when the securities-violation pleadings identi-
fied corporations or insurers as defendants, and (2) when insurers and/or 
multinational corporations defended themselves in state or federal courts 
of appeals.754 The “win” ratios for securities-based class action defendants 
across all categories are 0.556, 0.588, 0.667, and 0.643 respectively.755 
Before leaving Table 4, one final, important observation is warranted. 
In the wake of class action reforms and if certain conditions are satisfied, 
CAFA allows the following: a corporate defendant may assert that a “mass 
action” is essentially a class action and remove the state law lawsuit from 
a supposedly “anti-corporate” state court to a purportedly “impartial” 
federal district court.756 Under CAFA, a civil action qualifies as a “mass 
action” if 100 or more persons present claims that have common questions 
of law and fact, and each person wants monetary relief.757 But, historical-
ly, using the 100-or-more-persons-claim definition, mass-tort actions have 
not been viewed as class actions or mass actions.758 Arguably, CAFA’s 
definition overturns conventional wisdom and muddles the definition of 
mass torts.759 
In fact, before and in the wake of CAFA, anti-reformers asserted 
strongly that “mass action” is simply a thinly disguised term for “mass 
                                                 
754 See supra Table 4. 
755 See supra Table 4. 
756 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(11)(A), 119 Stat. 4, 
11. Presently, citing CAFA’s mass action removal provisions, federal courts may treat 
many state mass-tort actions as if they were class actions. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2657 
(2005) (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (“[T]his substitute [amendment] is the superior 
piece of legislation .... The substitute is much better .... [because] we exclude non-class 
action cases involving physical injuries. [CAFA] applies not only to class actions, but 
also to mass torts. The Democratic substitute removes the mass tort language.”). 
757 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, § 4(a)(11)(B)(i), 119 Stat. at 11. 
758 Cf. 151 CONG. REC. 2090 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“Anyone who reads 
[CAFA] will notice that ... it affects more than just class actions. Individual actions, 
consolidated by state courts for efficiency purposes, are not class actions. Despite the fact 
that a similar provision was unanimously struck from the bill during the last Congress, 
mass actions reappeared in this bill this Congress. Federalizing these individual cases will 
no doubt delay, and possibly deny, justice for victims suffering real injuries.”). 
759 See id. at 2082 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (“Mass torts are large scale per-
sonal injury cases that result from accidents, environmental disasters, or dangerous drugs 
that are widely sold. Cases like Vioxx ... and cases arising from asbestos exposure are 
examples of mass torts. These personal injury claims are usually based on State laws, and 
almost every State has well established rules of procedure to allow their State courts to 
customize the needs of their litigants in these complex cases.”). 
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torts.”760 And from anti-reformers’ perspective, class action reformers and 
multinational corporations want to federalize all state mass-torts and per-
sonal-injury cases.761 Even more pointedly, a fairly large consortium of 
anti-reformers insists that CAFA’s removal provisions are: 
Patently unfair to citizens harmed by toxic spills, contaminated drink-
ing water, polluted air and other environmental hazards .... [CAFA] 
would allow corporate defendants in many ... “mass tort” environmen-
tal cases to remove these kinds of state environmental matters from 
state court to federal court, placing the cases in a forum that could be 
more costly, more time-consuming, and disadvantageous [for the vic-
tims of] toxic pollution.762 
On the other hand, class action reformers have been just as adamant, 
insisting that “[m]ass torts and mass actions are not the same.”763 But even 
more ardent class action reformers have stressed that mass-tort actions are 
indeed nothing less than nationwide class actions.764 Thus, according to 
the more adamant reformers, mass-tort actions—like nationwide class 
actions generally—should be removed to and litigated in federal courts, 
because (1) mass-tort actions are abusive,765 (2) they allow unethical law-
                                                 
760 See, e.g., id. at 1660 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (“[S]upporters of [CAFA] 
claim that mass actions are not the same as mass torts and ... they have no desire to affect 
mass tort cases. I know that is their position, but it is not what [CAFA] says.”). 
761 See, e.g., id. at 2648 (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee) (“This class action 
lawsuit legislation ... is excessive and overreaching.... [It] wants to federalize mass 
torts.”); id. at 1660 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (“If the goal is to federalize all state 
personal injury cases, supporters should be open about it and say it publicly.”). 
762 Id. at 2649 (statements from a letter submitted by S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Vice 
President for Government, American Rivers, and various other environmental organiza-
tions). 
763 See id. at 2082 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (quoting comment of Sen. Trent 
Lott) (“The phrase ‘mass torts’ refers to a situation in which many persons are injured by 
the same underlying cause, such as a single explosion, a series of event, or exposure to a 
particular product. In contrast, the phrase ‘mass action’ refers to a specific type of lawsuit 
in which a large number of plaintiffs seek to have all their claims adjudicated in one 
combined trial. Mass actions are basically disguised class actions.”); id. at 2649. 
764 151 CONG. REC. 2642 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) (“The mass action 
provision was included in [CAFA] because mass actions are really class actions in dis-
guise. They involve an element of people who want their claims adjudicated together, and 
they often result in the same abuses as class actions. In fact, sometimes the abuses are 
even worse because the lawyers seek to join claims that have little to do with each other 
and confuse a jury into awarding millions of dollars to individuals who have suffered no 
real injury.”). 
765 See, e.g., id. at 1826 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Abuse of the class action 
system has even become the inspiration for popular literature. In 2003, ... John Grisham 
released a book entitled ‘The King of Torts.’ Grisham’s novel takes its reader into the 
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yers to game the system to secure hefty attorneys’ fees,766 and (3) they 
undermine the “economic competitiveness” of national and multinational 
corporations.767 
Therefore, against the backdrop of corporate defendants’ newly ac-
quired right to remove larger numbers of purely state substantive law mass 
actions from state courts to federal courts, there is one additional pressing 
question: Are states’ righters and anti-reformers’ general fears about cor-
porate defendants abusing that right warranted? Or, stated differently, are 
corporate defendants more likely to win greater numbers of class action 
lawsuits if state law mass actions or mass-tort actions satisfy the 100-or-
more-persons class action rule and are removed from state courts to feder-
al courts? Arguably, without considering any other variables, the remain-
ing statistics in Table 4 provide some insight. 
Once more, in the table, class members’ and class action defendants’ 
win/loss ratios appear under two broad categories—“Corporations and 
Insurers Cases” and “Insurers Only Cases.”768 Now, examine the second 
row of ratios. Those coefficients demonstrate the dispositions of tort-based 
class actions, or class actions in which class members’ theory of recovery 
sounded in tort.769 The results are mixed, which probably explains class 
action reformers’ and anti-reformers’ passion about this issue and their 
respective desires to litigate tort-based, personal-injury lawsuits either in 
state or federal courts.770 First, class members are substantially more likely 
to win tort-based class actions in state appellate courts, regardless of 
whether complainants sued multinational corporations and insurers jointly 
or individually.771 The class members’ “win” ratios in state appellate 
courts are 0.667 and 0.675, respectively.772 
                                                                                                                         
world of the mass tort/class action lawyer where clients are treated like chattel and bar-
gaining chips.... The end game is not the pursuit of justice for the class members and 
clients, but in the pursuit of a hefty attorney’s fee. Although Grisham’s book is intended 
as fiction, it is hard to distinguish it from the facts of our broken class action system.”). 
766 Id. 
767 Id. at 2091 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) (“I have spoken previously on this 
floor about my concerns that this legislation does not go far enough to address the scan-
dal of litigation abuse that plagues our civil justice system. I stand by those concerns 
today. We can and should do more to reduce the burden of frivolous, expensive litigation. 
Our Nation’s economic competitiveness in the 21st century depends on it.”). 
768 See supra Table 4. 
769 See supra Table 4. 
770 See supra Table 4. 
771 See supra Table 4. 
772 See supra Table 4. 
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In contrast, corporate defendants are substantially more likely to win 
tort-based class actions when those claims are litigated in federal courts of 
appeals.773 And corporate defendants won large percentages of tort-based, 
federal class actions regardless of whether class members sued multina-
tional corporations and insurers jointly or individually.774 Corporate de-
fendants’ “win” ratios in federal courts are 66.7% and 84.6%, respective-
ly.775 
To conclude the discussion of the results in Table 4, the brief com-
ments of a class action reformer and anti-reformer are worth restating. The 
proponent stressed: “The class action system ... is broken. Over the past 
decade, class action lawsuits have grown by over 1,000 percent nation-
wide. This extraordinary increase has [produced] ... claims that are often 
unjust. [Class actions involving multistate] plaintiffs and defendants ... are 
tried in small State courts with known biases.”776 But the anti-reformer 
asserted: 
[T[he business community has worked ... long and ... hard to remove 
the rights of consumers and citizens to sue in their own State courts.... 
The businesses know they can win more class action cases in Federal 
courts than they could ever win in State courts. That is what this whole 
[CAFA] debate is about.777 
Which position is correct? Based on the limited findings in Table 4, 
the anti-reformers’ position is only partially correct.778 It is true: multina-
tional corporations, insurers, and other corporate defendants—rather than 
class action complainants—are more likely to win class actions by sub-
stantially larger margins in federal courts of appeals.779 There is, however, 
an even more surprising finding: multinational corporations and insurers 
are also more likely to win class actions by substantial margins in state 
appellate courts.780 This latter, unexpected finding seriously challenges, 
and even negates, the accuracy of class action reformers’ unrelenting and 
previously discussed assertions that class action reforms are needed, be-
cause (1) class action systems in state courts are broken, (2) state court 
judges have known biases against out-of-state corporate defendants, and 
                                                 
773 See supra Table 4. 
774 See supra Table 4. 
775 See supra Table 4. 
776 151 CONG. REC. 2084 (2005) (statement of Sen. Mike Enzi). 
777 Id. at 2082 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin). 
778 See supra Table 4. 
779 See supra Table 4. 
780 See supra Table 4. 
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(3) anti-corporate biases prevent corporate defendants from winning a 
significant number of class actions in state courts. 
E. Two-Stage Multivariate Probit Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Litigants’ Characteristics and the Disposition of Class Actions in State 
and Federal Courts of Appeals 
The discussion above revealed several broad, statistically significant 
findings: (1) litigants’ status—class members versus class defendants—
influences who is more likely to win an overwhelming majority of class 
actions in both state and federal courts, (2) state and federal courts’ geo-
graphic locations influence whether class members or defendants win a 
majority of class actions, and (3) class members’ theories of recovery—
choice of substantive laws—significantly influence whether class com-
plainants win a majority of class actions in state or federal courts.781 
Certainly, these broad findings preclude anyone from establishing per-
suasively that allegedly “biased” judicial rulings determine whether plain-
tiffs or defendants will win a majority of class actions in state or federal 
courts. As the author has explained on other occasions in published law 
review articles, to determine whether there is evidence of “judicial bias,” 
several factors must be weighed. 782 But even more importantly, one must 
address forthrightly questions about the quality of the sample data—
whether the cases appearing in regional law reporters actually reflect what 
is occurring in courts, factually and generally.783 Therefore, to increase the 
likelihood of one’s conducting a sound study, an investigator must (1) 
employ a procedure that generates more “powerful” inferential statistics 
and coefficients than simple percentages, (2) measure the unique as well 
as simultaneous effects of legal and extralegal variables on the disposition 
of class actions, and (3) test for “selectivity bias” in the sample data. 784 
Why test for “selectivity bias” in sample data? Arguably, appellate 
courts’ rulings are more important and persuasive, since those rulings are 
                                                 
781 See supra Table 4. 
782 See Rice, supra note 296, at 1208–09 (discussing the inherent problems with using 
only reported cases and simple percentages to make inferences). To be sure, there are 
“full” judicial decisions which are not published in various federal and state reporters. 
However, to address that limitation in part, the present study includes both cases appear-
ing in the reporters as well as in multiple online state and federal databases. 
783 See Rice, supra note 296, at 1208–09. 
784 In several published articles, the author has discussed “selectivity bias,” the prob-
lems that it generates, and the test for it in sample data. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance 
Contracts and Judicial Decisions over Whether Insurers Must Defend Insureds that 
Violate Constitutional and Civil Rights: An Historical and Empirical Review of Federal 
and State Court Declaratory Judgments 1900–2000, 35 TORT & INS. L. J. 995, 1088–89 
nn.431–32 (2000); Rice, supra note 296, at 1209 n.386; Rice, supra note 266, at 371–75 
nn.157–59 (1992). 
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significantly more likely to be “final decisions” than federal district courts 
or state trial courts’ rulings. However, after state trial courts and federal 
district courts issue unfavorable class action rulings or judgments, some 
class plaintiffs and defendants accept those decisions and choose not to 
seek appellate review.785 Other class litigants, however, refuse to accept 
lower courts’ adverse judgments, and the latter litigants decide to chal-
lenge unfavorable outcomes in either state or federal appellate courts.786 
Therefore, the obvious question becomes whether any statistically sig-
nificant difference exists between the attributes of litigants who choose to 
appeal adverse rulings and those who decide not to appeal. Of course, if 
there are significant differences between “appealers” and “nonappealers,” 
their dissimilar personal attributes—rather than “judicial bias” or other 
factors—might provide the better explanation of appealers’ propensity to 
win or lose more or less class actions in state and federal courts of appeals. 
Since the current sample contains some information about the attributes of 
class action “appealers” and “nonappealers,” a test for “selectivity bias” 
was warranted before attempting to measure whether “judicial bias” exists 
in state and federal appellate courts’ class action proceedings.787 
Again, in this Part, the goal is to understand more fully why class ac-
tion defendants and plaintiffs are likely to have relatively larger or smaller 
win/loss ratios in state or federal courts of appeals. And to help achieve 
that end, the present analysis employs a statistical procedure that allows 
one to measure unique as well as simultaneous effects of specific legal and 
extralegal variables—say, theories of recovery, types of defendants, and 
geographic locations of courts—on the disposition of class actions in state 
and federal appellate courts. Stated slightly differently, the challenge is to 
secure the specific individual, statistical effects (“explanations”) of certain 
variables on the courts’ dispositions of class actions, while controlling for 
and determining the multiple and simultaneous effects of other “pre-
sumed” random factors. Thus, to help increase the likelihood of achieving 
the stated ends, the author employed a multivariate, two-staged, probit 
procedure.788 
                                                 
785 See supra Table 2. 
786 See supra Table 3. 
787 See Rice, supra note 296, at 1209. 
788 In multiple published law review articles, the author has discussed and employed 
this statistical procedure to measure simultaneously unique and multiple effects of predic-
tors on the disposition of court decisions. See Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the 
Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Empirical and Historical Analysis of Courts’ 
Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration and Insolvency Statutes 
with the McCarran-Ferguson Act—1941–1993, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 399, 445–49 
nn.213–19 (1994); Rice, supra note 296 at 1088–94 nn.431–32, 1208–14 n.386–87; 
Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX, and Section 
504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis, 5 REV. LITIG. 219, 287 nn.406–09 (1986) 
(using StataCorp’s STATA STATISTICAL SOFTWARE to analyze the data generally and to 
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Now, consider Table 5. It presents a multivariate probit analysis of the 
disposition of class actions in state and federal courts of appeals.789 The 
table illustrates several distributions, probit values, and statistics for two 
multivariate models—Model A and Model B.790 
TABLE 5 
THE MULTIVARIATE EFFECTS OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON LITIGANTS’ 
DECISIONS TO COMMENCE CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AND ON THE 
DISPOSITION OF THOSE ACTIONS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 
1925–2011  (N = 2657) 
 
MODEL A 
Decision to Initiate Causes 
of Action to State and 
Federal Courts of Appeals 
(N = 1680) 
 Decision of Causes of 
Action in State and 
Federal Courts of Appeals 
(N = 1680) 
Selected Predictor Variables Probit 
Values 
Robust Std. 
Errors 
 Probit 
Values 
Robust Std. 
Errors 
     
Complainants’ Ethnicity:     
Anglo-American -0.1370 0.0633* -0.0070 0.0784 
African-American -0.1439 0.1320  -0.0466 0.1409 
    
Circuits:    
Fourth Circuit -0.0727 0.1196  0.1809 0.1544 
Fifth Circuit 0.7487 0.0981***  0.2076 0.1668 
Seventh Circuit 0.5443 0.0968***  0.2922 0.1355* 
Eleventh Circuit 0.1619 0.0877  0.1559 0.0975 
    
INTERACTION EFFECTS:    
ClassAction* STATE Courts 0.5255 0.0948***  0.3776 0.1374** 
ClassAction* Insurers 0.5377 0.1144***  -0.0126 0.1865 
ClassAction* Corporations -0.0046 0.1376***  0.0742 0.1637 
ClassAction* Contract Claims -0.4806 0.1102***  -0.5145 0.1473*** 
ClassAction* Tort Claims -0.3428 0.1096**  0.1736 0.1697 
ClassAction* Civil-Rights Claims -0.3743 0.1474**  0.0215 0.2071 
ClassAction* Consumers’ Claims -0.5587 0.1061***  -0.4006 0.1527** 
ClassAction* Securities Claims -0.6662 0.1359***  -0.3037 0.2378 
ClassAction* Antitrust Claims -0.4959 0.2467*  0.0509 0.3120 
  
CONSTANT 0.3964 0.0500***  -0.3989 0.2258 
    
Wald test for independent equations (“selectivity bias”):  Chi square = 0.7900,  p-value = 0.3743 
 
*** Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.001 
** Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.01 
* Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.05 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
compute the multivariate-probit coefficients in particular); Rice, supra note 266, at 369–
77 nn.157–60. 
789 See infra Table 5. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of 
the William & Mary Business Law Review. 
790 See infra Table 5. 
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
 
MODEL B 
Decision to Initiate Causes 
of Action to State and 
Federal Courts of Appeals 
(N = 1680) 
 Decision of Causes of 
Action in State and 
Federal Courts of Appeals 
(N = 1680) 
Selected Predictor Variables Probit 
Values 
Robust Std. 
Errors 
 Probit 
Values 
Robust Std. 
Errors 
       
Complainants’ Ethnicity:       
Anglo-American -0.2013 0.0633***  -0.0565 0.0757 
African-American -0.1655 0.1339  -0.0582 0.1373 
    
Circuits:    
Fourth Circuit -0.0512 0.1205  0.1867 0.1482 
Fifth Circuit 0.7780 0.0982***  0.2554 0.1329* 
Seventh Circuit 0.5634 0.0982***  0.3219 0.1129** 
Eleventh Circuit 0.1803 0.0891*  0.1739 0.0944 
    
INTERACTION EFFECTS:    
ClassAction* FEDERAL Courts -0.8159 0.1007***  -0.6309 0.1512*** 
ClassAction* Insurers 0.8100 0.1145***  0.2013 0.1760 
ClassAction* Corporations 0.2497 0.1375  0.2632 0.1596 
ClassAction* Contract Claims -0.2564 0.1036*  -0.3560 0.1261** 
ClassAction* Tort Claims 0.1826 0.1072  0.2625 0.1426 
ClassAction* Civil-Rights Claims 0.1584 0.1668  0.4205 0.1961* 
ClassAction* Consumers’ Claims -0.2760 0.1103**  -0.2147 0.1268 
ClassAction* Securities Claims -0.1881 0.1519  0.0453 0.2132 
ClassAction* Antitrust Claims -0.1686 0.2563  0.3122 0.3014 
    
CONSTANT 0.4584 0.0498***  -0.4146 0.1455** 
       
Wald test for independent equations (“selectivity bias”):  Chi square = 1.910,  p-value = 0.1647 
 
*** Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.001 
** Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.01 
* Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.05 
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At the outset, it is important to note that the findings in Table 5 are 
based on a multivariate probit analysis of 1,680 cases rather than 2,657 
cases—the total sample size.791 Of the 1,680 cases, there are 824 state and 
federal class action decisions.792 Of this latter number, litigants appealed 
519 class actions to federal and state appellate courts, and they decided not 
to appeal 305 class actions.793 The remaining 856 cases are non-class ac-
tion decisions; they were also decided in state and federal lower courts.794 
Of the non-class action cases, litigants decided to appeal nearly seventy 
percent (69.3%) to appellate courts.795 The remaining thirty percent 
(30.6%) were not appealed.796 Of course, we do not know why some class 
action and non-class action litigants decided not to appeal adverse rulings 
or outcomes. To use statistical jargon, those cases were “unobserved” in 
either state or federal courts of appeals. Thus, their absence could be a 
source of “selectivity bias” when attempting to explain class action liti-
gants’ wins/losses in state and federal courts of appeals. 
Against the backdrop of those preliminary remarks, consider the varia-
bles and coefficients in Model A, which appears left of the vertical line in 
Table 5.797 That model comprises three predictor variables, along with 
their subcategories: “Complainants’ Ethnicity” has two categories; “Cir-
cuits” has four categories; and, nine additional variables appear under the 
heading “Interaction Effects.”798 To the right of the vertical line, Model B 
                                                 
791 See infra Table A. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of 
the William & Mary Business Law Review. The purpose of the content analysis was to 
gather information about more than forty variables. Thus, if any case had a missing value 
on any variable, those cases were omitted to increase the likelihood of performing a 
sound multivariate probit analysis. Thus, the author omitted 977 cases. 
792 See supra Table 2. 
793 See supra Table 2. 
794 See infra Table A. 
795 See infra Table A. 
796 See infra Table A. These percentages are based on a review of the non-class action 
statistic in Table A. 
797 See supra Table 5. 
798 See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelly, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1139–40 n.122 
(2009) (“By testing multiple variables simultaneously in this way, we can evaluate 
whether each characteristic has a statistically significant relationship with case outcome, 
while controlling for all others.... [Regressions] provide a unified framework in which to 
examine and test interaction effects, which indicate whether two (or more) variables 
together have an effect different than would be expected from knowledge of their indi-
vidual effects alone.... Finally, [one may test] for statistical interactions between variables 
in ... regression models [to determine] ...whether the effect of each variable on case 
outcome depends in magnitude and/or direction of the value of another variable.”); see 
also Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Esti-
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appears.799 Barring one exception, the variables in Model B are identical 
to those in Model A.800 The one exception becomes readily apparent if the 
reader carefully reviews the nine interaction-effect variables in each mod-
el.801 Even more to the point, the first “dummy” interaction-effect variable 
in Model A is “ClassAction*STATE Courts.”802 However, in Model B, the 
first “dummy” interaction-effect predictor is “ClassAction*FEDERAL 
Courts.”803 
Model A presents two distributions of probit values, along with their 
respective distributions of robust standard errors and z-statistics.804 The 
various asterisks describe the probit values’ levels of statistical signifi-
cance.805 The “Interaction Effects” are simply “categorical dummy varia-
bles” which measure the independent effects of categories within certain 
predictor variables only among complainants who filed state law class 
actions. The probit values appearing under the caption “Decision to Initi-
ate Causes of Action in State and Federal Courts of Appeals (N=1,680)” 
answer this inquiry: whether the multiple and simultaneous effects of 
“Complainants’ Ethnicity, Types of Circuits and Interaction Effects” sig-
nificantly influenced litigants’ decisions to appeal their adverse rulings.806 
The findings show that some of the probit values are statistically sig-
nificant.807 Thus, we may conclude that some of the factors influenced 
class action litigants’ decisions to appeal unfavorable lower court rulings 
to state and federal appeals courts.808 Likewise, in Model B, many of the 
                                                                                                                         
mates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 115–16 n.27 (1995) (explaining and measuring 
the statistical effects of “dummy” interaction variables—zeros and ones—on sellers’ and 
buyers’ decisions and bargaining outcomes). 
799 See supra Table 5. 
800 See supra Table 5. 
801 See supra Table 5. 
802 See supra Table 5. 
803 See supra Table 5. 
804 See supra Table 5. 
805 See, e.g., Thomas J. Brennan, What Happens After a Holiday?: Long-Term Effects 
of the Repatriation Provision of the AJCA, 5 N.W.J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 11–12 nn.34–35 
(2010) (“Columns of the table represent separate regressions, and rows of the table repre-
sent variables corresponding to coefficients computed in the regressions.... The value 
reported for each regression and variable is the point estimate of the coefficient, and the 
value [to the right] is the robust standard error estimate.... In reports of regression results 
in this Article the notations *, **, and *** are used to indicate statistical significance at 
the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. These values are computed using the robust 
standard errors described in the above footnote.”). 
806 See supra Table 5. 
807 See supra Table 5. 
808 See supra Table 5. 
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same variables influenced litigants’ decisions to appeal state trial courts’ 
and federal district courts’ adverse rulings.809 In both models, the litigants’ 
decision to appeal or not appeal can be explained by (1) knowing the 
complainants’ ethnicity, (2) knowing the circuits in which the state and 
federal courts were located, and (3) knowing complainants’ theories of 
recovery.810 
Now, given those statistically significant findings, we must answer the 
most important question: whether “selectivity bias” appears in the data. 
Stated differently, is there any meaningful difference between litigants 
who decided to appeal adverse class action rulings and those litigants who 
decided not to appeal? This necessarily requires a researcher to “test” for 
similarities between, say, two equations—the two distributions of probit 
values within Model A as well as the two distributions of values within 
Model B. At the bottom of each model in Table 5, two Wald tests for 
independent equations suggest that no meaningful “selectivity bias” exists, 
because the respective Chi-square values are not statistically significant.811 
Therefore, in light of no apparent “self-selection bias,” the important in-
quiry becomes whether the simultaneous and multiple effects of the pre-
dictors in Model A and Model B are significantly more or less likely to 
sway the dispositions of class action disputes in appellate courts. Put simp-
ly, the answer is yes. 
Again, reconsider Model A and examine the probit values under the 
heading “Disposition of Causes of Action in State and Federal Courts of 
Appeals.” Four predictors have statistically significant probit values.812 
The “Seventh Circuit” variable has a positive 0.2922 probit value.813 It 
means that complainants generally are substantially more likely to prevail 
in all state and federal appellate courts that are located within the borders 
of the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction.814 And it is important to repeat that 
this applies to all complainants without controlling for whether they were 
class action or non-class action plaintiffs.815 
However, the next three statistically significant probit values in Model 
A are class action-specific findings. Consider the first interaction-effect 
variable. The positive 0.3776 coefficient reveals that class action com-
plainants are significantly more likely to win their cases in state courts of 
                                                 
809 See supra Table 5. 
810 See supra Table 5. 
811 See supra Table 5. 
812 See supra Table 5. 
813 See supra Table 5. 
814 See supra Table 5. 
815 See supra Table 5. 
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appeals.816 On the other hand, the remaining two interaction-effect varia-
bles tell a different story.817 Reviewing the “ClassAction*Contracts” vari-
able, the corresponding probit value under the column “Disposition of 
Causes of Action” is negative (-0.5145).818 It strongly suggests that class 
action complainants are significantly more likely to lose on appeal when 
their theory of recovery sounds in contract.819 Also, class action members 
are substantially more likely to lose when they sue corporate defendants 
for allegedly violating consumer protection laws.820 The corresponding 
probit coefficient for the “ClassAction*Consumers’ Claims” variable is 
negative (-0.4006).821 
A review of the coefficients in Model B—under the caption “Disposi-
tion of Causes of Action in State and Federal Courts of Appeals”—reveals 
five variables with corresponding statistically significant probit values.822 
First, the positive 0.3219 probit value in Model B indicates that plaintiffs 
generally are substantially more likely to prevail in both state and federal 
courts of appeals located within the borders of the Seventh Circuit’s juris-
diction.823 This finding is consistent with the finding in Model A.824 But 
the positive and statistically significant 0.2554 probit value indicates that 
plaintiffs generally are also substantially more likely to prevail when they 
appeal their cases to state and federal appellate courts within the borders 
of the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction.825 Of course, this latter finding is incon-
sistent with the Fifth-Circuit finding in Model A.826 
The third statistically significant variable—“ClassAction*Federal 
Courts”—in Model B confirms what class action reformers know as well 
as what anti-reformers and states’ righters fear: complainants who file 
state law class actions in federal courts of appeals are substantially more 
likely to lose than win.827 The corresponding statistically significant and 
negative probit coefficient (-0.6309) supports this conclusion.828 And to 
underscore this latter finding, one needs only to consider the next statisti-
                                                 
816 See supra Table 5. 
817 See supra Table 5. 
818 See supra Table 5. 
819 See supra Table 5. 
820 See supra Table 5. 
821 See supra Table 5. 
822 See supra Table 5. 
823 See supra Table 5. 
824 See supra Table 5. 
825 See supra Table 5. 
826 See supra Table 5. 
827 See supra Table 5. 
828 See supra Table 5. 
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cally significant finding in Model B: class action complainants are sub-
stantially more likely to lose on appeal when their theory of recovery 
sounds in contract.829 The corresponding statistically noteworthy probit 
coefficient (-0.3560) for the interaction-effect variable—“ClassAction 
*Contract Claims”—is negative.830 
The final statistically significant variable in Model B is “ClassAction 
*Civil-Rights Claims.” Its corresponding probit value (0.4205) is posi-
tive.831 It strongly suggests that class action members are considerably 
more likely to win than lose civil-rights actions in courts of appeals.832 By 
comparison, the positive influence of this latter variable for class members 
does not appear in Model A.833 Then again, in Model A, the “ClassAction 
*Consumers’ Claims” variable has a statistically significant and negative 
influence (-0.4006) on class members’ likelihood of success in courts of 
appeal.834 On the other hand, the direction of this latter variable’s influ-
ence under Model B is also negative (-0.2147); its impact, however, is not 
statistically significant.835 
Finally, one additional observation is worth noting at this point. In 
Models A and B, the respective probit values for complainants’ ethnici-
ty—Anglo-American and African-American—are not statistically signifi-
cant.836 Of course, in law, there is no sound reason why they should be 
“predictive.”837 But several empirically based legal studies have shown 
that, wittingly or unwittingly, both state and federal courts of appeals 
allow complainants’ race/ethnicity to influence outcomes in a variety of 
legal controversies.838 
                                                 
829 See supra Table 5. 
830 See supra Table 5. 
831 See supra Table 5. 
832 See supra Table 5. 
833 See supra Table 5. 
834 See supra Table 5. 
835 See supra Table 5. 
836 See supra Table 5. 
837 Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, Redlining, and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, 
Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued 
Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950–1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
583, 584 (1996). 
838 See generally David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty 
in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from 
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); Charlotte L. Lanvers, Different Federal 
District Court, Different Disposition: An Empirical Comparison of ADA, Title VII Race 
and Sex, and ADEA Employment Discrimination Dispositions in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 381 
(2007); Rice, supra note 837. 
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Therefore, in light of the positive and negative effects of the variables 
discussed above, we must ask: what do the statistically significant class 
action findings suggest? At a minimum, we may conclude that, when 
examining the unique and concurrent impact of all variables in the two 
models, complainants are significantly more likely to win when (1) state 
courts of appeals decide the class action disputes, and (2) when appellate 
courts hear and resolve civil-rights disputes.839 Conversely, class action 
defendants—multinational corporations and insurers—are appreciably 
more likely to prevail (1) when federal courts of appeals resolve the class 
action controversies, and (2) when appellate courts hear and resolve class 
actions involving breach-of-contract action and consumer violation 
claims.840 
But should one expect class members to win considerably more class 
actions in state appellate courts than class defendants? Should defendants 
prevail significantly more often when federal courts of appeals decide 
questions of law and fact in class action cases? Furthermore, should one 
expect the unique effects of class members’ theories of recovery or choic-
es of law to predict class members’ likelihood of winning or losing in 
either federal or state courts of appeals? Or should one expect any of the 
variables appearing in Table 5 to influence the disposition of class actions 
in state and federal courts of appeals? The resounding answer to each 
question is no.841 
Yet as we have seen in this empirical study, those variables affect class 
action litigants’ likelihood of receiving favorable or unfavorable legal and 
equitable rulings and remedies in state and federal courts of appeals.842 In 
view of these unexpected statistical findings, one could reasonably con-
clude that both federal and state appellate courts are intentionally or unin-
tentionally allowing irrelevant, prejudicial or extra-legal factors signifi-
cantly influence the disposition of class actions. Perhaps the statistical 
effects of immaterial variables on litigants’ likelihood of success or failure 
explain, in part, class action defendants’ and complainants’ respective 
reticence about litigating class actions in state courts or in federal courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Among objective judges and experienced practicing attorneys, there is 
general agreement about one point: a class action is a more efficient pro-
                                                 
839 See supra Table 5. 
840 See supra Table 3. 
841 See supra Table 5. 
842 See supra Table 5. 
552 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:419 
 
cedure to resolve numerous disputes at once, using a single lawsuit rather 
than multiple, time-consuming, and expensive lawsuits.843 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has found and concluded on numerous occasions that state 
court judges are remarkably competent to decide general actions involving 
state and federal claims.844 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that state 
judges also have the requisite proficiency as well as the professional and 
judicial character to hear and decide state substantive law class actions in a 
fair manner. Yet, as reported throughout this Article, class action reform-
ers—primarily multinational corporations, national insurance companies, 
and their congressional supporters—have been quite vocal: reformers have 
proclaimed incessantly that state court judges and juries are exceedingly 
ill-prepared to hear and decide state law class actions, especially those 
which are allegedly disputes of “national importance.”845 Moreover, class 
                                                 
843 See, e.g., Beverly Enterprises-Arkansas, Inc. v. Thomas, 259 S.W.3d 445, 451 
(Ark. 2007) (“A class action is clearly a more efficient way of handling a case where 
there is a predominating, common issue to be resolved for all 489 class members.”); 
Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 455 (Tex. 2007) (“Aggregation of 
claims in an appropriate class action is a more efficient way to resolve numerous disputes 
at once.”). 
844 See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 347 
(2005) (“State courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional challenges to local 
land-use decisions. Indeed, state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal 
courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zon-
ing and land-use regulations.”); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 449 
(2001) (“[We] concluded that both courts erred [by] failing to recognize that the state 
court was competent to hear the employee’s personal injury claim and the vessel owner’s 
claim for limitation.”); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975) (“The princi-
ple underlying Younger and Samuels is that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate 
constitutional claims, and therefore a federal court should, in all but the most exceptional 
circumstances, refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding.”); Madruga 
v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 346 U.S. 556, 560–61 (1954) (“[State courts are] ‘competent’ to 
adjudicate maritime causes of action in proceedings ‘in personam,’ [if] the defendant is a 
person [rather than] a ship or some other instrument of navigation.”) (citation omitted); 
see also California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 399, 411 (1982) (noting that the 
district court in this case was without jurisdiction unless there was no “plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy” in state court); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 528 
(1980) (finding the Illinois’ legal remedy was a “plain, speedy and efficient” remedy”). 
845 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1828 (2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“This 
[class action reform bill] is not an overwhelming antilawyer bill.... This is a bill that will 
straighten out these egregious, wrongful actions by some of these jurisdictions by putting 
these important cases in courts where it is much more likely that justice will prevail.... It 
is just that these cases will be tried in federal jurisdictions in these very prestigious feder-
al courts, as they should be because of the diversity problems that are presented by these 
cases, and it is much more likely that we will have less fraud, less unfairness, less jackpot 
justice in the federal courts.”); id. at 2643 (statement of Rep. Edward Markey) (“[H]ere it 
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action reformers have argued that forcing corporations and national insur-
ers to defend themselves and litigate “nationwide class actions” in state 
courts is inefficient and unfair, because each state court judge has to weigh 
and apply, if necessary, fifty-one different sets of substantive laws to re-
solve each dispute.846 
Perhaps class action reformers’ more cutting and contentious charges 
are these: (1) “crafty,” “abusive,” “unscrupulous,” and “profiteering” class 
action lawyers shamelessly manipulate or “game” state courts’ civil pro-
cedures and file “frivolous class actions”—which allegedly harm consum-
ers, businesses, the economy, and job creation;847 (2) “dishonest” class 
                                                                                                                         
is, ladies and gentlemen. Citigroup’s Smith Barney subdivision: ‘Tobacco. Flash—Senate 
Just Passed Class Action Bill—Positive for Tobacco.’ Let me read it to you: ‘The Senate 
just passed [a class action reform] bill, 72–26.... This bill is designated to funnel class 
action suits with plaintiffs in different States out of State courts and into the federal court 
system, which is typically much less sympathetic to such litigation. The practical effect 
of the change could be that many cases will never be heard given how overburdened 
Federal judges are, which might help limit the number of cases .... [The CAFA] is the 
final payback to the tobacco industry, to the asbestos industry, to the oil industry, to the 
chemical industry at the expense of ordinary families who need to be able to go to court 
to protect their loved ones when their health has been compromised. And these people are 
saying, your State is not smart enough, your jurors are not smart enough to understand 
how the MTBE ruined the groundwater in their state and poisoned thousands of people, 
that it has to go to a State where Amerada Hess or some large oil company feels comfort-
able.”). 
846 See Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing a 
corporate defendant “asserting that the district court abused its discretion [by] certifying a 
nationwide class ... under the laws of fifty-one jurisdictions”); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 454 (E.D. La. 2006) (regarding a corporate defendant’s claim that 
the application of the laws of fifty-one jurisdictions to the proposed class action claims 
prevented class members from satisfying the typicality, adequacy, predominance, and 
superiority requirements of Rule 23). 
847 See 151 CONG. REC. 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[W]e need to pass 
this [class action reform bill because] there are loopholes in the class action system.... [I]n 
recent years class actions have been subject to abuses that actually work to the detriment 
of individual consumers.... Additionally, this gaming of the system clearly works to the 
detriment of business and our economy and the need for job creation. We currently have 
a system, therefore, which some trial lawyers...game the system in an effort to maximize 
their fees.”); id. at 1826 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Frequently, class actions are 
the best way to compensate large groups of injured consumers. Yet, ... the financial 
reward of a settlement is so great that the class action system has attracted a small group 
of unscrupulous lawyers who will do anything, say anything, and sue anything or any-
body—not to help their clients but to line their own pockets.... A small handful of 
wealthy lawyers is profiting from the class action system.”); id. at 1809 (statement of 
Sen. John Cornyn) (“We have seen that some of these egregious abuses of the class 
action procedure have been used to make certain entrepreneurial lawyers very wealthy 
when the consumers literally get a coupon worth pennies on the dollar .... I like to think 
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action lawyers’ “sympathetic,” “friendly,” and unprincipled “accomplic-
es”—state court judges—wield enormous judicial powers, creating injus-
tice and “tilting” judicial proceedings in favor of class action lawyers;848 
and (3) “intimidating” state court judges are intentionally biased against 
out-of-state defendants and consistently violate corporate defendants’ 
fundamental rights of due process.849 Therefore, according to class action 
reformers, multinational corporations and insurers are more likely to 
“lose” class action lawsuits procedurally and on the merits in state 
courts.850 
                                                                                                                         
anybody with common sense recognizes the very real abuses that have occurred in the 
class action system.”); see also supra notes 613 and 726 and accompanying text. 
848 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2636 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) (“I rise 
in strong support of ... the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.... The crisis now threatens 
the integrity of our civil justice system and undermines the economic vitality upon which 
job creation depends.... [Among the] infamous handful of magnet courts ... the increase in 
filings now exceeds 5,000 percent. The only explanation for this phenomenon is aggres-
sive forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will act as willing 
accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases and setting policy for the 
entire country.”); id. at 2085 (statement of Sen. George Allen) (“We have heard about 
cases where lawyers shop around to find courts in particular counties that have a proven 
track record of being sympathetic to class action lawsuits with absurdly large judgments. 
When justice arbitrarily hinges on [the location of the] county in which a case is tried, 
that is not fair.”); id. at 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Over the past several 
years, we have seen a rise in the number of class action lawsuits filed in a few state courts 
known for tilting the playing field in favor of the plaintiffs’ bar ... dishonestly ... getting 
the courts to not do justice. These courts, referred to as ‘magnet courts’ for their attractive 
qualities to enterprising plaintiffs’ lawyers, certify class actions with little regard to 
defendants’ due process rights.”). 
849 See, e.g., id. at 2645 (statement of Rep. Christopher Cannon) (“[Class action law-
yers will] find a person who is the named plaintiff.... Sometimes they have to promise to 
pay off that named plaintiff at this point, but that is all part of the game.... Rule 23 is the 
rule that would apply in federal courts that defines when a class action can be certified 
consistent with fundamental fairness and due process considerations. But in this game, 
there is no fairness. There is no due process. So [class action lawyers] easily convince 
their magnet state [court] to certify ... a class.”); id. at 2081 (statement of Sen. Jeff Ses-
sions) ([T]he American Tort Reform Association [conducted a study, outlining] large 
number[s] of frivolous class actions [by counties. It also listed] judicial cultures that 
ignore basic due process and legal protections and ... [the county judges who] intimidate 
proponents of tort reform.”); id. at 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[T]rial law-
yers seek out jurisdictions in which the judge will not hesitate to approve settlements in 
which the lawyers walk away with huge fees and the plaintiff class members often get 
next to nothing. The judges in these jurisdictions will decide the claims of other State 
citizens under their unique State law. They will use litigation models that deny due pro-
cess rights to consumers and defendants.”). 
850 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2084 (statement of Sen. Mike Enzi) (“Lawsuits that 
have plaintiffs and defendants from multiple States are tried in small State courts with 
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Certainly, the empirical study discussed in this Article cannot and was 
not designed to determine whether state court judges and jurors are more 
or less competent to decide class actions than their counterparts who sit on 
the federal bench. Furthermore, the present study cannot adequately re-
solve two additional controversies: (1) whether allegedly “intimidating” 
and “hostile” state court judges conspire with supposedly “abusive” and 
“unscrupulous” class action lawyers to violate class action defendants’ 
procedural and substantive due-process rights, and (2) whether state court 
or federal court judges are more or less likely to allow politics or political 
considerations to influence their class action rulings.851 On the other hand, 
the statistical findings reported here are clear about one matter: multina-
tional insurers and other corporate defendants are exceedingly more likely 
to win class actions in both state and federal courts.852 
Moreover, the findings reveal that corporate defendants are more like-
ly to “win” large numbers of class actions regardless of whether federal 
district courts or state courts of general jurisdiction decide class actions 
procedurally or on the merits.853 But even more telling, corporate defend-
ants—rather than class complainants—are significantly more likely to win 
                                                                                                                         
known biases.... [I]n a case involving plaintiffs from Wyoming and Alabama and defend-
ants from New York and Idaho that no party [should have] the inevitable ‘home-court’ 
advantage that comes when a case is tried in your backyard.... [This bill] is a step in the 
right direction.... [I]t ensures that cases involving folks from Illinois, Arkansas, and 
Mississippi are not decided in a State court in Wyoming. These ... interstate cases ... 
should [be] decided without a home state bias that can exist in some State courts.... [This 
bill] gives the defendants in a lawsuit a chance to have their day in an impartial court.”). 
851 Cf. id. at 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[S]ome trial lawyers seeking to 
game the system in an effort to maximize their fees seek out some small jurisdiction to 
pursue nationwide [class action] cases.... Often, these suits have very little, if anything, to 
do with the place in which they are brought. Rather, lawyers select the venues for strate-
gic reasons, or for political reasons, a practice known as forum shopping.”); id. at 1831 
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (“[T]he only class of workers that will be negatively 
affected by [CAFA] is the trial lawyers who will no longer be able to bring major na-
tionwide class actions in their favorite county court.... It has long been recognized that 
Federal courts, by virtue of their independence from political pressure, provide a more 
objective, hospitable forum ... than State courts.”); id. at 1827 (statement of Sen. Orrin 
Hatch) (“Many State courts appear at times to be nothing more than rubberstamps for 
[lawyers].... This is not civil justice.... The Class Action Fairness Act would alleviate 
many of the problems present in the current class action system.... [Consumers’ class 
actions will] have to be brought in a legitimate way, in Federal court where it is much 
less likely that they will be hammered by political judges who are in cahoots with the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers in that jurisdiction. Federal courts as a general rule will adequately 
dispense justice in these matters.”). 
852 See supra Table 3. 
853 See supra Table 2. 
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the overwhelming majority of class actions in state as well as in federal 
courts of appeals.854 In fact, none of the reported statistically significant 
findings support class action reformers’ general assertion that multination-
al corporations and national insurers are substantially more likely to lose 
class actions in state courts, because purportedly “incompetent,” “intimi-
dating,” and “prejudiced” state court judges have a noticeable propensity 
to abuse out-of-state defendants’ procedural and substantive rights.855 
But let us assume that the empirical findings reported here are indis-
putable and they do not support class action reformers’ and their congres-
sional supporters’ “biased state judges” theory. Still, one might appropri-
ately ask: why should CAFA’s questionable class action removal provi-
sion generate the slightest concern among fair-minded states’ righters and 
commonsensical jurists—practitioners, judges, and legal scholars? Once 
more, under CAFA, a defendant may remove an arguably purely state law 
class action from a state trial or circuit court to a federal district court, if 
the controversy is a “case of national importance.”856 To prove that a con-
troversy has “national importance,” a defendant must establish three ele-
ments: (1) the citizenship of a single class member is different from any 
other litigant’s citizenship—“minimal jurisdiction”; (2) the class compris-
es at least 100 members; and (3) the class members’ requested damages 
exceed $5 million.857 
                                                 
854 See supra Table 3. 
855 Cf. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Weickert, 638 F. Supp. 2d 826, 829–30 
(N.D. Ohio 2009) (“The ‘Findings’ section of CAFA [states in relevant part]: ‘(4) Abuses 
in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate com-
merce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United 
States Constitution, in that State and local courts are (A) keeping cases of national im-
portance out of Federal court; (B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against 
out-of-State defendants; and (C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on 
other States and bind the rights of the residents of those States.’ CAFA § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. 
No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005). Congress went on to state that one of the purposes of 
CAFA was to ‘restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by 
providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under 
diversity jurisdiction.’ CAFA § 2(b)(2).”). 
856 See, e.g., Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 
2005); Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., 2005 WL 1799414, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005) 
(concluding that “a removing defendant bears the burden of establishing federal court 
jurisdiction and that all doubts must be resolved in favor of remand” and that CAFA did 
not alter this rule). 
857 See Weickert, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 829–30 (“Congress intended to expand federal 
diversity jurisdiction in certain qualifying class actions (those where the claim exceeds $5 
million, the class includes at least 100 plaintiffs, and minimal diversity exits [sic]). The 
‘Findings’ section of CAFA reflected this ‘national importance’: (4) Abuses in class 
actions undermine the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and 
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To be sure, an intelligible discussion of the “overbroad doctrine” under 
the Constitution is neither possible nor warranted here.858 But the proce-
dural test to establish that a class action of national importance is “over-
broad,” undermines or attacks at least two key fundamental principles of 
judicial federalism: (1) like federal judges, state court judges have the 
competence, temperament, and more importantly, common sense to pro-
tect all litigants’ basic civil and economic rights; and, (2) state courts are 
better suited to hear and decide purely state law causes of action.859 
The second principle has been seriously undermined or questioned. To 
illustrate, consider these facts. Among other claims, consumers often al-
lege that corporate defendants violate states’ anti-pollution, fair debt col-
lection, consumer protection, deceptive trade practices, employment dis-
                                                                                                                         
the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United States Con-
stitution, in that State and local courts are (A) keeping cases of national importance out of 
Federal court; (B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State 
defendants; and (C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States 
and bind the rights of the residents of those States. CAFA § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 
119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005).”); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 
531 n.7 (1967) (reiterating that Article III of the Constitution grants diversity jurisdiction 
and permits federal courts to decide cases with only “minimal diversity”—proof that just 
one party or litigant has citizenship which is different from all other parties). 
858 See generally In re FedPak Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 207, 214 (7th Cir. 1996) (question-
ing federal bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction and favoring a narrow “related to” standard “to 
prevent the expansion of federal jurisdiction over disputes that are best resolved by the 
state courts”); In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 787–88 (11th Cir. 1990) (ques-
tioning federal bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction and stating that an “overbroad construc-
tion” of “related to” jurisdiction may bring into federal court matters that should be 
decided by state courts). 
859 Cf. Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
703, 709–11 (1982) (“The broadest construction of federal question jurisdiction views 
congressional action under article I as a source of judicial power.... Congress, by virtue of 
its article I power to create a bankruptcy trustee, can confer on the federal courts jurisdic-
tion over all controversies to which the trustee is a party.... The article III approach does 
not limit the federal courts to cases in which the governing law is federal; it has long been 
held that some state law claims (even outside such areas as diversity jurisdiction) are 
properly the subject of federal jurisdiction. But the article III approach does require the 
court to identify a ‘federal interest’ at stake in the litigation of a state law claim. The 
range of permissible federal interests thus determines the breadth of federal jurisdiction. 
A broad construction of federal interests would grant ‘protective jurisdiction’ when 
Congress has enacted legislation ‘expressing a national policy in the area concerned’ .... 
But the broad article III approach is flawed by an underlying assumption that state courts 
are ill-suited to participate in a national program. That assumption is out of step with the 
Supreme Court’s growing reliance on the state courts to protect basic civil and economic 
rights. When state courts are viewed as the partners of federal courts, ‘protective jurisdic-
tion’ becomes an overbroad justification for federal jurisdiction over state law claims, the 
resolution of which is not necessary to promote federal objectives.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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crimination, and products liability statutes.860 Still other class members 
file breach-of-contract claims against sellers and vendors who sell defec-
tive goods and services within a state.861 However, in the wake of CAFA, 
                                                 
860 See, e.g., Health Group Sues McDonald’s over Happy Meal Toys, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY, Dec. 15, 2010 (“A California mother [is] ... suing McDonald’s Corp. to get 
the fast-food chain to stop using toys to market meals to young children.... They say 
McDonald’s is violating several consumer protection laws .... [L]awyers ... filed the 
lawsuit in state court in San Francisco ... [and] have asked that it be certified as a class 
action.”); Minnesota Prepares to Sue a Debt Collection Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2011, at B9, (“Minnesota’s attorney general accused the Encore Capital Group of cutting 
corners by filing ‘robo-signed’ affidavits in debt collection lawsuits, the same practice for 
which banks have come under fire in home foreclosures.... The Minnesota attorney gen-
eral, Lori Swanson, accused Encore of fraud .... Ms. Swanson wants the Ohio court to 
clarify that the proposed class-action settlement does not bar government agencies from 
pursuing similar litigation. She is seeking to file her lawsuit in a Minnesota state court.”); 
P. J. Huffstutter, Suits Against Supermarkets Advance: A Judge Certifies Two Class 
Actions Brought by Employees of Ralphs and Albertsons, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at 
B3 (“A federal judge has certified two separate class-action lawsuits against grocery 
chains Ralphs and Albertsons -- advancing a legal fight between the retailers and 9,000 
workers who contend they were illegally denied millions of dollars in [unemployment] 
benefits during the 2003–04 grocery lockout and strike.”); Dana Littlefield, Two Car 
Owners in County Sue Toyota in State Court; Lawyers Are Seeking Class-Action Status, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 27, 2010, at B1 (“A lawsuit was filed ... in state court on 
behalf of two San Diego County car owners who claim they’ve experienced the same 
problems and defects with their vehicles that led to a recent recall.... [L]awyers said the 
[class action] lawsuit was filed in Superior Court because Toyota has offices in Califor-
nia, an option that was unavailable to out-of-state plaintiffs. The attorneys said unfair-
competition laws here would be more beneficial to their clients than federal law.”); 
Mireya Navarro, Better Cleanup Is Planned at a Former Chrome Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
6, 2011, at A19 (“New Jersey officials have identified more than 160 sites ... contaminat-
ed by chromium. Most of it came from the production of coatings for machine parts and 
from chromium-laced waste used as fill material in construction in the 1950s and the 
1960s.... [A] class-action lawsuit [was] filed ... in state court against both Honeywell and 
PPG seeking compensation for landowners whose properties have been devalued and 
payments for regular medical screenings.”); Karen Robinson-Jacobs, Suits Accuse Snap-
ple of False Health Claims, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Nov. 20, 2010, at D1 (“The Plano-
based maker of Snapple faces lawsuits in California and Florida that accuse the company 
of false and misleading’ claims about the health benefits of its Acai Mixed Berry Red 
Tea.... [T]he California lawsuit ... was filed ... in federal court and seeks class-action 
status .... The Florida case [was] filed in state court [and] ... makes a similar claim.”). 
861 See, e.g., Keith Herbert, Customers Seek Class-Action Status, NEWSDAY (New 
York), Oct. 28, 2010, at A18 (“Cablevision subscribers, upset over not having Fox televi-
sion programs during the network’s fee dispute with the cable television provider, have 
begun filing class-action lawsuits that seek refunds. Five Cablevision subscribers were 
named as complainants in two separate lawsuits, one filed in state court in Nassau County 
... [They asked] that a judge approve class-action status, which allows the courts to deal 
with a large number of small claims collectively.”). 
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disgruntled consumers have filed thousands of such class actions in state 
courts, which have been removed to federal district courts.862 Moreover, 
even if one uses a conservative and rough estimate, an examination of pre- 
and post-CAFA reported cases suggests that nearly ninety percent of the 
class actions filed in state courts could qualify as “disputes of national 
importance.”863 
Thus, in view of the empirical findings reported in this Article, Con-
gress fashioned and enacted an extremely “overbroad” class action remov-
al provision, and Congress achieved that end by embracing class action 
reformers’ uninformed arguments which have no sound foundation in fact 
or in law.864 As of this writing, there are 94 federal district courts,865 and 
approximately 2,177 state trial courts of general jurisdiction.866 Even more 
significantly, there are about 10,387 trial judges who try cases in state 
                                                 
862 See Christopher Chorba et al., Year-End Update on Class Actions: Explosive 
Growth in Class Actions Continues Despite Mounting Obstacles to Certification, GIBSON 
DUNN (Feb. 10, 2009) http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/Year-EndUpdate 
OnClassActions.aspx (“The number of class actions has grown exponentially in recent 
years. Although reliable numbers are hard to come by, Federal Judicial Center statistics 
suggest that new class action cases filed in or removed to federal court increased 72% 
between 2001 and 2007, reaching approximately 4,000 to 5,000 annually as of mid-2007 
(the last period for which data are available). This represents more than a dozen new 
lawsuits every day. And while the Class Action Fairness Act (‘CAFA’) has shifted many 
putative nationwide class actions from the state to the federal system, ... class action 
lawyers ... report that state court class action activity in many courts has not diminished. 
CAFA has prompted a flurry of single-state class actions filed in state courts, and recent 
statistics show that in at least one forum favored by the plaintiffs’ bar (Los Angeles), 
state class action filings continue to grow.” (footnotes omitted)). 
863 The author searched Westlaw’s ALLSTATES database and submitted the following 
query on June 21, 2011: sy(“class action” /p damages) & da(aft December 21, 1989). 
That submission generated 535 cases. Later, the author executed the Westlaw’s “locate 
command,” looking for the following words or phrases in each case: “class size,” mil-
lion, size, damages, and large. The statement appearing in the text is based on a twenty-
five percent sampling of the reported, state law cases. 
864 See 151 CONG. REC. 2651–52 (2005) (statement of Rep. Mark Udall). 
865 See BNA’S DIRECTORY OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, JUDGES, AND CLERKS 1 
(2011). 
866 See generally id. at xvii. State trial courts of general jurisdiction appear under var-
ious headings—circuit courts, commonwealth courts, courts of common pleas, district 
courts, superior courts, and supreme court in New York. Id. For each state, the author 
reviewed and added the statistics appearing under the heading “Court Structure as of 
Fiscal Year 2007.” Id. “The Directory contains listings for courts of record, which are the 
top three courts levels; the limited-jurisdiction trial courts are not included. The court 
structure charts are included in order to provide a view of the entire court structure of a 
state.” Id. Thus, total number appearing in the text is a fair approximation. Id. 
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courts.867 Consequently, the implicit message that CAFA’s removal provi-
sion communicates is resoundingly clear: year in and year out, ninety-four 
federal district courts’ judges—rather than ten thousand-plus state trial-
court judges—are decidedly more efficient, more impartial, and intellectu-
ally more talented to adjudicate thousands of purely state law class actions 
in a timely manner.868 
In addition, contrary to what some class action reformers have pro-
claimed, the prevailing view is that the ninety-four federal district courts 
are already overburdened.869 And, although reasonable minds may differ, 
there is general agreement about another matter: CAFA’s “class actions of 
national importance” removal test is an easy-to-satisfy standard and it is 
likely to exacerbate federal district courts’ overload problems by produc-
ing a massive backlog of cases.870 Thus, the author embraces the current 
                                                 
867 BNA’S DIRECTORY, supra 865, at xvii. 
868 151 CONG. REC. 1828 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
869 See, e.g., id. at 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“I have heard some oppo-
nents ... argue that the Class Action Fairness Act will somehow result in a delay or even a 
denial of justice to consumers. They have argued that state courts resolve claims more 
quickly, and that removing these actions will result in the overburdening of our federal 
courts. I have yet to see or hear a single shred of persuasive evidence to support these 
claims. In fact, according to the data, a strong case in the opposite direction can be made. 
According to two separate examinations of the state and federal court systems conducted 
by the Court Statistics Project and Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the average 
state court judge is assigned nearly three times—nearly three times—as many cases as a 
federal court judge. The increase of State court class actions further compounds this 
burden and interferes with the ability of the state court judges to provide justice to their 
citizens.”). But see id. at 2079 (statement of Sen. Tom Carper) (“Finally ... [when] shift-
ing some class action litigation of a national scope [to federal district courts] ... [we need 
to be sure that] we do not overburden the already busy Federal judiciary.”). 
870 Cf. id. at 2653 (statement of Rep. Joe Baca) (“[CAFA] will send the majority of 
class action suits from State to Federal courts, making it more difficult for people who 
have been unfairly hurt to collect compensation for their injuries.”); id. at 2651–52 
(statement of Rep. Mark Udall) (“Mr. Speaker, one of the most important rights we have 
as Americans is the ability to seek redress from the courts when we believe our rights 
have been abridged or we have been improperly treated. And, when a complaint arises 
under a State law, it is both appropriate and desirable that it be heard in State court be-
cause those are the most convenient and with the best understanding of State laws and 
local conditions. Of course, it is appropriate to provide for removing some State cases to 
Federal courts. But I think that should be more the exception than the rule, and I think 
this bill tends to reverse that. I think it excessively tilts the balance between the States 
and the Federal government so as to throw too many cases into already-overburdened 
Federal courts—with the predictable result that too many will be dismissed.”); id. at 1657 
(statement of Sen. Russell Feingold) (“A particularly troubling result of this bill will be 
an increase in the workload of the Federal courts. We all know these courts are already 
overloaded.... The Congress has led the way in bringing more and more litigation to the 
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conventional wisdom that allowing corporate defendants to remove thou-
sands of purely state law class actions to already-overburdened federal 
district courts will decrease those tribunals’ likelihood of hearing and 
deciding so-called “class actions of national importance” judicially, me-
ticulously, efficiently, impartially, and in a timely manner.871 
Before closing, one additional point needs emphasis. Even assuming 
that state and federal courts will be able to secure adequate resources to 
hear and decide efficiently and timely all types of class actions, one prob-
lem still remains. As reported earlier, the types of state law and federal 
theories of recoveries appearing in class members’ pleadings influence 
states’ as well as federal courts’ disposition of class actions.872 In particu-
lar, class action litigants’ likelihood of prevailing or losing is based on (1) 
whether consumer protection claims or securities violation claims form the 
basis of complainants’ class actions, and (2) whether breach-of-contract 
claims or tort-based allegations formed the basis of class members’ com-
plaints.873 
The present study, however, also uncovered some debatably unsettling 
findings. Again, class members and defendants are substantially more 
likely to “win” or “lose” when state and federal judges intentionally or 
unintentionally allow arguably impermissible or extralegal variables to 
influence the disposition of class actions.874 For example, class members 
and defendants are likely to “win” or “lose” class actions procedurally or 
on the merits depending on: (1) whether complainants filed class actions 
in courts located in the western region or in the southern region of the 
country, (2) whether racial minorities filed class actions in federal district 
courts or in state trial courts, (3) whether the Fifth Circuit or the Fourth 
Circuit resolved substantive and procedural class action issues on appeal, 
and (4) whether the Seventh Circuit or the Eleventh Circuit resolved class 
action questions of law and fact on appeal.875 
Certainly, after a painstaking review of the common law as well as 
state and federal statutes, one would be hard-pressed to find any statement 
                                                                                                                         
Federal courts ....”); id. at 1649 (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from Fifteen 
State Attorneys Generals) (“[B]y transferring most state court class actions to an already 
overburdened federal court system, this [Act] will delay (if not deny) justice [for] a 
substantial number of injured citizens.”). 
871 See 151 CONG. REC. 2653 (statement of Rep. Joe Baca); id. at 2651–52 (statement 
of Rep. Mark Udall); id. at 1657 (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold); id. at 1649 (Letter 
to the Majority and Minority Leaders from Fifteen State Attorneys General). 
872 See supra Table 3. 
873 See supra Table 5. 
874 See, e.g., supra Table 3 and Table 5. 
875 See supra Table 1 and Table 3. 
562 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:419 
 
suggesting that a particular theory of recovery is more or less likely to 
influence or predict the disposition of class actions. The absence of such a 
finding is neither good nor bad, neither expected nor unexpected. Of 
course, one’s discovering that certain theories of recovery have fairly 
strong “predictive power” might be enlightening or even useful for some 
lawyers who commence class actions, or defend corporate clients against 
class actions in state and federal courts. Contrarily, upon carefully examin-
ing state and federal laws, one also would have to search extensively and 
diligently to find any intelligible reasons to explain federal and state judg-
es’ propensity to allow any extralegal factors—ethnicity, politic, occupa-
tion, years of education, gender or geography—to influence the disposi-
tion of class actions. Simply put, federal and state laws do not predict such 
outcomes and such statistically significant findings should not appear 
among otherwise competent and impartial federal and state judges’ class 
action declarations, motions, judgments, or jury charges. Yet, in the pre-
sent study, such influences are clearly evident.876 
Again, the doctrines of comity, finality, and federalism evolved for 
important reasons.877 In part, they are designed to ensure “harmonious 
state-federal relations”878 and to create efficient federal and state judiciar-
ies—which will conserve precious judicial resources, decide cases in a 
timely manner and award appropriate remedies.879 Second, “federal courts 
                                                 
876 See, e.g., supra Table 3, infra Table A. 
877 See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) (concluding that the stat-
ute’s purpose “further[s] comity, finality, and federalism” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (reiterating that 
the purpose of the federal statute is “to further the principles of comity, finality, and 
federalism” (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 436)); Williams, 529 U.S. at 436 (recognizing 
that the purpose of the federal statutes is “to further the principles of comity, finality, and 
federalism.”); Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 586 
(1995) (“We have long recognized that principles of federalism and comity generally 
counsel that [federal] courts should adopt a hands-off approach with respect to state tax 
administration.”). 
878 See Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 67 (1948) (Frankfurter) 
(“[A] close observation of the limitation upon the Court is not ... a strangling technicality. 
History bears ample testimony that it is an important factor in securing harmonious State-
federal relations.”). 
879 See Panetti v. Quarterman, No. 06-6407, slip op. 1, 12 (U.S. June 28, 2007); see 
also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06 (2006) (“The AEDPA statute of limita-
tion promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the 
accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions 
while the record is fresh, and lends finality to state court judgments within a reasonable 
time.” (quoting Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000))); Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 49 n.7 (1987) (“The goals of finality would be frustrated, rather 
than furthered, by these wasteful and time-consuming procedures. Based on the unusual 
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are courts of limited jurisdiction.”880 Their power to hear and decide fed-
eral or state law controversies is constrained.881 Furthermore, more than a 
century and a half ago, the Supreme Court stressed that the “efficient ad-
ministration of judicial power” is paramount882 when division-of-labor 
decisions are made about allocating cases for hearings in federal and state 
courts, or when one fashions a system to manage federal or state courts’ 
finances and bureaucracies.883 
Thus, in light of these fundamental principles and acknowledging that 
state court judges have the expertise and temperament to fashion “plain, 
speedy and efficient” remedies, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld 
state judges’ authority to hear and decide various actions involving both 
                                                                                                                         
facts of this case, the justifications for the finality doctrine—efficiency, judicial restraint, 
and federalism—would be ill served by another round of litigation on an issue that has 
been authoritatively decided by the highest state court.” (citing Radio Station WOW, Inc. 
v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945))); Radio Station WOW, 326 U.S. at 123–24 (“Since 
its establishment, it has been a marked characteristic of the federal judicial system not to 
permit an appeal until a litigation has been concluded in the court of first instance.... This 
requirement has the support of considerations generally applicable to good judicial ad-
ministration. It avoids the mischief of economic waste and of delayed justice. Only in 
very few situations, where intermediate rulings may carry serious public consequences, 
has there been a departure from this requirement of finality for federal appellate jurisdic-
tion”). 
880 See Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 160 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t was cer-
tainly fair to have had the purely Texas state law claims heard in Texas state court, and 
there is nothing to indicate that either party would have been prejudiced by a remand to 
Texas state court.... [C]omity demands that the ‘important interests of federalism and 
comity’ be respected by federal courts, which are courts of limited jurisdiction and ‘not 
as well equipped for determinations of state law as are state courts.’” (quoting Parker & 
Parsley Petrol. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 588 (5th Cir. 1992))); Durant, Nich-
ols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack 
the power to disregard such limits as have been imposed by the Constitution or Con-
gress.”). 
881 See Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160; Durant, 565 F.3d at 62. 
882 See Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. 583, 594 (1857) (noting “that the question presented 
... is not a new question [or] determinable upon any novel principle” and stressing that the 
application of a “just and equal” principle resolved without undermining the “efficient 
administration of the judicial power”). 
883 Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 389 n.15 (1989) (“[T]he Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts handles the administrative and personnel matters 
of the courts, matters essential to the effective and efficient operation of the judicial 
system [and that] Congress also has established the Federal Judicial Center which studies 
improvements in judicial administration.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1982 ed. & Supp. 
IV1982))). 
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state and federal law disputes.884 Class actions are included among the 
list.885 However, CAFA’s “cases of national importance” removal clause 
is arguably an overbroad and unfair procedural tool that undermines 
states’ rights as well as consumers’ right to obtain timely and fair hearings 
in state courts.886 Quite simply, class action defendants must satisfy only 
                                                 
884 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039–40 (1983) (stressing that the 
Court’s examining “generally unfamiliar” state laws as well as a vacation and a continu-
ance for clarification were unsatisfactory because the process would create “delay and 
decrease in [the] efficiency of judicial administration” (quoting Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 
143 (1952))); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 411 (1982) (concluding 
that “a state-court remedy is ‘plain, speedy and efficient’” if it gives the litigant “a ‘full 
hearing and judicial determination,’” which allows the litigant to “raise any and all con-
stitutional objections” (citing Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981))); 
Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 528 (“Illinois’ legal remedy that provides property owners paying 
property taxes under protest a refund without interest in two years is a ‘plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy’ under the Tax Injunction Act.”); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Krog-
er, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978) (observing that the plaintiff voluntarily chose to commence 
a suit in federal court that involves a state law claim and stressing that “[a] plaintiff 
cannot complain if ancillary jurisdiction does not encompass all of his possible claim ... 
since it is he who has chosen the federal rather than the state forum,” and concluding that 
“the efficiency that plaintiff [wanted] so avidly [was] available without question in the 
state courts” (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th 
Cir. 1972))). But see Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 390 
(1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“If state law is simply indeterminate, the concerns of 
comity and federalism ... do not come into play. At the same time, the federal courts have 
direct interests in ensuring that their resources are used efficiently ... as well as in ensur-
ing that parties asserting federal rights have an adequate opportunity to litigate those 
rights. Given the insubstantiality of the state interests and the weight of the federal inter-
ests, a strong argument could be made that a federal rule would be more appropriate than 
a creative interpretation of ambiguous state law.” (footnote omitted)). 
885 151 CONG. REC. 2652–53 (2005) (statement of Rep. Bill Delahunt). 
886 See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two 
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 1217, 1245 (2008) (“Defendants need not do much to remove a case from state to 
federal court. Removal is one of the very few procedural tools that a party ... [may] use: 
the defendant files a notice of removal, not a motion to remove.... [T]he notice must 
contain ‘a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.’” (footnote omitted)); see 
also 151 CONG. REC. 2652–53 (statement of Rep. Bill Delahunt) (“Mr. Speaker, we have 
before us a bill that would sweep aside generations of State laws that protect consumers. 
Citizens will be denied their basic right to use their own State courts to file class action 
lawsuits against companies—even if there are clear violations of State [laws].... [This bill 
is] the latest in a series of assaults on States’ rights to provide legal remedies for harm 
suffered by their citizens.”); id. at 2646 (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt) (“This bill ... 
will effectively undermine the utility, practicality, and choice the class action mechanism 
has offered to injured persons with legitimate claims against powerful entities.... [And 
suddenly, why do] my States rights friends believe that the Federal courts and the Federal 
Government can solve every problem in our society? That is just simply absurd, incon-
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three exceedingly easy-to-prove “numerical elements” to establish a class 
action of national importance.887 As a consequence, they may remove an 
inordinate number of truly substantive state law actions to federal 
courts.888 
But even more importantly, allowing corporate defendants and others 
to remove such large numbers of state law class actions to federal courts is 
statistically and economically irrational.889 Why? Again, the current em-
pirical findings disclose that class actions reformers’ submitted reasons for 
wanting to enact the removal statute never existed.890 “Long-overdue” 
class action reforms were not warranted, because allegedly “incompetent,” 
“biased,” and “intimidating” state court judges do not have a long history 
of deciding class action controversies overwhelmingly against defend-
ants.891 In fact, the opposite is true.892 To repeat, class action plaintiffs are 
substantially more likely to lose procedurally and on the merits in state 
trial and appellate courts, as well as in federal district and appellate 
courts.893 Furthermore, multinational corporations and national insurers 
have a long history of filing “truly substantive national class actions” 
                                                                                                                         
sistent with any kind of consistent philosophy about federalism.”); id. at 2090 (statement 
of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“[This reform will] make it harder for American citizens to pro-
tect themselves against violation of State civil rights, consumer, health, environmental 
protection laws, to take these cases to State court.... These courthouses have experience 
with the legal and factual issues within their States.... Cynics might even speculate 
that...the business groups [who are] behind this purported ‘procedural’ change are really 
seeking the dismissal of meritorious cases on procedural grounds by the federal courts.... 
Anyone who reads this bill will notice that ... it affects more than just class actions. 
Individual actions, consolidated by state courts for efficiency purposes, are not class 
actions.... Federalizing these individual cases will no doubt delay, and possibly deny, 
justice for victims suffering real injuries.”). 
887 Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1202–03 (11th Cir. 2007). 
888 151 CONG. REC. 2090 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
889 Id. at 2646 (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt). 
890 See supra Table 4. 
891 See 151 CONG. REC. 2095 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“[T]o my col-
leagues who are strong opponents of all of this ... [CAFA] is a simple matter of court 
reform.... It is long overdue.”); id. at 2076 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham) (“I agreed 
to support [CAFA] some time ago because I believe we are long overdue for reform in 
the class action area.”); id. at 2072 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[CAFA] is long 
overdue.... Time and again, it has been said by parties on all sides that class actions have 
a proper place in the legal system. This bill is a modest effort to swing the pendulum back 
toward common sense, making the system work as it was intended.”). 
892 See supra Table 2. 
893 See supra Table 2. 
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against other corporations in state courts—where judges are supposedly 
highly “prejudiced,” “inept,” and “dishonest.”894 
Finally, in the course of researching this Article, the author uncovered 
an unexpected finding: CAFA’s jurisdictional and removal provisions 
have begun to generate serious intra-circuit and inter-circuit conflicts 
among federal courts over the interpretation of “jurisdictional amount” 
and over the extent of federal courts’ authority to remove and remand 
purely substantive state law class actions.895 Read more broadly, these 
                                                 
894 See, e.g., Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 969 P.2d 337, 340 (Okla. 1998) 
(“Black Hawk Oil Company, brought a class action ... for itself and others similarly 
situated against Exxon Corporation, Oryx Energy Company, and many others as defend-
ants. [Black Hawk sought] damages in both contract and tort for defendants’ failure to 
pay for the slop oil the Plant operators collected.”); Canal Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Budget 
Plan, Inc., 41 So. 3d 375, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reporting a case in which three 
premium finance companies filed a class action suit against Canal Insurance Company 
and Canal Indemnity Company, asking for a declaration of rights and presenting a 
breach-of-contract claim.); Tunica Pharmacy, Inc. v. Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
2010 WL 4116964, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“Business Pro Communica-
tions, Inc., an Illinois corporation, filed a class action complaint against Express Products 
in the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois.... [claiming] that Express Prod-
ucts ... violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 227, and 
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
505/2, and had committed common-law conversion of fax paper, toner, fax memory, and 
valuable time by sending unsolicited fax advertisements to businesses nationwide.”); 
Myron Corp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Corp., 970 A.2d 1083, 1085 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2009) (“Stonecrafters, Inc., an Illinois corporation, filed a class action complaint against 
Myron in Illinois state court,” alleging that Myron violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud 
and Deceptive Business Practices Act and committed common-law conversion.); Holiday 
Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (consider-
ing a case in which a marketing company commenced a class action against computer 
memory chip company, alleging that the latter violated the Cartwright Act and unfair 
competition law by engaging in allegedly anticompetitive conduct in connection with 
patents and licensing.); Paragon Networks, Int’l v. Macola, Inc., 1999 WL 280385, *1 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“Paragon, a Delaware corporation, filed a class action complaint in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County against Macola, an Ohio corporation that 
develops and supplies computer software,” alleging that Macola breached an express 
warranty and induced Paragon and other members of the class to purchase software based 
on Macola’s false and misleading representations.). 
895 Compare Yocham v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 2007 WL 2318493, at *3 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 13, 2007) (failing to find with a legal certainty that the amount in controversy had 
been met), Dent v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 2007 WL 1797653, at *7 (D.N.J. June 20, 
2007) (concluding that a defendant must show with legal certainty that the amount in 
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold), and Lamond v. Pepsico, Inc., 2007 WL 
1695401, at *3–5 (D.N.J. June 8, 2007) (noting the “confusion” surrounding the nature of 
defendant’s burden, and concluding that the defendants must prove with legal certainty 
that the requisite amount-in-controversy element has been satisfied), with Lowery v. Ala. 
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conflicts arguably call into question (1) whether CAFA’s removal provi-
sion undermines “harmonious state-federal relations,” respect for state 
court judges’ competence in particular and judicial federalism general-
ly,896 (2) whether CAFA’s removal provision is too broad,897 and (3) whet-
                                                                                                                         
Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the removing party 
bears the burden of establishing the jurisdictional amount has been met by a preponder-
ance of the evidence), Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc., 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (stressing that a defendant “seeking removal must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.” (quoting Abrego 
Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006))), and Home Depot, 
Inc. v. Rickher, 2006 WL 1727749, at *1 (7th Cir. May 22, 2006) (concluding that the 
removing litigant must establish with reasonable probability that the amount-in-
controversy requirement has been satisfied (quoting Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, 
Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005))); see also In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 
2009 WL 4067266, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Defendants removed the [class action] from 
New Jersey state court to the [federal district court] ... based on 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) and 
77p(c), and alternatively [on] 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the Class Action Fairness 
Act .... [The class representative] argues that [we] should remand the [class action] be-
cause [this] Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. According to [the representa-
tive], the 1933 [Securities] Act prohibits the removal of 1933 Act claims from state court 
to federal court and [the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998’s (SLUSA) 
amendments] ... do not change the anti-removal provisions.... SLUSA targets state class 
actions alleging false and misleading statements under state law, and those actions are 
removable. On the other hand, state class actions alleging only 1933 Act violations are 
still within the warm embrace of the antiremoval provisions of the 1933 Act. Nothing in 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 alters this result.... There is conflicting authority on 
whether SLUSA eliminates state court jurisdiction over state class actions asserting 1933 
Act claims.”); Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“District 
courts are divided [over] whether the anti-removal provision, as amended by SLUSA, 
allows for removal of covered class actions raising only 1933 [Securities] Act claims.”). 
896 Cf. Breakman v. AOL LLC, 545 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[Since] sig-
nificant federalism concerns [are] involved, this court strictly construes the scope of its 
removal jurisdiction.” (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107–09 
(1941))); Strawn v. AT&T Mobility, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) 
(noting that “removal statutes must be construed in light of the federalism concerns that 
animate the policy of strictly confining federal jurisdiction within the congressionally-set 
limits” (citing Sheets, 313 U.S. at 108–09)); Lowery v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 460 F. 
Supp. 2d 1288, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (“While CAFA admittedly broadens federal re-
moval jurisdiction, it does not unanchor the federal courts from the basic principle of 
federalism that requires the construction of removal statutes against a removing defend-
ant.”). 
897 Cf. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (con-
cluding that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and possess jurisdiction to 
hear a particular case only if a statute or the Constitution authorizes a hearing); Eufaula 
Drugs, Inc. v. Tmesys, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (reaffirming 
that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and that “removal statutes are 
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her federal courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over certain 
state law class actions because the phrase “national importance” is too 
ambiguous.898 Perhaps, if and when one of these inter-circuit removal-and-
jurisdictional conflicts reaches the Supreme Court in the not too distant 
future, that esteemed body will conclude what the research and empirical 
findings in this Article strongly suggest: (1) CAFA’s highly questionable 
removal and jurisdictional rules evolved from untruths or just plain fabri-
cations, and (2) the new rules undermine principles of judicial federalism. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court or, preferably, a new and more enlightened 
Congress, needs to restore some balance. 
APPENDIX 
A Comparison of Non-Class Action and Class Action Litigants in State 
and Federal Courts, 1925–2011 (N = 2,657) 
The entire database (N=2,657) for this study comprised both class ac-
tion and non-class action cases. Necessarily, to test whether courts permit 
extralegal factors to determine outcomes in class action cases and to test 
for “selectivity bias” in the sample of cases, the author had to consider 
courts’ dispositions of non-class action cases, too. Thus, it is important to 
consider some of the statistics in Table A—which illustrates a number of 
demographic attributes for litigants who were parties in non-class action 
(ordinary) and class action lawsuits. Here, only the most relevant percent-
ages are highlighted: 
                                                                                                                         
construed narrowly” (citing Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 
1994))). 
898 Cf. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f federal 
jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand to state court is necessary.” (quoting Mulcahey v. 
Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994))); In re Bus. Men’s 
Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993); Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray & 
Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1087–88 (D.N.D. 2006) (“Following removal of a case to 
federal court, a plaintiff can seek remand of the action back to state court. Removal 
statutes are strictly construed in favor of state court jurisdiction and federal district courts 
must resolve all doubts concerning removal in favor of remand.” (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c))); Johnson-Brown v. 2200 M Street LLC, 257 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D.D.C. 
2003) (stressing that federal courts “must resolve any ambiguities concerning the proprie-
ty of removal in favor of remand” (citing Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 
405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999))). 
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TABLE A 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-CLASS ACTION AND CLASS 
ACTION LAWSUITS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 1925–2011 
(N = 2657) 
Demographics Non-Class Action Suits  (N = 1833)  Class Action Suits  (N = 824) 
 Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
  
Jurisdiction:  
Federal Cases 957 52.2 417 50.6 
State Cases 876 47.8 407 49.4 
  
Tribunals:  
Trial & District Courts 397 21.7 303 36.7*** 
Appellate Courts 913 49.9 378 45.9 
Supreme Courts 520 28.4 *** 143 17.4 
       
Region of Country:  
East  451 24.6 228 27.7 
Midwest 525 28.6 203 24.6 
South 285 15.5 182 22.1*** 
Southwest 198 11.0 109 13.2 
West 365 20.0 *** 102 12.4 
  
Litigant’s Ethnicity:  
Diverse Groups  672 36.6 716 86.9 
Anglo-American, only 987 53.9 23 2.8 
African-American, only 99 5.4 47 5.7 
Mexican-American, only 14 0.8 5 0.6 
Other Minorities 61 3.3 33 4.0 
  
Primary Defendants:  
Insurers  1725 94.1 402  48.7 
Corporations 108 5.9 200 24.3 
Public Entities & Others ___ ___ 222 27.0 
  
Plaintiffs’ “Favorable”       
Outcomes by Courts:       
All Trial/District Courts 773 42.2 349 42.4 
All Appellate Courts 554 47.3 221 42.6 
All Supreme Courts 285 54.0 ** 62 43.7** 
  
Defendants’ “Favorable”       
Outcomes by Courts:       
All Trial/District Courts 1060 57.8 475 57.6 
All Appellate Courts 618 52.7 298 57.4 
All Supreme Courts 243 46.0 ** 80 56.3** 
  
*** Chi square test statistically significant at p # 0.0001 
** Chi square test statistically significant at p # 0.02 
  
First, a review of the “Jurisdiction” variable and corresponding per-
centages indicates that the proportional-stratified-random sampling pro-
duced nearly identical numbers of federal and state cases within each 
broad category of litigants. Among non-class action cases, the percentages 
for federal and state cases are 52.2% and 47.8%, respectively; and, among 
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class action cases, the respective percentages for federal and state cases 
are 50.6% and 49.4%.899 
The variable “Region of Country” reveals that nearly equal propor-
tions of ordinary cases and class action cases were litigated in similar 
regions of the Unites States.900 However, the variable labeled “Tribunal” 
illustrates the types of courts in which each case terminated or was decid-
ed ultimately.901 Those percentages show some significant differences 
between the groups. Among both regular and class action cases, the “final-
ity” for the greater majority cases occurred in appellate courts.902 The 
reported percentages are 49.9% and 45.9%, respectively.903 On the other 
hand, among the class action cases, 36.7% terminated in a trial or federal 
district court.904 But 21.7% of the regular cases ended in a trial or district 
court.905 These findings lend some credence to a prevailing argument that 
class actions are generally more difficult to litigate and win than regular 
lawsuits, because class complainants must face and overcome a substantial 
number of procedural hurdles even before a trial on the merits occurs. 
Without doubt, the two most important variables appearing in Table A 
are “Plaintiffs’ Favorable Outcomes by Courts” and “Defendants’ Favora-
ble Outcomes by Courts.” Consider the former variable. A comparison of 
regular and class action cases shows that aggrieved plaintiffs are likely to 
win nearly equal percentages of cases in trial/district courts—42.2% ver-
sus 42.4%.906 Also, fairly equal percentages of regular and class action 
plaintiffs prevailed in appellate courts—47.3% versus 42.6%.907 On the 
other hand, while 54.0% of plaintiffs won regular suits in state supreme 
courts, a lesser percentage (43.7%) of class action plaintiffs won in su-
preme courts.908 
Now, consider the next variable “Defendants’ Favorable Outcomes by 
Courts” and the corresponding percentages. Right away, we learn two 
important facts. First, a comparison of regular and class action cases 
shows that defendants are likely to win nearly equal percentages of cases 
in trial/district courts—57.8% versus 57.6%.909 An examination of de-
                                                 
899 See supra Table A. 
900 See supra Table A. 
901 See supra Table A. 
902 See supra Table A. 
903 See supra Table A. 
904 See supra Table A. 
905 See supra Table A. 
906 See supra Table A. 
907 See supra Table A. 
908 See supra Table A. 
909 See supra Table A. 
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fendants’ appellate-court wins among non-class action and class action 
cases shows very similar results. The percentages are 52.7% and 57.4%, 
respectively.910 Second, as the last row of percentages in Table A shows, 
56.3% of the defendants prevailed in class actions which were decided 
ultimately in various supreme courts; however, multinational corporate 
entities and insurers’ success rate in various supreme courts was less 
(46.0%) when those entities were defendants in non-class action law-
suits.911 
Finally when comparing all defendants’ outcomes to all plaintiffs’ out-
comes, defending corporate entities and insurers are significantly more 
likely to win the majority of all lawsuits—regardless of whether the ac-
tions were regular actions or class action lawsuits.912 Generally, across the 
various courts, plaintiffs’ and defendants’ aggregate successes are 45.4% 
and 54.6%, respectively.913 Please note: two percentages were computed 
(1) by adding all of the “Plaintiffs’ Favorable Outcomes” percentages and 
dividing by six, and (2) by adding all of the “Defendants’ Favorable Out-
comes” percentages and dividing by six. 
                                                 
910 See supra Table A. 
911 See supra Table A. 
912 See supra Table A. 
913 See supra Table A. 
